Posted on April 21, 2014
Whether a wetland or modest stream is subject to Clean Water Act regulation as a “navigable water” of the United States (navigable in law) remains a muddy question. In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining CWA jurisdiction: the body of water must be “relatively permanent” and it must be adjacent (have a continuous surface connection) to navigable waters. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion says waters or wetlands sharing a “significant nexus” with traditionally navigable waters are subject to CWA jurisdiction.
In 2011, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) released draft guidance on “waters of the United States” which expanded the waters over which the agencies planned to assert CWA jurisdiction, compared to pre-Rapanos. Then, in September 2013, the EPA’s Science Advisory Board released a draft scientific report, “Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters,” for public comment, stating that the final version of the report would be the basis for a joint EPA and ACOE rule on CWA jurisdiction. On March 25, 2014, the two agencies released a proposed rule stating that all tributaries of traditional navigable waters and interstate waters, and adjacent water bodies, are automatically jurisdictional because they share a “significant nexus” with navigable waters. The proposed rule appears to assert default jurisdiction over many seasonal and rain-dependent streams and wetlands near rivers and streams, provided they are “tributaries.” Beyond this, the proposed rule states that jurisdiction over other types of waters with more uncertain connections to downstream waters—such as unidirectional waters, non-adjacent wetlands, and other waters outside of flood zones and riparian areas—will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The official version of the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register yesterday with public comments due in ninety days.
Parties understandably confused can petition for case-specific jurisdictional determinations. While a decision on such a petition may be definitive, courts have refused to allow judicial review of such decisions because they are not “final decisions” under the Administrative Procedure Act. In Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a federal district court noted that jurisdictional determinations do not impose any new or additional legal rights or obligations, but merely remind the party of existing duties under the CWA. By contrast, the Supreme Court determined in Sackett v. EPA that compliance orders issued by the ACOE or EPA following or flowing from jurisdictional determinations are subject to judicial review.
Adding to the challenge of navigating these uncertain legal waters, many states and municipalities have expanded their statutory definitions of “waters” (e.g. artificial features and groundwater) and “wetlands” (e.g. soil types and buffers) to increase the breadth and depth of state and local regulation. So, update your navigational charts and prepare for some challenging sailing!
Posted on April 11, 2012
OSHA recently announced its final rule final rule revising the Hazard Communication Standard (HCS). Originally promulgated in 1983, the HCS is based on workers' "right to know" about the hazards they face in the workplace. The intent of the revised HCS is to clarify the information provided to workers, based on an employee's "right to understand" workplace hazards. Click to view OSHA's press release, "US Department of Labor's OSHA revises Hazard Communication Standard: Regulation protects workers from dangerous chemicals, helps American businesses compete worldwide."
The revised HCS reflects the United Nations' Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labeling of Chemicals (GHCS), which was negotiated by a variety of stakeholders around the world. Because American workers may use chemicals made abroad (and workers abroad may use US-produced chemicals), a consistent labeling standard around the world will enhance worker safety by making labels easier for everyone to understand.
The revised HCS makes three primary changes from the current standard:
Chemical producers and importers still bear the responsibility for classifying hazards presented by chemicals. The revised HCS provides detailed criteria for classifying the type and severity of hazard presented. The intent of the new information on hazard class and severity category is to efficiently provide guidance on the appropriate response to exposure.
The new rule requires a standardized label design that includes the use of pictograms, shown on the Hazard Communication Standard Pictogram Quick Card, which depict the type of hazard presented. Labels are also required to include a "signal word" ("danger" for more severe hazards and "warning" for less severe hazards) and a precautionary statement suggesting safety measures. A sample Hazard Communication Standard Label is available on the OSHA website.
Safety Data Sheets
OSHA will now require a standardized 16-section format for Safety Data Sheets (SDSs), formerly known as Material Safety Data Sheets or MSDSs. This is expected to enhance ease of use, especially in an emergency, by ensuring that key information (for example, spill response procedures) can be quickly found within the document. The new SDS format is shown on the OSHA website.
Chemical producers and importers are required to implement the revised label and SDS formats in 2015. As the GHSC labels are phased in around the world, American workers may start to receive labels and SDSs in the new format before the labeling rule goes into effect in the US. Therefore, to ensure that employees understand the new labels, OSHA requires US employers to train employees on the new label elements and SDS format by December 1, 2013.
Posted on March 29, 2011
On August 24, 2010, the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) proposed new regulations on the reporting of releases. The intent of the proposed regulations is to clarify when and how certain types of releases (spills) must be reported to the DEP.
