Posted on October 4, 2013
EPA is still working the kinks out of its New Source Performance Standards (NSPS) for the Oil and Natural Gas Sector, i.e., 40 C.F.R. 60 Subpart OOOO, referred to by many as the “Oil and Gas NSPS” and by some as simply “Quad O”. EPA first published the proposed Oil and Gas NSPS on August 23, 2011, in conjunction with proposed revisions to three other air regulations affecting various segments of oil and natural gas operations. The proposal prompted more than 150,000 public comments and kindled a national discussion on emissions at natural gas well sites. The final Oil and Gas NSPS rule was published in August 2012. Although the rule is most famous for establishing the first federal air standards for hydraulically-fractured natural gas wells, the rule also set significant volatile organic compound (VOC) standards for “storage vessels” used by the oil and natural gas industries.
Several stakeholders responded to the August 2012 rulemaking by filing petitions for administrative reconsideration of the Oil and Gas NSPS. On April 12, 2013, EPA published a notice granting reconsideration for a number of issues and proposing revisions to the storage vessel standards, in particular. Evidently, EPA significantly underestimated the number of storage vessels coming online in the field when it developed the August 2012 final rule, which required individual storage tanks with VOC emissions of 6 tons or more per year to achieve at least 95% reduction in VOC emissions. Tanks are commonly used at natural gas well sites, for example, to store condensate, crude oil, and produced water. In light of an updated tank estimate, EPA recognized that additional time would be needed for manufacturers to produce a sufficient number of VOC control devices.
Most recently, on September 23, 2013, EPA published final revisions to the storage vessel requirements in the 2012 Oil and Gas NSPS. Per the revised rule, which was immediately effective, an individual tank may be considered an affected facility if its construction, modification or reconstruction commenced after August 23, 2011; it has potential VOC emissions of 6 tons or more per year; and it contains crude oil, condensate, intermediate hydrocarbon liquids, or produced water. EPA made a number of important adjustments in the revised rule, chief among them an extension of the compliance date to give tank owners and operators more time to purchase and install controls. For the so-called “Group 1” storage vessels (which were constructed, modified or reconstructed between the August 2011 original proposal and the April 2013 proposal), the deadline to control VOC emissions is now April 15, 2015. For “Group 2” storage vessels (i.e., vessels that come online after April 12, 2013), the compliance deadline is April 15, 2014. Notably, pursuant to the revised Oil and Gas NSPS, operators only have until October 15, 2013 to estimate potential VOC emissions of Group 1 storage vessels for purposes of determining whether the rule applies.
Meanwhile, the agency is continuing to evaluate other issues raised in the reconsideration petitions that were submitted in response to the August 2012 rulemaking. EPA has stated in the past that it intends to address the remaining issues by the end of 2014.
Posted on August 26, 2013
On August 20, 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in Bell et al. v. Cheswick Generating Station, GenOn Power Midwest, L.P. answered a question of first impression: “whether the Clean Air Act preempts state law tort claims brought by private property owners against a source of pollution located within the state?” In this case, Plaintiffs filed claims under state tort law against the GenOn’s Cheswick Generating Station, a 570-megawatt coal-fired electrical generation facility in Springdale, Pennsylvania for allegations of ash and contaminants settling on their residential property (located within a mile of the plant). The Appeals Court held that “(b)ased on the plain language of the Clean Air Act and controlling Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that such source state common law actions are not preempted.”
This decision was based upon the U.S. Supreme Court precedent found in Intl. Paper Co. v. Ouellette. The question presented by Intl. Paper Co. v. Ouellette was “whether the [Clean Water] Act pre-empts a common-law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont law, when the source of the alleged injury is located in New York.” The U.S. Supreme Court held that: (1) Clean Water Act preempted Vermont nuisance law to extent that that law sought to impose liability on New York point source, but (2) Act did not bar aggrieved individuals from bringing nuisance claim pursuant to law of source state.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has previously applied the Intl. Paper Co. v. Ouellette decision to the Clean Air Act in Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Kaufman. In the Ashland Oil case The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia held that Intl. Paper Co. v. Ouellette “requires the application of the statutory or common law of the source state to an interstate pollution dispute when the pollutants in question are regulated by the Clean Air Act. However, the procedural law of West Virginia shall be followed when the issues are being litigated in this State's courts.”
Thus, it appears, at least in the 3rd Circuit, that while interstate common law disputes are preempted by the Clean Air Act, intrastate disputes are not.
Posted on July 10, 2013
In April of 2013 the Arkansas legislature put an end to the ad hoc policy of implementing the NAAQS through stationary source permitting based upon source specific NAAQS modeling. The Arkansas legislature did not need a crystal ball to predict the chaos that was about to occur when the new NAAQS (PM2.5, one hour SO2 and one hour NO2) were swept into the existing Arkansas regulatory program. Arkansas’ environmental agency, the Arkansas Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) has relied upon its stationary source permitting program to implement the NAAQS for years, as opposed to relying upon state implementation plan (SIP) development. ADEQ has required every permit applicant to submit air dispersion modeling, and thereby demonstrate that the source will not cause a NAAQS violation. By comparison, EPA generally requires only PSD permit applicants to submit NAAQS dispersion modeling, and requires the states to otherwise address NAAQS compliance through their SIPs.
When Arkansas’ SIP permit procedures were last updated in 2000, minor (non-Title V) sources, and “minor modifications” at major sources were not required to undertake NAAQS modeling. Arkansas’ policies regarding NAAQS modeling were generally in sync with the Clean Air Act and most other states. Over the ensuing years regulatory creep expanded Arkansas’ NAAQS modeling program to the point that nearly every stationary source permit application was involved. ADEQ permit engineers required NAAQS dispersion modeling for minor sources, for minor mods at major sources, and then for any permit renewal—even no change renewals, “just to make sure that the source is still OK.” For example, a facility that had operated in full permit compliance for decades, without any modifications, could face permit renewal problems for no reason other than background conditions or recent meteorological data changed the NAAQS modeling results. Suffice to say this development was unpopular, making permitting expensive, time consuming, and uncertain.
The uncertainty was predicted to become chaos in September of 2012 when ADEQ proposed to drop the new NAAQS into its existing SIP. ADEQ’s “plan” was that the new NAAQS would also be implemented through stationary source permitting, including ADEQ’s expansive NAAQS modeling policies. Of particular concern is the PM2.5 standard, which, at 12 ug/cm3, is already near or exceeded by the background levels measured at the majority of the ambient monitoring stations throughout the state—background that is rarely, if ever, the result of any stationary source activity, but more likely the result of rural road dust and other non-stationary sources.
It became apparent to the regulated community that each permit review following adoption of the new NAAQS would generate ad hoc findings of modeled exceedances of the new NAAQS. By implementing the NAAQS through stationary source permitting rather than SIP planning, ADEQ eliminated any evaluation of regional cause and effect, and precluded any consideration of comprehensive solutions that involve all contributing sources. Under ADEQ’s “plan,” the unwitting permit applicant is forced to stand alone and face the consequences of a failed NAAQS modeling exercise. Concerns raised by the regulated community fell on deaf ears.
The Arkansas legislature stepped in, and in April of 2013 it enacted Act 1302, which required ADEQ to stop “protecting the NAAQS” by requiring stationary source permit applicants to undertake dispersion modeling, except in enumerated circumstances. Act 1302 prohibits ADEQ from using modeling for stationary source permit decisions or requiring retrofit pollution control technology. With the exception of PSD and other limited situations, dispersion modeling can only be used when there is a source or pollutant-specific SIP requirement. The Clean Air Act requires states to develop a SIP “for maintenance and protection of the NAAQS,” and Act 1302 requires ADEQ to implement the NAAQS as required by the Clean Air Act. The legislature did not neuter the agency’s efforts to protect clean air (which was the agency’s unsuccessful lobbying position). The legislature just said quit implementing the NAAQS through ad hoc permit decisions based on source specific air dispersion modeling. The legislature told ADEQ to use its ambient monitoring network, area modeling, and other tools to evaluate NAAQS compliance, and where non-attainment occurs, do the comprehensive planning that is required by the Clean Air Act to address it. Act 1302 was carefully drafted to compliment the Clean Air Act, and serves as a good model for any state facing similar NAAQS implementation issues.
