Posted on March 31, 2015
Way back around the turn of the decade from the ‘70s to the ‘80s I was invited by the International Joint Commission to attend a conference in Montreal to discuss whether the Canadians should adopt a statute similar to the Toxics Substances Control Act of 1976 (“TSCA”). The IJC is a largely advisory US-Canadian body whose primary area of interest is the Great Lakes. Also on that delegation was the principal author of the text of TSCA, Clarence (“Terry”) Davies. I did not win many friends on that trip when I argued that TSCA took the wrong approach to regulating chemicals in the stream of commerce and in the environment primarily because it used an inappropriate cost-benefit premised standard of review. I also argued that TSCA’s standards were simultaneously too vague and too complex. I suggested that the Canadians start afresh.
In the years following, Congress ignored repeated calls for significant amendment or replacement of TSCA, including a chorus of suggestions that it be replaced by a statute resembling the European Community’s chemical regulatory regime, REACH. In the meantime, EPA soldiered along, trying to make the best of enforcing an antiquated and fundamentally flawed regulatory statute.
Now after all these years we have two competing bills in the Senate, each of which purports to “reform” TSCA. On the one hand we have S.697, the “Frank R. Lautenberg Chemical Safety for the 21st Century Act”, an allegedly “bipartisan” effort co-sponsored by Senators Mark Udall (D-N.M.) and David Vitter (R-La.), the first hearing on which was held on March 18th. And from another corner, we have S.725, the “Alan Reinstein and Trevor Schaefer Toxic Chemical Protection Act”, co-sponsored by Senators Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) and Ed Markey (D.Mass.). At about 175 legislative pages, these bills aren’t capable of being thoroughly analyzed in a blog.
The Udall bill is tepidly supported by the chemical industry and by at least one environmental group, the Environmental Defense Fund. It is opposed by some other environmental and public safety advocacy groups. It would pre-empt state chemical regulatory programs like California’s Proposition 65 and other state-run chemical regulatory programs in California and Washington. The Boxer bill, predictably, because its principal sponsor is from California, preserves state programs. Both bills in one degree or another attempt to address the core problems with TSCA by changing the standard of review to a risk-based standard, overhauling and strengthening EPA’s information gathering authority on hazard, exposure and use data, and prioritizing chemicals for review. The Udall bill throws a bone to the chemical industry by exempting a wide variety of chemicals considered to be of low exposure potential or low risk.
I confess that, although I am not a policy wonk, I have an interest in these bills partly because if either — or a significant element of either — is enacted into law I will have to re-write an entire chapter of The Law of Chemical Regulation and Hazardous Waste. My guess is that, given Congress’s track record of doing little or nothing over the last few years, I won’t have to worry about getting writer’s cramp any time soon.
Posted on March 30, 2015
It may come as a surprise that people fight over water in soggy Oregon and Washington. To be sure, we have not experienced the same level of conflict over competing water needs as our neighbors in the southwest, but in fact the conflicts are there and the stakes are high.
Most senior water rights in the Pacific Northwest are held by agriculture, whereas the growth in demand for water is occurring in the municipal and industrial sectors . . . and at last check, fish still need flowing streams. Add to that dynamic a declining hydrograph due to climate change, and the table is set for confrontation.
Two recent cases in the Oregon Court of Appeals and a case in the Washington Supreme Court that address municipal water rights illustrate the point. A more complete discussion of these cases is in the current issue of The Water Report.
The Oregon cases arise from a 2005 statute providing special rules for extensions of time to complete development of municipal water supplies. The caption for both cases is WaterWatch of Oregon v. Water Resources Department, but one involves the City of Cottage Grove and the other a group of Clackamas River water providers. The 2005 statute provides that for the first municipal extension granted after enactment of the statute, “fish persistence” conditions must be applied to the “undeveloped portion” of the city’s water system.
By the time Cottage Grove’s extension application was considered, the city had completed work on its water system. The Oregon Water Resources Department found no “undeveloped portion” and therefore imposed no fish persistence requirements. The court overturned the extension, finding that the fish conditions must relate back to the previous extension in 1999.