Connecticut General Statutes Section 22a-450 requires that any spill or discharge of "oil or petroleum or chemical liquids or solid, liquid or gaseous products, or hazardous wastes which poses a potential threat to human health or the environment, shall immediately [be] report[ed]." However, the very broad language of, and the absence of specificity in, section 22a-450 has left some struggling to determine what events should not be reported. While there have been previous attempts to promulgate regulations on spill reporting, none have been adopted.
The draft regulations provide release reporting criteria, including a list of the threshold quantities and types of releases that should be reported. First, the draft regulations define "reportable materials" to mean "any chemical liquid, solid, liquid or gaseous products, including but not limited to hazardous substances, hazardous waste, waste oil, used oil, petroleum constituents, asbestos, radioactive material, pesticide, prohibited pesticide, restricted use pesticide, or polychlorinated biphenyls." Further, under the draft regulations, reporting obligations are triggered (1) when the amount of reportable material released is equal to or greater than ten pounds; (2) when the quantity of reportable material is unknown, but is likely to be equal to or greater than 10 pounds; (3) for any release of certain specified materials (including friable asbestos, certain pesticides, PCBs, chlorinated solvents, or certain radioactive materials), regardless of the amount of the reported material; and (4) for reportable materials released in certain locations (including releases in public water supply watershed land, aquifer protection areas, watercourses or wetlands, or storm, sanitary, or combined sewers and releases from underground storage tanks), regardless of the amount of the reported material. Imminent hazards, imminent threats of a release, observable releases from abandoned containers, and surface soil stains also trigger reporting obligations. Finally, the proposed regulations list the information that must be included in a report and the deadlines for reporting (within one hour of a spill).
The draft regulations contain exceptions for certain releases of known reportable materials contained and removed within two hours (it is unclear, however, how this two hour exception comports with the requirement to report a spill within one hour) and for certain releases of food products and untreated domestic sewage. The draft regulations also contain exemptions for certain air emissions, water discharges, restricted use pesticide applications subject to other regulations, and various incidental releases.
Posted on September 14, 2009
There are three avenues of recovery under CERCLA - a contribution action and two types of cost recovery actions. These cost recovery actions are based on either the plaintiff’s “removal” of the hazardous substances or “remediation” efforts at the site. Each of these avenues has an independent statute of limitations provision. Thus, whether the statute of limitations period has been triggered will depend on how an action is characterized, i.e. whether the action constitutes a contribution action, a cost recovery removal action, or a cost recovery remedial action. While there are various state-specific causes of action related to environmental contamination in Connecticut, this article is confined to the statute of limitations for CERCLA cost recovery and contribution claims.
The statute of limitations analysis related to contribution claims is thankfully quite straight forward. Under CERCLA Section 113, these claims must be brought within three years of a civil action under Section 106 or 107, a CERCLA administrative order, or a judicially approved settlement with respect to costs or damages. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3). While questions may arise as to what may constitute a CERCLA “administrative order” or whether a “judicially approved settlement” must reference Section 106 or 107, we leave those discussions for another article.
Cost Recovery Claim
The analysis of what constitutes a viable cost recovery claim, whether it is removal or remedial, and when the statute of limitations is first triggered is more intricate. First, it is important to note that certain actions performed on a site may not trigger the statute of limitations period. “[T]here are some cases in which work on a site is neither a remedial nor a removal action, but rather constitutes ‘preliminary’ or ‘interim’ measures that do not trigger the statute of limitations . . ..” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282, *117 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009). While caselaw on what constitutes a preliminary remedy, as opposed to a permanent remedy, is limited, at least one court has determined that “evaluation, sampling, surveying and measuring” do not constitute the initiation of physical on-site construction because “these activities [do] not constitute ‘construction.’” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 204 (2d Cir. 2006)(quoting United States v. Findett Corp., 220 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2000)).
Beyond this, the characterization of a cost recovery action as either removal or remedial is crucial to determining whether an action to recover response costs is time-barred because there are different statute of limitations periods for a removal action and a remedial action. The statute of limitations for recovery of costs related to removal actions is three years after the completion of the removal action, whereas the limitations period for recovery of costs related to remedial actions is six years after the initiation of physical on-site construction of the remediation. Although there is a lack of clarity as to what constitutes a removal verses a remedial action, removal actions have generally been construed as “time-sensitive responses to public health threats . . ..” Remedial actions, in contrast, are often described as “permanent remedies to threats for which an urgent response is not warranted.”