During the two months since Act 1302 has been the law in Arkansas the agency has gone through some needed growing pains. The proposed rulemaking to enact the new NAAQS in Arkansas is being re-evaluated in light of the requirements of Act 1302. Much of the regulatory creep that occurred over the past decade has been curtailed, such that minor sources, minor modifications and no change permit renewals are no longer being required to submit dispersion modeling or demonstrate NAAQS compliance.
There is nothing like the heavy hand of the legislature to bring reason back into agency decision making. It appears that ADEQ now recognizes (much like most other states) that modeling has its limitations, and these minor stationary source projects are not causing, nor are they likely to cause any NAAQS problems. There is still a lot of work to be done as the new NAAQS are adopted, and real SIP planning commences. But sometimes it takes a pre-emptive strike to get the process started on the right track.
Posted on July 3, 2013
On June 13, 2013, U.S. EPA announced its enforcement priorities for the next three years. Among other things, the Agency decided to continue its ill-fated, 15-year old "New Source Review (NSR) Enforcement Initiative." This effort has targeted coal-fired power plants and other large manufacturing facilities for alleged violations of the Clean Air Act. The allegations often pertain to projects which were implemented over twenty and thirty years ago.
Not surprisingly, EPA has not fared very well in the courts with cases like this. The Agency has run into problems, including: 1) statute of limitations concerning projects completed more than five years before legal action has been commenced; 2) successor liability issues when the current owner/operator of a facility did not own or operate the facility when a targeted project was undertaken; and 3) serious evidentiary questions as to whether a decades-old project caused the requisite actual air emissions increase which triggers the requirements for NSR review under the Clean Air Act. See generally "EPA's Utility Enforcement Initiative: The MetED Decision May Pose Problems for Plaintiffs," BNA Daily Environment Report, June 13, 2013; U.S. v. Midwest Generation, LLC, 694 F. Supp. 2d 999 (N.D. Ill. 2010), appeal pending in 7th Circuit Court of Appeals.
A recent notice of violation illustrates some of the unfairness and waste of resources connected with EPA's NSR Enforcement Initiative. EPA issued the notice in 2012. It alleged a number of NSR violations against the owner/operator of a manufacturing facility (not a utility). One of the allegations pertained to a change made at that facility in 1982. Since 1982, the ownership of the facility has changed four times. The current owner has been targeted in EPA's enforcement action. Records regarding the 1982 project are scant, and the personnel involved in the work in 1982 are all either long-retired or deceased.
To make matters worse, EPA had received the available information about the 1982 project in 1999 from the party who owned the facility at that time. This was done in response to a Section 114 Information Request issued by EPA. That owner heard nothing further from EPA about any of the projects covered in the 1999 inquiry.
In 2011, EPA issued a new Section 114 Information Request to the current owner who had acquired the facility in 2006. The request covered projects that occurred after 1999, but it also covered projects which were done prior to 1999, including the 1982 project discussed above.
A reasonable person could ask: 1) Why did EPA wait for 13 years to allege a NSR violation regarding the 1982 project when the Agency was given information about it in 1999? 2) Why is EPA taking action now on a change made at the facility over thirty years ago? 3) Why is EPA targeting the owner who acquired the facility in 2006 -- some seven years after EPA was first given information about the 1982 project? 4) Has EPA considered that the current owner/operator of the facility is four times removed from the owner/operator who implemented the change in 1982?
Substantial amounts of money and countless hours of valuable employee time have been expended by the current owner in dealing with EPA on this case. Both the money and the time could have been better utilized in helping to keep the facility competitive in a very challenging global marketplace.
EPA should consider whether the continuation of the NSR Enforcement Initiative is justified with respect to projects that occurred decades ago. With most of these cases, fair-minded decision-makers at EPA will find that "Enough is Enough!"
Posted on June 25, 2013
Congress said EPA and the States are partners in implementing the Clean Air Act. It’s simple: EPA sets pollutant-by-pollutant standards for clean air (NAAQS) and each State develops and implements a state-specific plan to meet and maintain those NAAQS. Each partner is well-positioned and equipped to perform its assignment and Congress included appropriate “carrots and sticks” in the Act to ensure that both do their job. The Supreme Court has extolled Congress’s partnership approach and EPA routinely professes its deep appreciation of its State partners and their important role. So wassup with EPA suddenly demanding that thirty-six States delete rules about excess emissions during startup, shutdown and malfunction (SSM) that have been EPA-approved for 30 to 40 years?
On February 22, in response to a 2011 petition by Sierra Club, EPA proposed to “call” thirty-six state implementation plans (SIPs) because they contain affirmative defense, exemption, or director’s discretion rules for excess emissions during periods of SSM. EPA’s previous approval of the offending rules wasn’t even a speedbump. EPA also rejected any obligation to connect the offending rules with air pollution problems in the affected States. EPA’s legal position on how the States should enforce their CAA permits was enough to shuck the partnership and impose the federal will. And EPA didn’t even ask nicely. State requests for information about EPA’s consideration of their SIPs were ignored and States were given 30 days to comment on a proposal EPA took more than a year to develop. EPA gave its State partners another 45 days only after more than a dozen State Attorneys General jointly asked for more time and the Senate Committee considering the new Administrator’s confirmation made the same request.
When comments were filed on May 13, thirty affected States filed comments; none of them supported EPA’s proposed call of their SIP. Not even EPA’s regular supporters on issues like tougher NAAQS thought EPA’s dictation was a good idea. Complaints from EPA’s partners ranged from being wrongfully excluded from EPA’s evaluation of their SIP to EPA trampling on the States’ planning and implementation responsibilities to EPA creating a lot of work that could have been avoided if EPA had just talked to them. No amount of spin can make this look good for state–federal relationships.
So why? Well, Sierra Club did ask for it. Maybe because an obvious compliance impact is on emission limits with continuous monitoring and short averaging times like opacity. And maybe because coal-fired power plants always have opacity limits and deleting common excess emission rules will set those sources up for widespread enforcement litigation. Or, maybe the States and the previous EPAs had it wrong for all these years and someone finally straightened everyone else out. Like so many conundrums of this type, it might take some judges to give us the answer.
Pursuant to a settlement agreement with Sierra Club, EPA must finalize the SSM SIP Call by August 27, 2013.
Posted on June 7, 2013
On the night of his re-election, President Obama told the nation that he wanted “our children to live in an America…that isn’t threatened by the destructive power of a warming planet.”
In the past year, we’ve seen extreme weather, fueled by carbon pollution, cost hundreds of American lives and nearly $100 billion in damage across the country. Yet right now we have no national standards to control carbon pollution from the biggest emitters—the 1500 existing power plants which are responsible for 40 percent of U.S. carbon pollution. NRDC has developed a plan for how the President could use his existing authority under the Clean Air Act to cut this climate-changing pollution from power plants, quickly and cost-effectively.
In a 2011 Supreme Court decision, American Electric Power v. Connecticut, the court ruled that it is the EPA’s responsibility to curb carbon pollution from power plants, new and existing. Carbon pollution limits for new power plants have been proposed and the EPA needs to make them final. But the step that will make the biggest difference is cutting pollution from existing power plants. Under section 111(d) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA could set state-specific standards for average emissions from existing power plants based on each state’s current energy mix. Then states and power plant owners would have broad flexibility in deciding how to meet those standards, using a range of cost-effective measures and technologies.
