No Competitors In My Backyard?

Posted on March 2, 2015 by Seth Jaffe

In Paradise Lost, John Milton wrote that “easy is the descent into Hell, for it is paved with good intentions.”  

road to hell

A modern environmental lawyer might say that the road to waste, inefficiency, and obstruction is paved with good intentions.  Nowhere is that more apparent than with citizen suit provisions, as was demonstrated in the decision earlier this week in Nucor Steel-Arkansas v. Big River Steel.

Big River Steel obtained a permit from the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality to construct a steel mill in Mississippi County, Arkansas.  Nucor owns an existing steel mill in – you guessed it – Mississippi County, Arkansas.  Nucor brought a host of claims in various forums (Sorry; I’m not a Latin scholar and cannot bring myself to say “fora”) in an effort to derail the Big River Steel project.  It appealed the permit in Arkansas courts.  It also petitioned EPA to object to the permit.

Finally – the subject of this case – it brought a citizens’ suit under the Clean Air Act alleging that the permit did not comport with various CAA provisions addressing permitting.  The Court rightly dismissed the complaint, basically on the ground that the suit was simply an improper collateral attack on the air permit.  The 5th and 9th Circuits have reached similar conclusions in similar circumstances.

The point here, however, is that clients don’t want to win law suits; they want to build projects.  Even unsuccessful litigation can tie projects up in knots, jeopardizing project financing or causing a project to miss a development window.

The road to hell is paved with the pleadings of bogus citizen suits.

Smackdown Alert: Certiorari granted to review EPA’s GHG rules

Posted on October 15, 2013 by Theodore Garrett

The Supreme Court agreed today to review the EPA’s authority to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases from stationary sources.  The Justices accepted six petitions for review of the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. EPA (No., 12-1146 et al.), consolidated them for argument, and limited review to a single question:

“Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” 

The six petitions granted were filed by the Utility Air Regulatory Group, the American Chemistry Council, the Energy-Intensive Manufacturers, the Southeastern Legal Foundation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and a number of states.

EPA’s position, as presented in the DC Circuit and in its opposition to certiorari, is that regulation of greenhouse gas emissions under Title II triggered permitting requirements under the PSD program and Title V of the Act, which apply to stationary sources emitting “any air pollutant” above the statutory threshold.  EPA has interpreted “any air pollutant” to mean “any air pollutant regulated under the Clean Air Act,” and thus when the EPA’s regulation of emissions from new motor vehicles took effect in January 2011, the permitting requirements under the PSD program and Title V automatically applied to stationary GHG sources above the statutory threshold.

In its petition, the US Chamber of Commerce noted that EPA acknowledged that its tailoring rule would create a result “so contrary to what Congress had in mind — and that in fact so undermines what Congress attempted to accomplish with the [statute’s] requirements — that it should be avoided under the ‘absurd results’ doctrine.”  With respect to the issue upon which cert was granted, the Chamber argued that EPA incorrectly determined that all “air pollutants” regulated by the agency under the Clean Air Act’s motor vehicle emissions provision, 42 U.S.C. § 7421(a)(1), must also be regulated under the Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration of Air Quality and Title V programs when emitted from stationary sources.

The Utility Air Regulatory Group petition expressly did not ask the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Massachusetts v. EPA.  However, the UARG petition did ask the Court to consider whether its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA compelled EPA to include GHGs in the PSD and Title V programs when inclusion of GHGs would expand the PSD program to cover a substance that does not deteriorate the quality of the air that people breathe.  UARG emphasized EPA’s admission that regulation of GHGs under the Title I and Title V permit programs subjects “an extraordinarily large number of sources” to the Act for the first time, “result[ing] in a program that would have been unrecognizable to the Congress that designed PSD.” 

A coalition of environmental groups opposed certiorari, emphasizing that EPA’s endangerment and contribution findings and emissions standards for motor vehicles simply implement  the Supreme Court’s mandate in Massachusetts v. EPA.  They emphasize that the Petitioners’ arguments ignore the “air pollutant” definition that the Court in Massachusetts v. EPA held “unambiguous[ly]” (549 U.S. at 529) covers greenhouse gases. 

It is worth noting that four justices dissented in Massachusetts v. EPA, and the successful petitioners in Coalition for Responsible Regulation argue that Massachusetts does not compel the regulations at issue here.  The granting of the petitions for certiorari is sobering news for EPA. Stay tuned.

Scope of the Single Source Doctrine

Posted on September 17, 2012 by Richard Horder

Companies who wrestle with whether their various air pollution-emitting operations must be grouped together for Title V permitting purposes have received some assistance from a recent Sixth Circuit opinion.  In Summit Petroleum Corporation v. U.S. EPA, 2012 FED App. 0248P (6th Cir.), the court curtailed EPA’s expansive interpretation of a “single source” under the Clean Air Act. 

By rule, operations belong to a single source if they: (1) possess the same SIC codes; (2) are located on contiguous or adjacent land; and (3) are under common control.  See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(5), (6).  In addition, by policy, EPA has expanded the definition of “single source” to include not only the facilities that meet these three criteria, but also those facilities that provide support to an adjacent central operation.  See Preamble to the August 7, 1980 final Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations, 45 FR 52676; Preamble to Revised Part 51 and Part 70, Draft, February 18, 1998.  And, EPA has taken a “functional” approach to the term “adjacent,” such that these support facilities need not even physically adjoin the main facility.  For example, EPA considered two aluminum smelter facilities adjacent, despite their 3.4 mile separation, due to the extensive truck traffic between the two properties.  See Letter from Steven C. Riva, U.S. EPA, to Robert Lenney, Alcoa Inc., Mar. 9, 2009.  See also Letter from Pamela Blakely, U.S. EPA, to Don Sutton, Illinois EPA, re: General Dynamics, Ordinance & Tactical Systems, Inc., Mar. 14, 2006 (several plants considered a single source, despite their 8-mile separation, because they met a “common sense notion of a plant”).