Assuming for this discussion that the efforts undertaken at a site are beyond preliminary, there is inconsistency as to whether the statute of limitations for remedial actions would only run after a final Remedial Action Plan (RAP) has been approved for the site. One court in the Ninth Circuit, for example, concluded that initiation of physical on-site construction of the remedial action “can only occur after the final remedial action plan is adopted, and that . . . the statute of limitations, therefore, could not have begun to run until the final remedial action was approved . . ..” Cal. v. Neville Chem. Co., 358 F.3d 661, 671 (9th Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit, however, has rejected such a bright line rule and determined that the statute of limitations can be triggered without a final RAP, if the action is “consistent with a permanent remedy.” Schaefer v. Town of Victor, 457 F.3d 188, 205 (2d Cir. 2006).
Compounding the important distinction between removal and remedial actions is variability within the courts in determining the initial trigger for the statute of limitations period. Some courts apply a statute of limitations to an entire site after remediation commences on one portion of the site, while others look to multiple statute of limitations at a single property. See Colorado v. Sunoco, 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003) contra U.S. v. Manzo, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70860 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006). While the Second Circuit has not spoken on this issue, a recent District of Connecticut case has adopted the opinion that “there can be only one removal and one remedial action per facility, regardless of the number of phases in which the clean-up occurs.” Yankee Gas Servs. Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44282 (D. Conn. May 22, 2009)(emphasis added). Should a court adopt a one site, one action approach, the statute of limitations would be triggered by the first removal or remedial action at the site. Id.; see also Colorado v. Sunoco Thus, it is important to evaluate what actions have occurred at your facility and whether those actions would be considered “removal” or “remedial” to ensure the statute of limitations for a cost recovery action does not run., 337 F.3d 1233 (10th Cir. 2003).
At Robinson & Cole, we have environmental attorneys who have broad experience representing clients in CERCLA actions and the prosecution or defense of other environmental claims. We stand ready to apply this experience and insight to your specific needs. If you would like to discuss statute of limitations concerns, or broader environmental issues, please contact any of the attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group.
Earl Phillips W. Richard Smith Lauren Vinokur
(860) 275-8220 (860) 275- 8218 (860) 275-8341
email@example.com firstname.lastname@example.org email@example.com
 United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2005); see also OBG Tech. Servs. v. Northrop Grumman Space & Mission Sys. Corp., 503 F. Supp. 2d 490, 524 (D. Conn. 2007)(“[w]hether . . .actions are properly characterized as remedial or removal actions is a question of law for the Court to decide”); Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 926 (5th Cir. 2000)(“the CERCLA definitions [of removal and remedial action] are expansive enough that certain activities may well be covered by both…[and] the cases on this issue tend to be highly fact-specific . . ..”)
 United States v. W.R. Grace & Co., 429 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2005); see also W.R. Grace & Co. v. Zotos Int'l, Inc., 559 F.3d 85, 92 (2d Cir. 2009). Under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) a remedial action “includes, but is not limited to, such actions at the location of the release as storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated contaminated materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of leachate and runoff, on-site treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect the public health and welfare and the environment.”
Posted on March 13, 2009
As of January 1, 2009, a party seeking to develop or expand certain facilities in Connecticut that require approval by the state Siting Council or the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) must comply with significantly expanded public participation requirements before applying for or receiving approval from the Siting Council or DEP.
The new requirements arise from Public Act 08-94, An Act Concerning Environmental Justice Communities and the Storage of Asbestos-Containing Material (the "Act"), enacted in May 2008. The Act applies to certain proposed new or expanded facilities — including but not limited to a "major source" of air pollution under the federal Clean Air Act, certain electric generating facilities with a capacity of more than 10 megawatts, a sewage treatment plant with a capacity of more than 50 million gallons/day, and certain types of waste management facilities — that are located in an "environmental justice community." An "environmental justice community" is defined as either a U.S. census block group for which 30 percent or more of the population consists of low-income persons (income below 200 percent of the federal poverty level), or a Connecticut "distressed municipality," as defined by other state statutes relating to economic development.
In general, the Act requires a subject party to take three main steps:
- Before filing an application for a "new or expanded" permit with DEP or an application for a Certificate of Environmental Compatibility and Public Need with the Siting Council, the party must now file and receive approval of a "meaningful public participation plan" from DEP or the Siting Council. "Meaningful public participation" means that community residents and other potentially affected persons are sought out and provided an opportunity to participate in and influence the regulatory agency's decision. The "meaningful public participation plan" must include an informal public meeting to be held for community residents. The plan must also contain measures to facilitate public participation. The Act specifies in great detail measures that may or must be taken, including sign posting, newspaper ads, Web page notices, and written notification to neighborhood and environmental groups and to local and state elected officials.