Not all states line up at the same starting point when it comes to carbon emissions—some are heavily coal dependent, while others rely more on lower-carbon fuels and clean, renewable energy. Developing state-specific standards will give heavily coal-reliant states more realistic targets, while still moving them toward a cleaner energy supply. In addition, states and power plant owners can keep costs down by using a variety of measures to achieve compliance, whether it’s installing a new boiler in an old coal-fired plant, or investing in a home-weatherization program to reduce energy demand. These efficiency measures will help keep energy bills low and also create thousands of jobs that can’t be outsourced.
All in all, NRDC’s flexible, cost-effective proposal can achieve a 26 percent reduction (from 2005 levels) in carbon pollution from power plants by 2020, according to modeling done by the same firm the EPA uses for much of its air pollution modeling. The cost of compliance, about $4 billion, is comparatively low, and is vastly outweighed by the benefits--$25 to $60 billion in savings. These benefits come in the form of 3,600 lives saved, and thousands of asthma attacks and other illness prevented each year due to less air pollution, as well as the value of reducing carbon pollution by 560 million tons. This is twice the reduction that will be achieved by clean car standards.
The President has been very clear about the need to do something to curb global warming. This cost-effective proposal could be his biggest opportunity to take decisive action. He can dramatically reduce carbon pollution from power plants--while creating major health benefits and jobs--using his existing authority under the Clean Air Act.
Posted on June 3, 2013
Four votes. That is the number of votes required to grant a Supreme Court petition for a writ of certiorari. And because that is the same number of Justices who dissented from the Court’s landmark 2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, EPA has reason to worry over the summer.
Pending before the Court are nine petitions seeking review of a wide ranging set of challenges to EPA’s regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles and new stationary sources. Petitioners include most every significant part of American industry, 14 States, and numerous political leaders. Some petitions, consistent with Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s dissent from the D.C. Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. U.S. EPA, are strategically narrow; they ask the Court to review only a relatively narrow issue regarding the applicability of the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to greenhouse gas emissions. Others, by asking the Court to overturn EPA’s determination that greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles endanger public health and welfare seek, as a practical matter, to topple the Obama Administration’s effort to address global climate change in the absence of new federal legislation. But a few of the petitions jettison even any pretense of modesty by directly asking, consistent with D.C. Circuit Judge Janice Rogers Brown’s blistering dissent from en banc denial, the Court to do no less than overrule Massachusetts v. EPA.
The Solicitor General and other respondents (including 18 States) will no doubt oppose cert on all issues in their responsive filings this summer. They have nontrivial arguments, especially given the serious questions they can raise concerning the Article III standing of petitioners to raise the particular legal claims that would likely otherwise have the most force on the merits. But EPA is likely to be less concerned with whether review is granted than, if granted, on what issues. The legal stakes for some issues raised are far less consequential than they are for others, which are quite enormous.
Any cert grants will likely be announced in late September, shortly before October’s “First Monday” to allow for expedited briefing and argument as early as January 2014 and more likely in February. Otherwise, all petitions will be denied on that First Monday. It will be a long summer’s wait for all parties.
Posted on May 21, 2013
Climate tort plaintiffs cannot catch a break in the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. In a May 14, 2013, decision, the Fifth Circuit found—once again—that a group of Mississippi Gulf Coast property owners is barred from suing energy companies for tortiously emitting greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).
The case, Ned Comer, et al. v. Murphy Oil USA, et al., has a long and twisting history. At one point the case was widely viewed as in the vanguard of a handful of cases with the potential to radically realign the legal framework under which companies emit GHGs.
Comer was originally filed in the Southern District of Mississippi in 2005. Plaintiff coastal property owners alleged that the defendant companies’ emissions exacerbated climate change, which intensified Hurricane Katrina, which in turn damaged the plaintiffs’ property. Invoking the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction, the plaintiffs sought compensatory and punitive damages, asserting state law claims of nuisance, trespass, and negligence, among other claims. The district court dismissed the claims on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the matter was not justiciable under the political question doctrine.
In November 2009, a Fifth Circuit panel reversed, in part, the district court’s dismissal of the claims. The Fifth Circuit panel found that plaintiffs had standing to bring the state law claims, which the court found did not present political questions.
The Fifth Circuit panel’s decision came in the wake of the Second Circuit’s precedent-setting September 2009 decision in State of Connecticut, et al. v. American Electric Power Company Inc., et al., in which the Second Circuit recognized the validity of federal common law public nuisance claims challenging the emission of GHGs, found that a number of states and private environmental groups had standing to press such claims, and rejected the argument that the claims are nonjusticiable. Together, these cases were viewed as potentially ushering in a new era in which companies emitting GHGs would need to contend not just with EPA’s regulations but also with common law climate tort claims seeking injunctive relief or money damages.
The new era was not to be. As to Comer, before the panel opinion’s mandate issued, a majority of the Fifth Circuit’s active, unrecused judges voted to rehear the case en banc. Under Fifth Circuit rules at the time, this vacated the panel opinion reversing the district court’s dismissal. Before the Fifth Circuit reheard the case en banc, however, another Fifth Circuit judge was recused, leaving the court with only eight active, unrecused judges. Five of the remaining eight judges then determined that, with the additional recusal, the court lacked a quorum to proceed, and the judges issued in May 2010 an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ appeal from the district court’s decision for lack of a quorum.
Plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court, seeking review of the Fifth’s Circuit dismissal of their appeal. The Supreme Court denied the petition in January 2011, at which point one might have expected the case to be over.
However, the same group of property owners proceeded to file a new complaint in May 2011 alleging many of the same nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against the same energy company defendants. The District Court again dismissed the claims, finding them to be barred by res judicata and the applicable statute of limitations, and also to fail to establish proximate causation and be preempted by the Clean Air Act. In addition, as it had in Comer I, the court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims raised nonjusticiable political questions.
The Fifth Circuit’s May 2013 decision in Comer II upholds the district court’s dismissal of the climate tort claims. The Fifth Circuit agreed the case is barred by res judicata, and did not address the district court’s other grounds for dismissal. Despite the procedural quirks of Comer I, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s decision in that case to represent a final judgment, never modified on appeal. In addition, the Fifth Circuit found the district court’s final judgment to be on the merits because it adjudicated the jurisdictional issues of standing and justiciability.
Fall of 2009 may turn out to have been an apogee of sorts for climate tort claims. In June 2011, the Supreme Court issued a decision in Connecticut v. American Electric Power, holding that the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abatement of GHG emissions. Climate tort plaintiffs in a third case, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., were also on the losing end of a September 2012 Ninth Circuit panel decision which found the plaintiffs’ claims that climate change would result in erosion and flooding of the island where they live to be a matter that should be left to the legislative and executive branches of government. The Kivalina plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court in February for a writ of certiorari.
As GHG levels in the atmosphere approach their highest levels in hundreds of thousands of years or longer, the prospects for new legislative or executive branch action are uncertain. Although California recently implemented an economy-wide GHG cap and trade scheme, which began imposing compliance obligations earlier this year, that program is being challenged in the courts and there appears to be little appetite for comprehensive federal climate change legislation. EPA proposed in April 2012 a GHG performance standard for new power plants pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority, but the timing for action with respect to existing power plants and other emitting sectors is unclear. In light of the uncertainty on the regulatory and legislative fronts, and given the massive alleged harms involved, it may be too early to say if the climate tort is essentially finished or will in the future be resuscitated in a new and more potent guise.
Posted on April 12, 2013
The August 21, 2012 decision of the D.C. Circuit Court in EME Homer City Generation LP v. EPA, Case No. 11-1302, not only vacated the Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), it also provided a detailed framework (including the math) for how future plans should be developed by States to implement national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) through the “good neighbor” provisions of the Clean Air Act. This case has already been the subject of various posts to this Blog. This article will provide an update of activities that have occurred in recent weeks as state and federal agencies, NGOs and the regulated community respond to the decision and its implications for implementing the various NAAQS (past, present and future).