The Oregon Supreme Court initially accepted review of the case, but then without explanation declared that review was “improvidently” granted and dismissed it. Thus, the case stands; legislative corrections may be forthcoming. For the moment, Cottage Grove and other similarly situated public water providers may have less water than they previously thought due to fish flow curtailments and may incur unbudgeted additional public expense.
In the Clackamas case, the court found the “fish persistence” conditions were inadequate because OWRD failed to articulate how the conditions actually protected fish. The case is now back before OWRD for further proceedings.
In Cornelius v. Washington State University, the Supreme Court came to a happier conclusion for public water providers. The issue was whether university groundwater rights identified as for “domestic” purposes were entitled to special protections afforded only to municipal purposes. The Court unequivocally held they are.
The economies of our region depend on the courts getting it right with respect to municipal water supplies. Washington public water providers can rest easier than their counterparts in Oregon after their state courts’ recent pronouncements.
Posted on March 25, 2015
Those who have tried to keep up with the development of environmental law into the second decade of the 21st century will not be surprised, as others may be, by the attention now focused on reuse of soil. Uncounted millions of cubic yards of soil are moved each year in the New England region alone. Until very recently, in the absence of contamination above regulatory remediation standards, the excavation and reuse of soils was not subject to any environmental regulation at all.
Now with the pace of national economic activity rising, soil reuse is drawing the focused attention of State regulators in the northeast region and across the nation. EBC Nov 6, 2014 program. In particular, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Vermont are all currently considering how to regulate soil reuse. In 2014, Massachusetts adopted a requirement for the development of a soil reuse policy by June 2015 and that effort is well underway.
While New Hampshire relies on a broad definition of “contamination,” it recognizes it lacks explicit legal authority to develop a full blown regulatory program for reuse of “mildly contaminated” soil. The current definition of contamination reaches, by its terms, any non-naturally occurring, regulated contaminant “that has the potential to adversely affect human health or the environment.” N.H. Env-Or 602.07.
In these circumstances, New Hampshire is currently regulating on a case by case basis, limiting receiving sites to soils that do not exceed natural background levels. Solid waste regulation can be avoided by an agency waiver, or reuse can be approved with an acceptable soil management plan and soil testing protocol. The New Hampshire agency is making efforts to respond to approval requests rapidly enough to avoid frustrating market driven transactions. It recognizes, as other regulators do, that construction projects may otherwise be forced to send lightly contaminated soil to landfills, depriving the region of essential landfill capacity, while increasing construction costs for little, if any, environmental benefit. For example, both New Hampshire and Massachusetts have recognized that unreclaimed gravel pits and quarries present potential hazards and risks of their own. They can be attractive nuisances that claim the lives of those who try to use them unwisely for recreation year after year and they can become repositories for discarded materials including stolen or abandoned vehicles. In short, they can be a locus of a range of community problems, if unattended. Rather than pay to send lightly contaminated soils to landfills, a better and more beneficial use could be found.
The States considering such new programs recognize that their efforts to impose environmental regulation on such a substantial volume of previously unregulated activity could well have unintended and unnecessary adverse consequences for both small and large scale redevelopment projects just as the economy is gaining strength. It must be undertaken in a manner that will not exacerbate other very significant potential problems. They are coordinating among themselves the planning and development of such regulation and giving serious consideration to designing methods that will likely bear the simplicity and efficiency of general permits. Legislative action will no doubt be necessary to authorize these new programs.
There is little question that as economic activity continues to increase, the States must establish consistent criteria setting forth the standards to be used in determining where mildly contaminated soils generated at construction projects and other developments can be disposed of at subsurface locations. Municipalities and the regulated community need to be educated about this process and engage with the regulators to ensure that the final standards are well-understood, easily implementable, and adequately ensure the environment is protected.
Posted on March 23, 2015
On January 15, 2015, Oklahoma Western District Judge Timothy DeGiusti dismissed a declaratory judgment action brought by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) against Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG&E) under the Clean Air Act. In United States v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co. , the Court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over EPA’s claims.
The litigation involved certain modifications made by OG&E at its Muskogee and Sooner plants. These modifications occurred more than five (5) years prior to EPA’s suit. Before commencing each of the projects, OG&E submitted “Project Notifications” to the Oklahoma Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) that: (1) stated that each of the modifications would not result in a significant emissions increase; and (2) committed to submitting annual reports supporting this conclusion. OG&E did not submit detailed emissions calculations. However, five years of data subsequent to the modifications confirmed that significant emissions increases did not occur.