Therefore, when EPA recently considered whether Summit Petroleum Corporation’s gas wells and associated flares should be considered a single source with its gas sweetening plant, EPA did not find it dispositive that several of the wells were located over a mile from the plant and were separated by other intervening properties.  Instead, EPA noted that the wells and the plant were highly interdependent and under Summit’s common ownership.  As a result, the wells and plant met the “common sense” notion of a single facility.  See Letter from Cheryl Newton, U.S. EPA, to Scott Huber, Summit Petroleum Corporation, Oct. 18, 2010.

Summit challenged EPA’s single source determination, and the Sixth Circuit vacated that determination in Summit Petroleum Corporation v. U.S. EPA.  The court found it “unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term ‘adjacent’” that EPA equated “functional relatedness” with “physical adjacency.”  Id., at *2.  The court ordered EPA to use instead the “ordinary, i.e., physical and geographical” meaning of the word “adjacent.”  Id.

This decision will affect long-standing EPA policy and practice in making single source determinations.  As the Director of EPA’s Region VIII Air Program noted, there is “no evidence that any EPA office has ever attempted to indicate a specific distance for ‘adjacent’ on anything other than a case-by-case basis.”  See Letter from Richard Long, U.S. EPA, to Lynn Menlove, Utah Division of Air Quality, “Response to Request for Guidance in Defining Adjacent with Respect to Source Aggregation,” May 21, 1998, citing 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,695 (August 7, 1980) (“EPA is unable to say precisely at this point how far apart activities must be in order to be treated separately.  The Agency can answer that question only through case-by-case determinations.”).  Therefore, companies with “functional” single-source determinations should consider whether the recent Sixth Circuit decision could impact their status under the Title V program.

Kentucky Action on PM 2.5

Posted on November 19, 2009 by Carolyn Brown

As has been reported, EPA granted in part petitions to object to the merged PSD construction/Title V operating permit issued by the Kentucky Division for Air Quality for the addition of a 750 MW pulverized coal-fired boiler at the Trimble County facility owned by Louisville Gas & Electric Company (LG&E). EPA’s action occurred more than three years after the proposed permit and final PSD determination authorizing construction to commence. One ground for the grant of the petition was that the state permitting record did not contain adequate justification of use of the PM10 program as a surrogate for PM2.5 for PSD analysis.

 

Following submittal of additional information by LG&E, Kentucky issued its preliminary determination that many have argued was an attempt to regulate by Title V objection rather than by rulemaking.   Regardless, the Division for Air Quality determined that use of the PM10 Surrogate Policy has been shown to be reasonable for the Trimble County project. In short, DAQ concurred with LG&E that there was a lack of test data regarding the particle size distribution of the particulate matter for the combination of controls on the unit and noted that the control train was state of the art. DAQ also noted that PM2.5 is always a subset of PM10 and that PM10 BACT analyses implicitly include consideration of reductions of PM2.5 emissions. After considering the elements of the control train, DAQ concluded that there were “no known base technologies available” for a PC Boiler that would provide additional reduction of PM2.5

 

LG&E also addressed fugitive emission sources, the emergency generator and cooling tower in its submittal to demonstrate that use of PM10 as a surrogate was reasonable. Although a Class II Cumulative PM2.5 NAAQS analysis was not conducted, LG&E provided information from modeling exercises to further support its position that it was reasonable to rely on the PM10 surrogate policy. DAQ noted that in the absence of a final rule on significant impact levels for PM2.5, a PM2.5 emissions inventory and regulatory dispersion modeling system, it was not possible to conduct a cumulative PM2.5 NAAQS analysis. 

Kentucky Action on PM 2.5

Posted on November 19, 2009 by Carolyn Brown

As has been reported, EPA granted in part petitions to object to the merged PSD construction/Title V operating permit issued by the Kentucky Division for Air Quality for the addition of a 750 MW pulverized coal-fired boiler at the Trimble County facility owned by Louisville Gas & Electric Company (LG&E). EPA’s action occurred more than three years after the proposed permit and final PSD determination authorizing construction to commence. One ground for the grant of the petition was that the state permitting record did not contain adequate justification of use of the PM10 program as a surrogate for PM2.5 for PSD analysis.

 

Following submittal of additional information by LG&E, Kentucky issued its preliminary determination that many have argued was an attempt to regulate by Title V objection rather than by rulemaking.   Regardless, the Division for Air Quality determined that use of the PM10 Surrogate Policy has been shown to be reasonable for the Trimble County project. In short, DAQ concurred with LG&E that there was a lack of test data regarding the particle size distribution of the particulate matter for the combination of controls on the unit and noted that the control train was state of the art. DAQ also noted that PM2.5 is always a subset of PM10 and that PM10 BACT analyses implicitly include consideration of reductions of PM2.5 emissions. After considering the elements of the control train, DAQ concluded that there were “no known base technologies available” for a PC Boiler that would provide additional reduction of PM2.5

 

LG&E also addressed fugitive emission sources, the emergency generator and cooling tower in its submittal to demonstrate that use of PM10 as a surrogate was reasonable. Although a Class II Cumulative PM2.5 NAAQS analysis was not conducted, LG&E provided information from modeling exercises to further support its position that it was reasonable to rely on the PM10 surrogate policy. DAQ noted that in the absence of a final rule on significant impact levels for PM2.5, a PM2.5 emissions inventory and regulatory dispersion modeling system, it was not possible to conduct a cumulative PM2.5 NAAQS analysis.