Let me begin by noting that on March 29, 2013, EPA and various environmental organizations filed for a writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. Even as EPA was filing for such a writ, EPA has scheduled two meetings this month with states to obtain input on technical and policy decisions. In these meetings, EPA is offering its interpretation of the court decision and its views about various options that exist for conducting the required analyses through the shared responsibility of EPA and the states.
Finally, the Midwest Ozone Group (MOG), a coalition of electric power generation interests, has developed a position statement on how the court opinion might be implemented including the identification of the following seven rules taken from the court opinion.
1. Basic rule - An upwind State’s obligation is limited to its own significant contribution and it cannot be directed to reduce emissions to account for any other factors impacting a downwind State’s nonattainment.
2. Proportionality of Downwind States - A downwind State is responsible for above-NAAQS amounts that are not attributable to significant contributions from upwind States.
3. Proportionality of Upwind States - The ratio of an individual upwind State contribution to the total contribution of all upwind States should be used as scalar to determine how the total upwind contribution is allocated among upwind States.
4. The Role of Costs - EPA may reduce some or all of the obligations of upwind States to avoid the imposition of unreasonable costs.
5. Insignificance - Once contributions are determined, a State is not required to address more than that contribution amount minus the significance threshold.
6. NAAQS Attainment - Once an area meets the NAAQS, no additional upwind emission reductions are required.
7. Over-Control - When multiple downwind areas are concerned, reductions associated with one downwind area should be reviewed in other areas to ensure unnecessary over control is not achieved
The full position statement can be found here.
The MOG position statement is accompanied by a presentation prepared by Alpine Geophysics which applies an example set of modeling data to these rules to illustrate how the rules might be applied as well as the significant technical and policy questions that remain. The Alpine Geophysics presentation can be found here.
Posted on April 1, 2013
A group of Harvard law students has come up with a novel strategy to achieve more stringent regulation of firearms in the United States, namely environmental citizen suits.
Frustrated by the slow pace of Congressional efforts to strengthen regulation of firearms, this group of students has filed citizen suit notice letters against dozens of hunt clubs and firing ranges in the South and Midwest. The notice letters allege that the hunt clubs and their members:
• Violate the Clean Water Act by discharging pollutants from point sources over navigable waters without a permit
• Violate the Clean Air Act by emitting hazardous air pollutants without a permit
• Dispose of hazardous wastes, including lead and other heavy metals, without a RCRA disposal permit or compliance with the RCRA uniform waste manifest requirements
• Own and operate facilities where CERCLA hazardous substances are released into the environment; and
• Cause or contribute to the unpermitted disposal of solid waste.
This group of students, the Harvard Environmental Law & Litigation Society, is only recently organized, but they are clearly ambitious. One of the students, Angel Del Norte, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said, “We hope our efforts will blow some of those gun crazy deep South Bubbas out of the water.”
One of the targeted organizations, the Poteau Piscine Club in south Alabama, is working to organize a unified response to the citizen suit notices. The club’s President, Robert E. Lee (“Bobby”) Rhebop, stated in a press release that all of the organizations targeted in Alabama had agreed to contribute to a joint legal defense fund. Rhebop added, “If those pointy headed snot noses in Boston think they know something about guns, I can’t wait ‘til they see the business end of my .357. I’ll teach ‘em what a discharge from a real point source can do.”
Reaction has also spread rapidly in Texas. One of the targeted hunt clubs has persuaded their local legislator to introduce a bill in the state senate that would authorize Texas residents who attend Harvard to carry concealed weapons on the Harvard campus. As one proponent of the bill said “If we pass this sucker, I bet every Texan in Harvard will start getting straight A’s.”
To date no one from EPA has commented on the notice letters.
Posted on February 13, 2013
The current Clean Air Act retains the premise in the Clean Air Act of 1963 that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments." Among the many balancing acts embedded in the text of the Clean Air Act, the balance between federal and State prerogatives is one of the more challenging.
Over time, the accumulation of requirements, and the multiplication of more requirements at a faster and faster pace, puts strains on the Clean Air Act's ideal of "cooperative federalism." In the present era of divided government and increasing political polarization, tensions between EPA and the States, and between certain States, are on the rise. For example, EPA has been sued by some States to force more aggressive regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, and by other States to force less aggressive regulation of criteria pollutants that cross State boundaries. The "turbulence inherent in [the Clean Air Act's] divided relationship" was noted in William Session's December 14, 2012 post.
While sharp contrasts on energy policy get most of the publicity, it is the small things – the finer details of regulation of sources classified as "minor" or "insignificant" under the statute and regulations – that account for a disproportionate share of the friction with regard to federal versus State prerogatives. Tensions over State discretion – particularly with regard to environmentally inconsequential mandates, land use, and small businesses – are not new to the Clean Air Act. Soon after her transition from head of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation to Administrator of EPA twenty years ago, Carol Browner said:
When I worked at the state level, I was constantly faced with rigid rules that made doing something 100 times more difficult and expensive than it needed to be. It makes no sense to have a program that raises costs while doing nothing to reduce environmental threats.
A new Association of Air Pollution Control Agencies, launched in January 2013, holds promise for enhancing the State-federal partnership basic to the design of the Clean Air Act. The primary goals of the new association are to help the States assist each other in carrying out their responsibilities under the Clean Air Act, and to better understand EPA requirements as they evolve.
The AAPCA selected Battelle Memorial Institute, the world's largest non-profit research and development organization, to provide technical assistance and organization and staffing support. The initial seventeen participants in the AAPCA are: Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. If the new AAPCA improves the technical proficiency of State air pollution control agencies, and increases the level of cooperation and collaboration between EPA and State air agencies, it will well serve the design of Congress and the interests of the nation.
Posted on December 14, 2012
All of us know that enforcement of the Clean Air Act’s (CAA) proscriptions against pollutant air emissions is premised on the concept of Acooperative federalism. We know that the CAA’s policy development and enforcement regime is based upon a division of state and federal regulatory responsibility. Stated simply, the concept is that the federal government, through the EPA, sets standards for permissible emissions of substances affecting ambient air quality while individual states retain responsibility for implementing programs to enforce these standards.
The States’ implementation mechanisms are aptly titled State Implementation Plans or SIPs. SIPs are employed to demonstrate that federal and state air pollution regulations will allow counties in a particular state to meet federally mandated ambient air quality standards (NAAQS). The SIP process approval results in pollution control requirements which govern and often times unduly complicate compliance efforts of state regulators. They can also increase compliance costs borne by the regulated community. One aspect of that conundrum is the fact that when States fail to meet deadlines for attaining these standards, the regulators themselves can face sanctions from EPA and even suits by the public. Litigation and its costs complicate matters further.
As some regulators in Pennsylvania recently observed . . . [T]he current aggressive schedules for NAAQS reviews, State Implementation Plan (SIP) development and promulgation of Maximum Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards are significant problems. Taken together, these inefficiencies are a resource drain on EPA, the states, the regulated community and the economy as a whole. The messy situation described in this quote is the subject of this blog.
The turbulence inherent in this divided relationship has escalated in recent times fraying the long-standing statutory regulatory compact between the federal government and the States.
An instructive example of the conflict of enforcement concept and reality engendered by the CAA’s cooperative federalism scheme was clearly highlighted in the recent case WildEarth Guardians v. Jackson. This case dealt with EPA’s delays in approving SIPs or pollution control plans affecting discharges of fine particulate matter or PM2.5. The plaintiffs in Wild Earth alleged that EPA failed to take final action under section 110(k)(2) and (3) of the CAA to approve SIP submittals in twenty (20) states meeting applicable requirements respecting the 2006 PM2.5NAAQS.