Although the underlying dispute revolves around whether OG&E was required to obtain a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit before commencing each of the modifications, EPA did not allege that the projects were “major modifications” or that the projects resulted in “significant emissions increases” from the Sooner or Muskogee plants. Nor did the government seek penalties for violations of the PSD permit requirements or injunctive relief requiring OG&E to obtain permits, likely seeking to avoid the application of the five year general statute of limitations applicable to government claims for fines, 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Instead, the government only sought a declaration that OG&E did not properly project whether the modifications to the Sooner and Muskogee plants would result in a significant increase in emissions.
Given that the government did not allege a “major modification” or a “significant emissions increase” for any of the projects, the Court found that the government had not presented an actual case or controversy sufficient for the Court's exercise of jurisdiction.
Even if OG & E failed as a matter of law to evaluate whether the modifications would result in a significant increase in post-modification emissions of regulated pollutants at each facility, that failure to project is not, without more, determinative of whether a PSD permit is required. Unmoored from a claim that the modifications at issue are major modifications, Plaintiffs ask this Court to make a declaration as to a collateral legal issue governing aspects of a future potential suit. EPA's attempt at piecemeal litigation, therefore, cannot withstand the Court's jurisdictional limitations.
The Court also rejected EPA’s novel claim for injunctive relief seeking to require OG&E to properly calculate whether the projects were likely to result in a significant emissions increase prior to construction.
The Court is not aware of any decision in which the injunctive relief requested by EPA has been granted, or for that matter, ever requested. As the parties concede, there is no statutory or regulatory requirement that projections be submitted to EPA or any other regulatory authority in the first instance. And, as the Sixth Circuit addressed in DTE Energy, there is no prior approval required by the agency. Thus, if the Court were to grant the injunctive relief requested by EPA it would be directing OG & E to submit projections where no statutory or regulatory authority for such action exists. The availability of relief of the nature requested by EPA is a matter to be addressed by Congress, not this Court.
This is an important decision limiting EPA’s ability to “second-guess” a facility’s pre-construction permitting calculations in the absence of data demonstrating a significant emissions increase.
Posted on March 17, 2015
In its March 9, 2015 decision in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, the Supreme Court held that the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-and-comment requirement “does not apply . . . to interpretative rules.” The decision was unanimous, but the concurring opinions of Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas express concern with the consequences of the Court’s opinion. As set out well in the temperate concurrence of Justice Scalia (yes, it really is temperate), in giving the category of interpretive rules Auer deference:
we do more than allow the agency to make binding regulations without notice and comment. Because the agency (not Congress) drafts the substantive rules that are the object of those interpretations, giving them deference allows the agency to control the extent of its notice-and-comment-free domain. To expand this domain, the agency need only write substantive rules more broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice and comment.
While the three concurring justices are looking down the road for the right case for revisiting what is generally known as Auer deference (i.e., judicial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations), Seth Jaffe’s next-day blog posting suggests that the road to the right case might be a long one.
I agree that the Court is unlikely to revisit Auer during the current Administration. But what happens if those in the next Administration disagree with choices made by the current Administration? What if they choose to address those disagreements by issuing a tsunami of interpretative rules that reverse both longstanding interpretive rules on which people have relied and/or the newer interpretive rules of the current Administration? What happens, for example, if the next Secretary of the Department of Labor reverses the interpretive rule upheld by Perez? Will those adversely affected by such a new interpretive rule stand by without protest? Will they be satisfied with Justice Sotomayor’s suggestions for recourse (e.g., by trying to persuade courts that the reinterpretations are arbitrary and capricious)?
I think not. I think that just a short jog down the road, we will see some particularly bold (or outrageous) re-interpretative rules flowing from agencies unimpeded by fears of the judicial review process. That will prompt challenges from those supportive of the previous interpretive rules. And that might well prompt the Chief Justice and one or more other justices to join Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas in revisiting Auer deference. I, for one, would welcome that revisit.