- The party must hold an informal public meeting and offer "clear, accurate and complete" information about the proposed facility or facility expansion and its potential environmental and health impacts. The DEP or the Siting Council may not take any action on the party's permit, certificate, or approval earlier than 60 days after the informal public meeting.
- The party must also consult with the chief elected official(s) of the town(s) in which the facility is to be located to evaluate the need for a "community environmental benefits agreement," which is defined as a written agreement by which the property owner or developer commits to the municipality to provide "financial resources" to mitigate, in whole or in part, "impacts reasonably related to the facility, including, but not limited to, impacts on the environment, traffic, parking and noise." The municipality must provide community residents an opportunity to be heard concerning the need for and terms of such an agreement.
Where a facility must comply with the Act for both Siting Council and DEP approvals, the Act allows DEP to waive the requirement for an additional informal public meeting if one has already been held for purposes of the Siting Council approval.
DEP estimates that some or all of about 69 municipalities in the state qualify as an "environmental justice community." DEP is now working with the Department of Economics and Community Development (DECD) to identify these areas more specifically. DEP has also drafted template and guidance documents and will discuss these at a public workshop on Tuesday, January 13, 2009, 10:00 to 12:00 noon at DEP offices in Hartford.
In summary, the Act has the potential to alter significantly the timing, cost, and outcome of DEP and Siting Council applications for affected facilities.
Robinson & Cole is currently advising a number of clients regarding the Act and its potential impacts on facility development in Connecticut. We stand ready to apply our experience and insights to your operations and strategic planning. If you would like to discuss these issues and how they may impact your business, or if you would like a copy of the draft DEP implementation documents, please contact any of the following attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group:
Earl Phillips, (860) 275-8220, firstname.lastname@example.org
Ken Baldwin, (860) 275-8345, email@example.com
Brian Freeman, (860) 275-8310, firstname.lastname@example.org
Pamela Elkow, (203) 462-7548, email@example.com
Posted on March 13, 2009
On February 25, 2009, EPA proposed a new set of rules and rule revisions applicable to a broad universe of existing stationary reciprocating internal combustion engines (RICE). These engines are typically used for a variety of purposes at commercial and industrial facilities, such as providing back-up electricity and powering fire pumps. The proposed rule for existing engines would supplement (and in certain instances, modify) the 2004 and 2008 rules for new engines. Collectively, these rules address "hazardous air pollutants" (HAPs) and are formally known as the RICE National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs).
Like the 2004 and 2008 rules, the proposed rules are dense and complex. They would apply to engines in three basic categories of stationary RICE:
- Existing smaller (<500 horsepower) engines at "major sources" of HAPs (i.e., facilities with potential emissions of at least 10 tons/year of an individual HAP or 25 tons/year of any combination of HAPs)
- Certain new or reconstructed engines at "major sources"
- Existing engines at "area sources" (i.e., non-major sources)
The definition of "existing" and "new or reconstructed" varies depending on such factors as the design type, power rating, fuel type, and usage of a particular engine. Similarly, such factors also would determine whether and how the engine would be subject to various proposed numeric emission limits or other requirements regarding fuels, emission controls, periodic emission testing, operating and maintenance practices, and associated recordkeeping and reporting.
Notably, EPA is proposing that RICE sources would not have the benefit of the "startup, shutdown, and malfunction" exemption that traditionally has been part of numerous NESHAP regulations, including the existing RICE NESHAP. (The legal status of this exemption is currently uncertain, following a December 2008 court ruling that struck it down.) However, EPA is also "co-proposing" an alternative limited exemption for certain engines that use catalytic controls: such engines would be subject to more relaxed emission limits during startup and malfunction, but not shutdown.
Public comments on this proposed rule must be received on or before the later of May 4, 2009, or 30 days after EPA holds a public hearing on the proposal.
The scope and complexity of the proposed rules present significant challenges in determining if and how the rules would apply to any individual engine. From our experience in counseling clients regarding the 2004 and 2008 rules, we stand ready to assist with the regulatory analysis, or with preparing public comments to EPA about the proposed rules and revisions. If you would like to discuss the proposed rules, please contact any of these attorneys in our Environmental and Utilities Practice Group: