EMERGENCY RESTRICTION/PROHIBITION

ORDER

This notice constitutes an Emergency Restriction/Prohibition Order (Order) by the United States Department of Transportation (DOT) pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 5121(d). This Order is issued to all persons who offer for transportation in commerce within the United States, UN 1267, Petroleum crude oil, 3, Packing Group (PG) I, II, or III, as described by 49 CFR § 172.101 of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR); 49 CFR Parts 171 to 180. By this Order, DOT is:

* mandating the proper testing (conducted with sufficient frequency and quality) and classification of petroleum products (i.e., petroleum crude oil) prior to them being offered into transportation;

* requiring persons who offer bulk quantities of petroleum crude oil for transportation in commerce by rail to treat Class 3 petroleum crude oil as a Packing Group (PG) I or Packing Group II hazardous material only until further notice.

Upon information derived from recent railroad accidents and subsequent investigations and testing, the Secretary of Transportation has found that violations of the Federal Hazmat law (51 U.S.C. §§ 5101, et seq.) or the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) (49 CFR Parts 171 to 180), and unsafe practices related to the classification and packaging of Petroleum crude oil, are
causing or otherwise constitute an imminent hazard to the safe transportation of UN 1267, Petroleum crude oil, 3, PG I, II, or III. For more detailed information, see "Background/Basis for Order" below.

**EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY ANY PERSON IDENTIFIED BY THIS ORDER:**

1) Shall, prior to offering into transportation, ensure that the petroleum product (i.e., petroleum crude oil) is properly tested and classed under current regulations, in accordance with the requirements of 49 CFR parts 172 and 173.

2) Shall transport by rail UN 1267, Petroleum crude oil, 3, PG I, II, or III, according to the requirements for petroleum crude oil, classified as Packing Group I or Packing Group II.

This Order applies to all persons who offer for transportation or transport by rail in commerce within the United States, petroleum crude oil, and its officers, directors, employees, subcontractors, and agents.

This Order is effective immediately and remains in effect unless withdrawn in writing by the Secretary, or until it otherwise expires by operation of regulation and/or law.

**Jurisdiction**

The Secretary of Transportation has the authority to regulate the transportation of crude oil in commerce. 49 U.S.C. § 5103(b). The Secretary of Transportation has designated petroleum crude oil, UN 1267, 3, Packing Group I, II, or III, as a hazardous material subject to the requirements of the HMR. 49 U.S.C. § 5121(d); 49 U.S.C. § 5103(a). Persons who offer for transportation, or transport, petroleum products (i.e., petroleum crude oil) in commerce within the United States are "persons," as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 5102(9), in addition to being "persons" under 1 U.S.C. § 1 and 49 CFR § 171.8. Commerce is as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 5102(1) and 49
CFR § 171.8, and “transportation” or “transport” are as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 5102(13) and 49 CFR 171.8. A “railroad” is as defined by 49 CFR § 171.8. A “train” is as defined by 49 CFR § 171.8. Accordingly, persons who offer for transportation or transport petroleum crude oil in commerce, including by rail, are subject to the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary, including the authority to impose emergency restrictions, prohibitions, recalls, or out-of-service orders, without notice or an opportunity for hearing, to the extent necessary to abate the imminent hazard. 49 U.S.C. § 5121(d).

**Background/Basis for Order**

An imminent hazard, as defined by 49 U.S.C. 5102(5), constitutes the existence of a condition relating to hazardous material that presents a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment may occur before the reasonably foreseeable completion date of a formal proceeding begun to lessen the risk that death, illness, injury or endangerment.

Misclassification is one of the most dangerous mistakes to be made when dealing with hazardous materials because proper classification is the critical first step in determining how to pack, handle, communicate about, and safely transport hazardous materials. Misclassification may indicate larger problems with company management, oversight, and quality control. Petroleum crude oil may contain dissolved gases, may exhibit corrosive properties and also may exhibit toxic properties. Additionally, the flammability of crude oil being shipped by bulk rail poses a significant risk of substantial endangerment to health, property, or the environment when an explosion occurs.
In light of continued dangers associated with petroleum crude oil shipments by rail, the actions described in this Order are necessary to eliminate unsafe conditions and practices that create an imminent hazard to public health and safety and the environment.