Posted on March 17, 2015
In a decision that may end a 13-year battle over wetlands jurisdiction, the Fourth Circuit on March 10 upheld the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers findings that a 4.8 acre wetland had a “significant nexus” to navigable waters under the Clean Water Act. Of importance to future challenges, the court deferred to the Corps’ rather ordinary wetlands evidence, despite contrary evidence from a developer of a proposed planned unit development in Chesapeake, Virginia.
The Precon case spanned the 2006 Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States, when Justice Kennedy introduced the jurisdictional standard of “significant nexus.” For a refresher, a “significant nexus” between wetlands and navigable waters exists “if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’”. For previous posts concerning CWA jurisdiction, see here and here. The Fourth Circuit previously had found a “nexus” between Precon’s 4.8 acre wetland and navigable waters seven miles away and allowed aggregation of the Precon’s 4.8 wetland acres with a region of 448 “similarly situated” wetlands, but remanded for application of the “significant” aspect of Justice Kennedy’s test.
CWA jurisdictional groupies watched the Precon case as among the first to involve evidence demonstrating jurisdiction under the “significant nexus” test and the only decision to be remanded for a showing of “significance.” Evidence was presented, experts disagreed, and the court deferred to the Corps. On the key point of “significance,” the decision found neither arbitrary nor capricious the Corps’ findings of water flow. In addition, the court deferred to the Corps’ showing of wetland functions in relation to the navigable water, particularly water quality (dissolved oxygen) impairments to the Northwest River, which are reduced by the carbon sequestration of retained organic matter by the aggregated wetlands. The court also found credible the Corps’ qualitative evidence of habitat use by common species (deer, squirrels, amphibians).
The take-away: If a “nexus” is “significant” based on a showing of general relationship of wetland functions to downstream receiving water impairments and common wildlife (wetland and non-wetland) usage, it is hard to imagine a wetland failing to be held jurisdictional when aggregation is allowed. Counsel for Precon indicates it will seek en banc rehearing and may seek certiorari, so there may be yet another chapter to this saga.
Posted on March 16, 2015
(Reproduced with permission from Daily Environment Report, den, 03/12/2015. Copyright 2015 by The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. (800-372-1033) http://www.bna.com)
Another Environmental Protection Agency battle focusing on coal has recently ended—for now at least. While most recent coal warfare has been fought on Clean Air Act fronts, this battle was fought on the fields of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. The target is coal combustion residuals (CCR) generated by electric utilities.
The EPA’s CCR rule will soon be published in the Federal Register. It has been a long time coming. The flash point for the rulemaking—the Archduke Ferdinand moment—was the December, 2008 Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Kingston, Tennessee incident. TVA’s ash pond dike ruptured and millions of gallons of coal ash and water spilled into the surrounding waters and land.
The Kingston spill received extensive press coverage, and it occurred just a few weeks after President Barack Obama was elected. Obama had nominated Lisa Jackson to be his EPA Administrator, and at her Senate confirmation hearing in January 2009, Jackson committed to take aggressive regulatory action to minimize the chances of similar occurrences in the future.
The EPA first proposed the rule in 2010, and issued three supplemental notices along the way. In 2013, because it was starting to look as though the EPA would take forever to issue a final rule, both industry and public interest groups secured a ‘‘citizens suit’’ federal court order forcing a deadline.
Now that the rule is out, more battles are coming. In light of the intense and polarized advocacy during the rule’s development, both judicial review and attempts to amend RCRA are a virtual certainty. And remarkably, for the most pivotal issue of the battle, the EPA’s new rule simply kicks the can down the road—thus setting up a completely new round of rulemaking unless Congress intervenes...
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Posted on March 13, 2015
Many states and the federal government have struggled with the challenge of how to adapt statutory strict liability schemes imposing clean up obligations on property owners in such a way that will enable new investors to redevelop brownfields sites without fear of litigation over previous releases.
The Connecticut General Assembly has recently provided liability relief to municipal entities to encourage them to redevelop brownfield sites by removing potential liability concerns which might otherwise arise from acquiring title to previously contaminated property.
The Connecticut legislation defines brownfields as “any abandoned or underutilized site where redevelopment, reuse or expansion has not occurred due to the presence or potential presence of pollution in the buildings, soil or groundwater that requires investigation or remediation before or in conjunction with the redevelopment, reuse or expansion of the property.”