In 2006, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia had found that EPA’s PM2.5 NAAQS had to change because it failed to adequately protect human health. A change in this NAAQS required a change in States SIPs. SIPs were proposed but languished at EPA. Five years later, the plaintiffs in Wild Earth alleged that . . . [W]ithout infrastructure plans, citizens are not afforded full protection against the harmful effects of PM2.5 while seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
Shortly after the suit was filed the plaintiffs and the EPA entered into a settlement. A consent decree called for the EPA to approve or disapprove SIP submittals for the 2006 PM2.5 standard as early as September 12, 2012 for some of the states involved and as late as February 13, 2013 for others. The Consent Decree was entered and the case dismissed in May of 2012. Case closed and compliance efforts back on track?
Unfortunately, many of the underlying issues raised in Wild Earth, specifically, the lack of cooperation between the States and the federal government on implementation of the PM2.5 NAAQS have raged on unabated. For example, eleven (11) states sued the EPA over the agency’s alleged failure to promulgate final NAAQS for PM2.5. In New York v. Jackson the plaintiffs are seeking a declaration that EPA is in violation of Section 109(d)(1) requesting that EPA review, propose and promulgate a new PM2.5 NAAQS. On June 14, 2012, EPA announced a proposal to strengthen the NAAQS PM2.5. Almost simultaneously, the D.C. Circuit issued an order refusing to set a schedule for EPA to issue a new PM2.5 NAAQS. Am.Farm Bureau v. EPA.
These developments will inevitably spawn additional delays in PM2.5 related SIP modifications and EPA approvals. That is the point of these comments on this small corner of CAA regulation and enforcement. Is the cooperative federalism underpinning of the CAA still workable? Can court’s recognize and respect the concept when regulatory policy, administrative lethargy and real human health concerns collide? These comments and observations have focused on the PM2.5 issue mainly because it has come up in some recent work in our office.
Without doubt other and more far-reaching examples of regulatory and judicial “turbulence abound, i.e., the raging fight over the EPA’s Cross State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR). In a dissenting opinion on the CSAPR case, on the concept of cooperative federalism, Judge Rogers had this to say. . . [T] he result is an unsettling of the consistent precedent of this court strictly enforcing jurisdictional limits, a redesign of Congress’s vision of cooperative federalism between the states and the federal government in implementing the Clean Air Act based on the court’s own notions of absurdity and logic that are unsupported by a factual record, and a trampling on this court’s precedent on which the Environmental Protection Agency was entitled to rely . . . . Whew!
So what are CAA practitioners to make of the mess Judge Rogers eloquently describes? This blog entry offers no practical guidance for those laboring for an aggrieved client nor laments a bad result impairing enforcement prerogatives of the regulators. Instead, I only point out that it may be time for a concerted effort to step back and reconsider whether the CAA’s cooperative federalism’s bifurcation of rule promulgation and enforcement continues to make scientific, policy or common sense in today’s world.
Posted on November 29, 2012
Author's Note: I wrote this piece at the request of my firm earlier this year. It appeared in the "Diversity Blog" on our firm's website around "earth Day" in April, 2012. After attending the ACOEL Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C. this past week, I know that many other College Fellows share my sentiments about the field we have been fortunate enough to practice law in during our careers.
I have been practicing environmental law at Quarles & Brady (in Milwaukee WI), in one form or another, since I joined the firm as a brand new attorney in 1977. Charlie Kamps was kind enough to be my mentor in the early days, and he gave me many opportunities to work with him on Clean Air Act issues. Over the years, I have been heavily involved in virtually all aspects of environmental law, but my work under the federal Clean Air Act became a real specialty. Among colleagues around the country who specialize in this area of the law, we often (somewhat sarcastically) refer to ourselves as "Air-Heads."
Working in environmental law has been very exciting. When I started out, Charlie and I were really the only two attorneys in the firm who devoted most of our practice time to environmental law. [There were many others in the firm who handled environmental litigation cases, such as the important Illinois v. Milwaukee Clean Water Act case which Quarles & Brady won in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1981. But those lawyers did not normally do environmental work on a day-to-day basis for a large number of firm clients.] In the early 1980's, the environmental practice area exploded with the passage of the federal Superfund Law and its eventual impact on virtually all corporate transactions, lending work and real estate ventures. Quarles & Brady's Environmental Practice Group grew to nearly thirty lawyers (in seven offices and four states) by the late 1990's.
For most of those years (from 1986 to 2007), I rode the wild, environmental-law-growth "roller coaster" as Chair of the firm's Environmental Law Group. At the same time, I was involved in many high stakes cases and transactions. Most of my work centered on air permitting and in defending Clean Air Act enforcement cases. I grew accustomed to living my professional life going at 100 mph on a regular basis. The issues were complex and novel, and I derived immense satisfaction from helping to steer difficult matters to a successful resolution.
The real stakes in environmental law could not be more important -- the protection of human health and welfare and the safeguarding of our natural resources for future generations. Many people think that it should be relatively easy to do all that -- just "follow the law." However, our environmental laws do not give precise directions on how this is to be accomplished. The laws set overall goals and prescribe processes by which those goals are to be achieved. But most often, the real requirements of our environmental statutes must be worked out on a case-by-case basis. This requires a complicated balancing of scientific, economic, engineering, legal and political factors. It is this balancing process which I have found exhilarating to be involved in throughout my career.
I am grateful for the opportunity to be involved in this important work. It has given meaning and a sense of real accomplishment to my professional life.
Posted on November 12, 2012
Written October 3, 2012
Water, lots of it, promises to dominate the Supreme Court’s October Term 2012 with three significant environmental cases already on the docket and potentially a couple more looming on the horizon.
In Arkansas Fish & Game Commn v. US, No. 11-597, argued on October 3rd, the Court will decide a Fifth Amendment Takings claim against the Army Corps of Engineers for temporarily flooding downstream riparian property. The parties and their supporting amici proffer competing per se “takings” and “no takings” tests. The Court seems likely to reject each in favor of the Justices’ preferred ad-hoc balancing approach. The other two cases, set for argument on consecutive days in December, are Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, No. 11-338 (consolidated with Georgia-Pacific v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, No. 11-347) and LA County Flood Control Dist v. NRDC, No. 11-460 (I am co-counsel for respondents in the LA County case). Both cases concern the application of the Clean Water Act to storm water discharges: logging in Decker and municipal storm water in LA County. The cases are the Court’s first opportunity to address storm water issues. The environmental respondents plainly have reason for concern in both cases. They won in the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s favorite circuit for reversal in environmental cases. One sign of potential trouble for the respondents: The Court asked the Solicitor General in both cases whether the cases warranted review. The SG said no, that neither case presented an important legal issue. Typically, the Court will take a case despite the SG’s negative view only if there are at least four Justices (the number required to grant review) contemplating reversal. Of course, Justices can and do change their minds once they have the benefit of full briefing and oral argument. For both Decker and LA County, environmental respondents are plainly hoping for just that.
Whether the October Term 2012 is a true blockbuster for environmental law may depend on the fate of petitions, should they be filed with the Court, seeking further review of the D.C. Circuit’s recent Clean Air Act rulings in Coalition for Responsible Regulation v. Jackson (EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations) or EME Homer City Generation v. EPA (EPA’s Cross-State Air Pollution Rule). EPA won the first in June and lost the second in August. Should the losing parties in either case successfully petition for Supreme Court review, the promise of a blockbuster Term will likely materialize.
Posted on October 29, 2012
The aim of this post is to encourage environmental lawyers to pay more attention to issues and developments in human health risk assessment.
Remedial clean ups under Superfund and RCRA are very largely driven by human health risk assessments carried out under EPA’s Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) as applied to chemicals on the site. The health-protective regulations under the Clean Air Act also are typically the product of statutorily mandated human health risk assessments. Mass tort cases seeking medical monitoring and personal injury are often based on such assessments. Just as the cost of clean up and CAA compliance are driven by these assessments, so too are numerous corporate decisions on what chemicals to use in manufacturing and commercial activity.
Despite its centrality to so many important activities, IRIS is cordoned off from most of the legal system. It is not rooted in or governed by any statute. Its results are not reviewable except in the context of their application to a particular site – and if that site is governed by Superfund, review, as a practical matter, is available only at the end of the remedial process. Perhaps because of this structure and because human health risk assessments are an intensely scientific undertaking, the presence of lawyers is very little felt.
Nonetheless, environmental lawyers should be aware of some on-going efforts aimed at examining and reforming IRIS and similar systems.
First, the Administrative Conference of the United States commissioned Prof. Wendy Wagner of the University of Texas School of Law to undertake a study entitled “Science in the Administrative Process: A Study of Agency Decisionmaking Approaches.” Prof. Wagner details in 80 pages how the processes of EPA (including IRIS), the Fish and Wildlife Service (endangered and threatened species listing) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission use science in regulatory decision-making. These useful guides are followed by almost 40 pages of recommendations and suggestions of best practices on issues such as the role of OMB in reviewing proposed agency actions with a major scientific component and the right of staff scientists to dissent from agency actions. Not surprisingly, given Prof. Wagner’s professional background, most of the topics on which she focuses are readily accessible to lawyers.
On September 10, 2012, the Administrative Conference held a workshop open to the public on many of Prof. Wagner’s ideas and proposals. It did not appear to me that very many environmental lawyers were on the stage or in the audience, despite the fact that issues and reforms discussed were central to their professional lives.
Second, in 2009, the National Academies published “Science and Decisions: Advancing Risk Assessment.” The volume focuses on EPA and IRIS. It is a thorough review of the issues and challenges of risk assessment from scientists who are, from time to time, called on to review EPA’s handiwork. Although some of the advice is merely editorial – be succinct and to the point, one chart or figure can be worth a thousand words – the authors address many of the major scientific issues in risk assessment, e.g. the selection of default values given the known sensitivity of a lab animal to a chemical, the probable sensitivity of humans has to be “calculated” or how to treat cumulative risks where there is exposure to two or more chemicals.
EPA is now working on implementing many of the suggestions set out in “Science and Decisions.” In September, 2012, the comment period closed on the draft of EPA’s “Framework for Human Health Risk Assessment to Inform Decision Making.” This document responds in large part to “Science and Decisions,” addressing “the recommendation that EPA formalize and implement planning, scoping, and problem formulation in the risk assessment process and that the agency adopt a framework for risk-based decision making.” EPA is not done absorbing “Science and Decisions” and the National Research Council is not done with EPA. The Council will continue to review how EPA implements IRIS. There will be an emphasis on EPA’s weight-of-evidence analyses and recommended approaches for weighing scientific evidence for chemical hazard and dose-response assessments. See Review of the IRIS Process, National Academies Current Projects.
The ongoing initiatives will provide the structure and the process for human health risk assessments in the future. The work of environmental lawyers will be shaped by what the scientists decide. Environmental lawyers should be engaged in these debates and arguments now.
Posted on October 8, 2012
The full import of the pivotal American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011), decision holding that federal common law claims for injunctive relief were displaced by federal regulation of GHGs under the CAA remain to be decided. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has now upheld the dismissal of a federal nuisance action filed in 2008 against Exxon Mobil et al., seeking damages for flooding attributable to climate change. Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxon-Mobil Corp., No. 09-17490 (Sept. 21, 2012). Damage estimates approached $400 million. The suit was dismissed by the District Court in 2009 on the grounds the regulation of greenhouse gases was a legislative matter rather than a judicial controversy and for lack of standing.
The Supreme Court in AEP held only that the plaintiff was not entitled to injunctive relief. Relying on AEP, the Ninth Circuit held that the federal Clean Air Act displaces climate change-related federal common law public nuisance claims for both injunctive relief and damages. In a concurring opinion, Judge Pro wrote that he would have dismissed for lack of standing as the plaintiff had failed to prove its injuries were directly attributable to the defendants.
In AEP, the Supreme Court held that the CAA would bar state common law nuisance claims if such claims were preempted, but the Court did not decide if the CAA in fact preempted state common law nuisance claims. In Kivalina, the district court dismissed the state common law nuisance claims without prejudice. The Ninth Circuit did not rule on the validity of these claims. Since the plaintiff’s state common law claims are undisturbed by this decision, it remains to be seen whether Kivalina or other will pursue such claims.
Posted on September 19, 2012
In his blog post of August 27, Rob Brubaker reported on three cases in which the courts refused to grant deference to EPA decisions under the agency’s Clean Air Act authority. EPA has fared a bit better in two recent Clean Water Act cases.
In Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement District v. EPA case, the issue was whether EPA properly issued a stringent NPDES permit renewal to a sanitary district to control excessive nitrogen and phosphorus loading. The First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the district’s argument that EPA should have waited until the district could complete its modeling effort, even though the model did not seem close to ready, and that EPA did not apply the best science. The court declined to conduct a de novo review of EPA’s scientific analysis, limiting its inquiry to whether EPA followed the appropriate administrative process, based its decision on record evidence and clearly articulated its reasoning. So long as the criteria imposed are within the “zone of reasonableness”, the court will not strike it down.
Interestingly, the Upper Blackstone court also rejected the district’s argument that the new permit is improper because even with stricter criteria, it would not be sufficient to correct the eutrophication problem in the watershed. The court set that aside, noting that the CWA contemplates multiple sources of contamination and no one party is responsible for cleaning up the river.
The Upper Blackstone case is consistent with the U. S. District Court’s decision in the Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA, which I discussed in my March 23 post. In the latter case, the court upheld EPA’s approval of Oregon’s numeric temperature standards, deferring to the EPA’s scientific expertise. It took issue with the narrative Natural Conditions Criteria because it was so broad that the court concluded it supplanted numeric standards. The court left the door open for the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality to rewrite the narrative standard for EPA review, based on the agencies’ own review of the science and a good explanation in support of the standard.
It appears the theme running through three Clean Air Act cases cited in the Brubaker post is that the reviewing court found no authority supporting EPA’s action, or that EPA’s interpretation defied the plain meaning of the statute. In the Clean Water Act cases, EPA overreaching on the Upper Blackstone permit or approval of Oregon water quality standards was not at issue. The focus instead was on whether EPA demonstrated it properly considered the best science available under the authority it had, and then explained how it got to its decision. In that context, EPA and state regulatory agencies will win more than they lose.
Posted on September 17, 2012
Companies who wrestle with whether their various air pollution-emitting operations must be grouped together for Title V permitting purposes have received some assistance from a recent Sixth Circuit opinion. In Summit Petroleum Corporation v. U.S. EPA, 2012 FED App. 0248P (6th Cir.), the court curtailed EPA’s expansive interpretation of a “single source” under the Clean Air Act.
By rule, operations belong to a single source if they: (1) possess the same SIC codes; (2) are located on contiguous or adjacent land; and (3) are under common control. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(5), (6). In addition, by policy, EPA has expanded the definition of “single source” to include not only the facilities that meet these three criteria, but also those facilities that provide support to an adjacent central operation. See Preamble to the August 7, 1980 final Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) regulations, 45 FR 52676; Preamble to Revised Part 51 and Part 70, Draft, February 18, 1998. And, EPA has taken a “functional” approach to the term “adjacent,” such that these support facilities need not even physically adjoin the main facility. For example, EPA considered two aluminum smelter facilities adjacent, despite their 3.4 mile separation, due to the extensive truck traffic between the two properties. See Letter from Steven C. Riva, U.S. EPA, to Robert Lenney, Alcoa Inc., Mar. 9, 2009. See also Letter from Pamela Blakely, U.S. EPA, to Don Sutton, Illinois EPA, re: General Dynamics, Ordinance & Tactical Systems, Inc., Mar. 14, 2006 (several plants considered a single source, despite their 8-mile separation, because they met a “common sense notion of a plant”).