Historically, municipalities and their affiliates, such as redevelopment agencies, were reluctant to acquire brownfields properties by foreclosing tax liens, or through arms- length transactions, because the State’s Clean Water Act imposes joint and several liability on owners of contaminated property, even if they did not own the property at the time of the releases. As such, if a municipal entity took title to contaminated property, it would run the risk of receiving an abatement order from the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) or being sued by third parties.
Under the new Municipal Brownfield Liability Relief Program, a municipality, or a qualified municipal affiliate, which qualifies for the program may take title to a brownfield property free of claims by the State or third parties for contamination existing on the property prior to the acquisition.
Assuming the property meets the definition of a brownfield under the statute, the municipality must meet four conditions to enter the program: a) that it intends to redevelop or facilitate redevelopment of the property, b) that it did not contribute to the contamination at the site, c) that it has no legal affiliation with a party responsible for the contamination, and d) that it is not under a previous obligation to remediate the property.
Another significant benefit of the new program is that it exempts a participating municipal entity from having to comply with the Connecticut Transfer Act. That Act requires a seller of certain classes of property defined as an “establishment” under the Act to make a filing with the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection. The filing requires that if there has been a release of hazardous waste at the property which has not been remediated, a party to the transaction must provide a certification that it will accept responsibility to conduct a full investigation and remediation under prevailing standards and guidelines.
Another benefit of the program is that a municipal entity is not required to fully investigate and remediate the property under the State’s Remediation Standard Regulations. However, it must make good-faith efforts to minimize the risk to public health and the environment. It also must submit a plan and schedule to facilitate both redevelopment and remediation, and it must also notify DEEP of any exceedances of Significant Environmental Hazard thresholds.
The legislature authorized the program in 2013, and DEEP provided application forms for the program in September of 2013. So far the response has been discouraging, with only two municipalities entering a total of three sites in the program to date. The lack of a robust response is likely attributed to the difficulty an underfunded DEEP faces in reaching out to the state’s 169 towns.
Whether the new liability relief program will eventually encourage more municipalities to participate in redeveloping and remediating brownfield properties remains to be seen. However, along with a recently announced round of grants from the Department of Economic and Community Development of up to $7.5 million, it should at least open the door for municipalities to take a second look at unproductive properties.
Posted on March 10, 2015
The Supreme Court on Tuesday ruled that, when an agency revises its interpretive rules, it need not go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. Although the decision, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, required the court to reverse a long-held line of D.C. Circuit cases, the decision was not difficult; it was, in fact, unanimous. In short, the Administrative Procedures Act:
states that unless “notice or hearing is required by statute,” the Act’s notice-and-comment requirement “does not apply … to interpretative rules.”
It carves out no exception for revisions to interpretive rules. Game over.
The truly interesting part of the case was in the concurring opinions. Both Justices Scalia and Thomas, effectively joined by Justice Alito, argued that Supreme Court decisions giving deference to agencies’ interpretation of their own rules have no constitutional foundation and should be overruled.
This is not the first time that they have made these arguments. As I noted previously, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, Chief Justice Roberts also suggested that it might be time to revisit what is generally known as Auer deference. It is notable in Perez that the Chief Justice joined the Court’s opinion. Absent a change in the make-up of the Court, I don’t see it revisiting Auer any time soon.
Otherwise, the most notable part of the case is a statement from Justice Thomas that, to me, already wins the metaphor of the year prize. Justice Thomas’s argument against Auer deference, while couched in constitutional terms, is really a screed (parts of which I sympathize with) against the growth of rulemaking and the modern administrative state. He laments the use of interpretive rules and the decline of formal notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the protections that are required:
Today, however, formal rulemaking is the Yeti of administrative law. There are isolated sightings of it in the ratemaking context, but elsewhere it proves elusive.
True dat. It just doesn't justify abandoning Auer deference in my book.
Posted on March 10, 2015
In a December 2012 blog post, I discussed the tensions raised by “Water for Texas 2012 State Water Plan” between the expected population growth and available water resources in Texas. As water demand is expected to rise, existing water supplies are diminishing.