Therefore, when EPA recently considered whether Summit Petroleum Corporation’s gas wells and associated flares should be considered a single source with its gas sweetening plant, EPA did not find it dispositive that several of the wells were located over a mile from the plant and were separated by other intervening properties. Instead, EPA noted that the wells and the plant were highly interdependent and under Summit’s common ownership. As a result, the wells and plant met the “common sense” notion of a single facility. See Letter from Cheryl Newton, U.S. EPA, to Scott Huber, Summit Petroleum Corporation, Oct. 18, 2010.
Summit challenged EPA’s single source determination, and the Sixth Circuit vacated that determination in Summit Petroleum Corporation v. U.S. EPA. The court found it “unreasonable and contrary to the plain meaning of the term ‘adjacent’” that EPA equated “functional relatedness” with “physical adjacency.” Id., at *2. The court ordered EPA to use instead the “ordinary, i.e., physical and geographical” meaning of the word “adjacent.” Id.
This decision will affect long-standing EPA policy and practice in making single source determinations. As the Director of EPA’s Region VIII Air Program noted, there is “no evidence that any EPA office has ever attempted to indicate a specific distance for ‘adjacent’ on anything other than a case-by-case basis.” See Letter from Richard Long, U.S. EPA, to Lynn Menlove, Utah Division of Air Quality, “Response to Request for Guidance in Defining Adjacent with Respect to Source Aggregation,” May 21, 1998, citing 45 Fed. Reg. 52,676, 52,695 (August 7, 1980) (“EPA is unable to say precisely at this point how far apart activities must be in order to be treated separately. The Agency can answer that question only through case-by-case determinations.”). Therefore, companies with “functional” single-source determinations should consider whether the recent Sixth Circuit decision could impact their status under the Title V program.
Posted on September 13, 2012
One company may own a variety of “functionally related” facilities that are located on various contiguous and non-contiguous parcels of land, spread out over many square miles. May all those “functionally related” facilities be considered “adjacent” and thus deemed to be one single major stationary source for Clean Air Act Title V permitting purposes?
A Court of Appeals recently weighed in on this issue. On August 7, 2012, the Sixth Circuit vacated EPA’s determination that Summit Petroleum Corporation’s natural gas sweetening plant and gas production wells located in a 43-square mile area near the plant were “adjacent” and thus could be aggregated to determine whether they are a single major stationary source for Title V permit purposes. Summit Petroleum Corp. v. EPA, 2012 WL 3181429 (6th Cir., Aug. 7, 2012). The majority held that EPA’s position that “functionally related” facilities can be considered adjacent is contrary to the plain meaning of the term “adjacent,” which implies a physical and geographical relationship rather than a functional relationship. The court also found EPA’s interpretation to be inconsistent with the regulatory history of Title V and prior EPA guidance. The case was remanded to EPA for a reassessment with the instruction that Summit’s activities can be aggregated “only if they are located on physically contiguous or adjacent properties.”
Posted on September 6, 2012
Federal and state regulators have, over the years, frequently received complaints about odor. Because the problem is a common one -- and because the origins of environmental law lie, in part, in the common law of public nuisance -- one might think we would have developed a consistent, practical way of regulating odor. We haven’t. No federal laws address odor, and the various state laws and rules addressing odor are a hodge-podge of not fully-considered ideas.
This is likely due in part to the subjective nature of odor: one person’s stench may be another person’s sweet smell of success. More importantly, though, there is no commonly accepted way of quantifying or measuring odor. If you cannot define something precisely and cannot agree on how to measure it, it necessarily follows that you will have a hard time regulating it. There have been attempts to use odor measurement technologies including the scentometer or field olfactometer, but they ultimately rely on subjective human olfactory assessment. While some states allow them as a guide, it does not appear that any statutory or regulatory scheme has adopted their use, and in fact, some states legislatures have adopted resolutions prohibiting their agencies from using such technologies for enforcement purposes.
So what is a regulator to do? Consider the efforts made by one state, my beloved Commonwealth. Virginia has tried to cram the square peg of odor into the round hole of the Best Available Control Technology (“BACT”) requirement of the Clean Air Act’s prevention of significant deterioration of air quality (“PSD”) preconstruction permitting program. Applying the BACT process to odor may have sounded like a good idea back in the day when the PSD rules were first adopted and BACT was a sexy new acronym, but implementation of the BACT approach for odor has not been easy.
At the outset, there is the difficulty that the BACT process applies only to things that are “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act. Not everything that regulators want to regulate under the Clean Air Act, however, is considered a “pollutant” under the Act. (If you doubt this, recall that it took many years of agency action and litigation and decisions by the United States Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court before it was generally accepted that carbon dioxide is a pollutant under the Clean Air Act.) And so it is with odor, which is defined by Webster’s Dictionary as “a quality of something that stimulates the olfactory nerves or the stimulation itself. In short, odor is definitely not a “typical” Clean Air Act pollutant. (Interestingly, certain substances that are pollutants, also carry the name “aromatic” if they also happen to be organic compounds with a cyclical structure, but I digress.)
Even if one can accept that “odor” is a “pollutant,” though, can the BACT process be applied to it? Not really. ”Best available control technology” means “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of [a pollutant . . .] which the permitting authority . . . , taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs, determines is achievable . . . .” Clean Air Act § 169(3). And typically BACT is determined through a top-down approach, i.e., one starts with the most stringent emission limitation theoretically achievable and then moves down from there only if the various costs of that approach are too high. How can such an approach work for odor, though, when we do not have a unit measure for odor, much less a quantitative scale for objectionable scent. Without such a measure or scale, it is effectively impossible to evaluate whether the environmental, economic or energy costs of reducing odor are reasonable or cost-effective.
So, if my beloved Commonwealth doesn’t now have the answer, let me cast my net more broadly and ask if anyone knows of a good practical scheme for regulating odor.
Posted on August 30, 2012
On August 13, 2012, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) disapproval of the Texas Flexible Permit Program (TFPP) had been arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, and unsubstantiated by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit granted the petition for review, vacated EPA’s disapproval of the Texas plan and remanded the matter to EPA.
The TFPP, a Minor new source review (NSR) permit program, had been submitted to EPA in November 1994 as a revision to the Texas State Implementation Plan (SIP). The TFPP authorized modifications to existing facilities without additional regulatory review provided the emissions increase would not exceed an aggregate limit specified in the permit.
Despite the mandate in the Clean Air Act (CAA) that EPA approve or disapprove a SIP revision within eighteen months of its submission, EPA failed to make a determination on the TFPP for more than sixteen years. By the time that EPA announced its disapproval, the State of Texas had issued approximately 140 permits under the TFPP. And despite the excessive delay in announcing its disapproval of the TFPP, EPA found time to promptly notify flexible permit holders in Texas that their facilities were operating without a SIP-approved air permit and that they were risking federal sanctions unless SIP-approved air permits, requiring current Best Available Control Technology, were obtained.
The State of Texas and ten industry and business groups subsequently filed suit challenging EPA’s disapproval, which had been based on three primary arguments: 1) the program might allow major sources to evade major NSR; 2) the provisions for monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting (MRR) are inadequate, and 3) the methodology for calculating permit emissions caps lacks clarity and is not replicable. Two of the justices on the 3-judge panel court rejected each of EPA’s contentions, with the third justice dissenting.
The majority rejected EPA’s contention that the TFPP allowed major sources to evade Major NSR because the TFPP includes three rules that affirmatively require compliance with Major NSR, and EPA could not identify a single provision in the CAA or the CAA implementing regulations that empowered EPA to disapprove a SIP that did not also contain an express negative statement that the Minor NSR permit could not be used to evade Major NSR. Further the court noted that in its briefings, EPA had conceded that language explicitly prohibiting circumvention of the Major NSR requirements is not ordinarily a minimum NSR SIP program element. 75 Fed. Reg. at 41,318-19.