These critical water supply constraints are again brought into sharp focus by the population projections contained in a March 5, 2015 report released by the Office of State Demographer. The 40-year projections (2010 to 2050) indicate that if the migration patterns observed in Texas between 2000 and 2010 continue at the same rate, the population of Texas will double, representing a significant increase in projections contained in the 2012 State Water Plan. The projected water resource shortages will be exacerbated.
The 2012 State Water Plan, based on a 50-year horizon, projected a 2060 population of 46.3 million. New population numbers, based on the recent migration patterns, project an increase from the 2010 Census population of 25.1 million to a 2050 population of 54.4 million.
For the past 10 years, Texas experienced the largest annual population growth of any state. Will the Texas economy maintain its strength to support job growth that will attract young workers from around the country and the world? Can the associated high net migration be sustained? What will be the impact of this growth? How will the environmental impacts be anticipated and managed?
The areas of fastest growth include the areas in and around Dallas/Ft. Worth, Austin/San Antonio, and Houston. Cities in those areas are making plans to secure long-term water supplies. Will they be successful? Will regulatory changes have to be made to surface and groundwater water rights to effectively and efficiently acquire, manage, and conserve these limited water resources? Will the infrastructure be there? How will it be financed?
Will Texas have “cool, clear water”?
Posted on March 9, 2015
It is popular to grouse about how long it takes EPA to issue a rule these days. When I was at EPA in its formative years, we often went from proposal to final in just a few months. There are many reasons why the trek to final rule signing has now become so time-consuming. To name just one, advocates on all sides increasingly file lengthy comments covering technical, economic, and legal issues. And reviewing courts increasingly require EPA to fully explain its basis and purpose in response to all those comments.
While these types of delays are understandable, another type of delay is not. I am speaking of the lag between the rule’s signing by the Administrator and its publication in the Federal Register. You would think this ministerial act (the Federal Register Director isn’t authorized to re-write EPA’s rules) should be accomplished in four or five days. It almost always was when I was at EPA, and today it often is for other agencies. And sometimes these days, EPA’s signed rules get published in a few days.
But there are many exceptions, and a great example is now before us. Administrator McCarthy signed the RCRA “coal combustion residue” (CCR) final rule on December 19, 2014. It has yet to hit the Federal Register, and EPA staff announced on a recent webconference that they “hoped” it would by late March or early April. Other recent examples come to mind. The signed-to-published lag time for EPA’s 2012 CAA Oil & Gas NSPS/NESHAP rule was 121 days. The lag time for EPA’s 2014 CAA NSPS greenhouse gas (GHG) proposed rule was 110 days. It now looks like the RCRA CCR Rule will break 100.
What in the world is going on during these lengthy lag times? EPA staff will tell you that a document with numerous charts, tables, and graphs bamboozles the Federal Register people – even though the CFR has been replete with charts, tables and graphs for decades. EPA staff will also tell you (as they have for the CCR Rule) that they are fixing “typos.” But with 21st century software, can catching and correcting typos possibly take 100 days or more?
So why grouse about this? I am not suggesting that EPA staff might be making substantive, consequential changes to a final rule after the Administrator signs it. EPA does place the final rule on its Website immediately after the document is signed, so any “corrections” in the Federal Register version can be detected by a careful review. (It would be nice – for transparency’s sake – if EPA would make a practice of releasing a red-line showing exactly which “corrections” were made to the signed version during the 100+ days.)
And I am not grousing about the Federal Register publication delays per se. What bothers me is EPA’s frequent practice of refusing to release critical documents supporting the final rule – for instance, the Response to Comment (RTC) document – until the day the rule hits the Federal Register. It is this embargo – coupled with a long signed-to-published lag time – that hurts. During the recent webconference for the RCRA CCR Rule, for instance, EPA staffers made clear that the RTC and other support documents would not be released until the “hoped for” publication in late March or April.
For an agency (and Administration) that touts “transparency” at every turn, I cannot understand why EPA engages in this embargo practice. And sometimes (but not often enough), EPA does release these support documents before the rule is published in the Federal Register – so there is obviously no legal barrier to such a release.