The majority also rejected EPA’s contention that the TFPP allowed the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality executive director too much discretion in determining MRR requirements in a Minor NSR permit and that this amount of discretion is contrary to EPA policy. The court found that EPA could not identify an independent and authoritative standard in the CAA or its implementing regulations that required MRR requirements to be specified in a SIP, rather than based on the size, needs, and type of facility authorized in a Minor NSR permit. In addition, the court found that EPA failed to identify the purported policy of disfavoring “director discretion” in any comments that EPA submitted to the State of Texas on the TFPP regulations or in EPA’s disapproval of the requested Texas SIP revision. Thus, the court held that the purported policy is not in the record on which the court must review EPA’s disapproval under the APA. Although not a factor in its decision, the majority also noted that “other recent EPA action tends to not only undercut the assertion of such a policy but also to give the impression that EPA invented this policy for the sole purpose of disapproving Texas’ proposal.”
Finally, the majority rejected all of the arguments EPA gave for finding the TFPP to be deficient. Among other things, the court concluded that EPA could not identify a single provision in the CAA or EPA’s Minor NSR regulations that requires a state to specify the method of calculating emissions caps or to demonstrate replicability in its SIP or as a condition of approval of a state’s Minor NSR program. Similar to its comments on EPA’s second contention, the majority also noted that EPA appears to have adopted the third test solely for application to the TFPP.
Due to the uncertain status of the TFPP and the risk of federal enforcement, most flexible permit holders requested that the flexible permits be altered to reflect that the authorization meets the air permitting requirements already in the EPA-approved Texas SIP. Thus, EPA succeeded in gutting a Minor NSR permit program that it had wrongly disapproved, but it did not achieve any substantive changes in permit requirements. Although the majority vacated EPA’s disapproval of the TFPP and remanded the matter to the agency, EPA is not likely to act and facilities in Texas are not likely to decide on whether to pursue new flexible permits until after the November election.
Posted on August 27, 2012
In split decisions over a two-week period on entirely different Clean Air Act issues, three different Circuits refused to give deference to EPA interpretations.
The merits of the three decisions – concerning the latitude States have in designing "minor" new source permitting programs approvable in their State Implementation Plans, the attributes that make a source "major" for Clean Air Act permitting purposes, and the limits on EPA's authority to manage emissions transported from one State to another – are far reaching and significant on many levels. One interesting common thread underlying the merits is how the three different Circuits approached the doctrine of deference.
In Texas v. EPA, No. 10-60614 (5th Cir., Aug. 13, 2012), the Fifth Circuit vacated EPA's disapproval of a State Implementation Plan revision Texas submitted to make its Minor New Source Review rules more flexible (by using a "bubble" concept for reducing the types of minor changes needing separate preconstruction permits). The Court dismissed EPA's position that the Texas rules conflicted with EPA's policy against State Implementation Plan provisions that allow "director discretion." The majority concluded "[t]here is, in fact, no independent and authoritative standard in the CAA or its implementing regulations requiring that a state director's discretion be cabined in the way that the EPA suggests" and "[t]therefore, the EPA's insistence on some undefined limit on a director's discretion is . . . based on a standard that the CAA does not empower EPA to enforce."
In Summit Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. EPA, Nos. 09-4348 and 10-4572 (6th Cir., Aug. 7, 2012), the Sixth Circuit vacated EPA's determination that, because they are "functionally related," natural gas production wells are "adjacent" to the gas processing plant to which the output of the wells is pipelined. The practical consequence is that if the wells and the plant are "adjacent," their potential emissions would be aggregated and would exceed the threshold level requiring a Title V permit, whereas if they are not "adjacent," they would be separately subject to less onerous "minor" source permitting requirements. The Court relied upon the dictionary definition, etymology, and case law on the meaning of "adjacent" to conclude that "adjacency is purely physical and geographical." The Court wrote "we apply no deference in our review of EPA's interpretation of ['adjacent']" since the word is "unambiguous," and "we hold that the EPA has interpreted its own regulatory term in a manner unreasonably inconsistent with its plain meaning . . .."
In EME Homer City Generation v. EPA, No. 11-1302 (D.C. Cir., August 21, 2012), the D.C. Circuit vacated EPA's Cross-State Air Pollution Rule (CSAPR), also known as the Transport Rule, requiring 28 States to curtail sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide emissions from one State deemed by EPA to "contribute significantly to nonattainment" of National Ambient Air Quality Standards for ozone or fine particulate matter in another State, or to "interfere with maintenance" of such standards in another State. The Court held that the way in which EPA quantified allowable emissions from the various States exceeded the Agency's statutory authority, and that EPA's preemptive implementation of State Implementation Plan requirements was "incompatible with the basic text and structure of the Clean Air Act" and contrary to the "first-implementer role" reserved for the States by the Act. The Court concluded that EPA's interpretation of the "good neighbor" provision – one of more than 20 State Implementation Plan requirements in Section 110(a)(2) of the Act – offended the principle that Congress does not "hide elephants in mouseholes" (citing the Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns). EPA's interpretation of its authority to promulgate Federal Implementation Plans before giving the States an opportunity to submit State Implementation Plans after EPA determined the level of "good neighbor" emission reductions required was rejected on both step 1 and step 2 Chevron grounds.
Three swallows do not a summer make, but if Courts continue to delve more deeply into the merits of EPA decisionmaking under the Clean Air Act and similar statutes in this era of Congressional gridlock, the consequences could be profound for supporters and opponents of EPA actions.
Posted on August 14, 2012
On Friday, in Texas v. EPA, the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals vacated EPA’s decision rejecting Texas’s SIP revisions that would have implemented (and did implement, for 16 years) a Flexible Permit Program for minor NSR sources. While genuflecting at the altar of deference to agency decisionmaking, the Court concluded that EPA’s rejection was not based on either EPA factual determinations or on its interpretation of federal, as opposed to state, law. The Court also concluded that EPA had not in fact relied on the reasons given in its briefs, and refused to defer to EPA’s “post hoc rationalizations.” The Court thus gave essentially no deference to EPA’s decision.
The interesting part of the decision was the dissent by Judge Patrick Higginbotham, a Reagan appointee. Judge Higginbotham took the majority to task for “not faithfully applying the deferential arbitrary and capricious standard.” He then persuasively demonstrated why the Texas program, as written, did violate the Clean Air Act.
After dismantling the majority’s logic, he then addressed the practical heart of the case – EPA’s 16-year delay in rejecting the SIP revisions. While criticizing EPA for the delay, Judge Higginbotham pointed out that there is a statutory remedy for EPA’s failure to rule on the revisions – a suit under section 7604(a)(2) of the CAA – a remedy never pursued by Texas.
What’s important about this case is that is an excellent example of why judicial restraint is so often “more honor’d in the breach than the observance.” (It’s been a while since I’ve quoted Shakespeare.) When a federal agency unwinds state policy after a sixteen-year delay, it’s very tempting for courts to engage in judicial activism, if that’s what it takes to go upside the agency’s head. The harder course, requiring more discipline, is to remain true the ideal of judicial restraint – that a court is not to substitute its judgment for an agency acting pursuant to an act of Congress. Therefore, Judge Higginbotham’s conclusion seemed worth note:
"As so often with political debate in search of a legal forum, its utility lies largely in pleasure of expression. Angst over perceived federal intrusion into state affairs ought be eased by the reality that laws enacted by Congress are laws of the States. Congress passed the Clean Air Act and made it enforceable by the EPA. The State was represented in that decision by two senators and its thirty-two other elected members of Congress. It also bears mentioning that its former governor was resident in the White House for eight of the years in passage here. The Clean Air Act is not foreign law. I dissent."