Why should anyone care about such an embargo? As soon as a final rule is released, regulated entities often need to go into high gear to prepare for compliance. In these preparations, they need to be able to understand and interpret the rule’s provisions, many of which are often unclear or ambiguous. EPA’s RTC often provides interpretations and guidance far more lucidly than the rule’s preamble. One good example: in the RTC to EPA’s 2013 CAA “CISWI” rule, EPA provided a key interpretation of what types of activities would be deemed a “modification” triggering new source status. This interpretation appeared nowhere in the rule’s preamble and could hardly have been divined from the regulatory language. It is plainly unfair and contrary to principles of good government to hide this kind of interpretation from regulated parties for 100+ days when they are preparing for compliance.
Moreover, parties on all sides of a rulemaking (industry and public interest groups) need to begin evaluating judicial review options and theories as soon as they can after a final rule is signed. Why should they have to wait 100+ days for critical documents that are essential to their evaluation?
So dear EPA: PLEASE start releasing your RTC and other supporting documents at the same time you release your signed rule!
Posted on March 3, 2015
On January 21, 2015 the California Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from a lower appellate court, thus leaving in place a decision with the potential to impact the longstanding relationship between the nation’s railroads and pipeline companies concerning payment for use of congressionally granted right-of-ways that date from the 19th Century.
The momentous decision in Union Pacific Railroad vs. Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline, Inc. was announced by a unanimous three judge panel from the Court of Appeal of the State of California’s Second Appellate District on November 5, 2014. The ruling overturned a Los Angeles County trial court judge’s award of $10 million for back rent, plus interest due to the Union Pacific Railroad from the Santa Fe Pacific Pipeline Company.
The pipeline company’s successful appeal centered on narrowing the scope of what pre-1871 grants from Congress to railroad companies included. The appellate court agreed with the pipeline company that the proverbial “bundle of sticks” of property rights granted by Congress only included uses related to “railroad purposes.” Oil and gas pipelines buried alongside the tracks were deemed not to be a railroad purpose, as petroleum pipelines were not even conceived of at the time the grants were issued, and had no link or relationship with the daily running of a railroad.
As a result of the appellate court’s holding, the true recipient of the pipeline rental payments was declared to be the United States government as represented by the Department of the Interior’s Bureau of Land Management. The right-of-way at issue was 2014 miles in length, touched five states and was being renewed for a period of ten years. Since the pipeline company had been making its rental payments to the railroad for several decades, the possibility looms of the United States, who was not a party to the lawsuit, seeking retroactive application of the ruling to the millions of dollars previously paid to the United Pacific Railroad.
It is anticipated that the railroad will file a petition to grant certiorari with the United States Supreme Court by its April 21, 2015 deadline. If the Union Pacific Railroad is unsuccessful in either getting certiorari granted or in the subsequent appeal itself, then one could envision other pipeline companies, fiber optic companies and other non-railroad oriented users of the many railroad right-of-ways across the entire country seeking to suspend and not renew rent payments to railroads with pre-1871 grants. Consequently, the United States government could end up with an unanticipated sizeable new income stream to help fill the nation’s coffers.
Posted on March 2, 2015
In Paradise Lost, John Milton wrote that “easy is the descent into Hell, for it is paved with good intentions.”
A modern environmental lawyer might say that the road to waste, inefficiency, and obstruction is paved with good intentions. Nowhere is that more apparent than with citizen suit provisions, as was demonstrated in the decision earlier this week in Nucor Steel-Arkansas v. Big River Steel.
Big River Steel obtained a permit from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality to construct a steel mill in Mississippi County, Arkansas. Nucor owns an existing steel mill in – you guessed it – Mississippi County, Arkansas. Nucor brought a host of claims in various forums (Sorry; I’m not a Latin scholar and cannot bring myself to say “fora”) in an effort to derail the Big River Steel project. It appealed the permit in Arkansas courts. It also petitioned EPA to object to the permit.
Finally – the subject of this case – it brought a citizens’ suit under the Clean Air Act alleging that the permit did not comport with various CAA provisions addressing permitting. The Court rightly dismissed the complaint, basically on the ground that the suit was simply an improper collateral attack on the air permit. The 5th and 9th Circuits have reached similar conclusions in similar circumstances.
The point here, however, is that clients don’t want to win law suits; they want to build projects. Even unsuccessful litigation can tie projects up in knots, jeopardizing project financing or causing a project to miss a development window.
The road to hell is paved with the pleadings of bogus citizen suits.