A. Recent Crude Oil Incidents

The United States has experienced a dramatic growth in the quantity of petroleum crude oil being shipped by rail in recent years. The growth has largely been spurred by developments in North Dakota, where the Bakken formation in the Williston Basin has become a major source for oil production in the United States. Much of the Bakken petroleum crude oil is shipped via rail to refineries located near the U.S. Gulf Coast or to pipeline connections, primarily located in Oklahoma.\textsuperscript{1} Shipping hazardous materials is inherently dangerous. Transporting petroleum crude oil can be problematic if released into the environment because it both is flammable and causes oil spills. This risk of flammability is compounded in the context of rail transportation because petroleum crude oil is commonly shipped in large unit trains. With the rising demand for rail carriage of hazardous materials, occasioned by the current demand for petroleum crude oil\textsuperscript{2} throughout the United States, the risk of rail incidents increases. Several accidents since last summer, which caused deaths, injuries and significant property damage, have demonstrated the need for emergency action to address unsafe practices in the shipment of petroleum crude oil by rail. The shipments are an imminent hazard when Packing Group I or Packing Group II petroleum crude oil is misclassified as Packing Group III, which could lead to an improper package being used to transport the misclassified hazardous material.

\textsuperscript{1} See AAR's December 2013 paper “Moving Petroleum crude oil by Rail”, available online at: https://www.aar.org/kevissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Crude-oil-by-rail.pdf.

\textsuperscript{2} In 2011 there were 65,751 originations of tank car loads of crude oil. In 2012, there were 233,811 originations. Association of American Railroads, Moving Crude Petroleum by Rail, https://www.aar.org/kevissues/Documents/Background-Papers/Moving%20Crude%20Petroleum%20by%20Rail%202012-12-10.pdf (December 2012).
Most recently, on December 30, 2013, a westbound grain train derailed 13 cars near Casselton, North Dakota,\(^3\) fouling main track 2. Simultaneously, an eastbound petroleum crude oil unit train was operating on main track 2. The petroleum crude oil unit train reduced its speed and collided with the derailed car that was fouling main track 2, resulting in the derailment of the head-end locomotives and the first 21 cars of the petroleum crude oil unit train. Eighteen of the 21 derailed tank cars ruptured, and an estimated 400,000 gallons of crude was released. The ruptured tank cars ignited causing an explosion. Approximately 1,400 people were evacuated. Damages from the derailment have been estimated at $8 million.\(^4\)

On November 8, 2013, a 90-car petroleum crude oil train derailed in a rural area near Aliceville, Alabama. The petroleum crude oil shipment had originated in North Dakota, and was bound for Walnut Hill, Florida, to be transported by a regional pipeline to a refinery in Saraland, Alabama. More than 20 cars derailed and the petroleum crude oil of at least 11 cars ignited resulting in an explosion and fire. Although there were no reported injuries, an undetermined amount of petroleum crude oil escaped from derailed cars fouling a wetlands area near the derailment site, and the costs are estimated at $3.9 million.

On July 6, 2013, a catastrophic railroad accident involving a U.S. railroad company occurred in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec, Canada, when an unattended freight train transporting crude oil rolled down a descending grade and subsequently derailed.\(^5\) The derailment resulted in multiple explosions and subsequent fires, which caused the confirmed death of forty-two people

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\(^3\) This derailment currently is being investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and information regarding this incident can be found at the NTSB website. See http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2014/Casselton_ND_Preliminary.pdf.

\(^4\) Federal Rail Administration

\(^5\) This derailment currently is being investigated by the Transportation Safety Board of Canada and information regarding this incident can be found at the TSB website. See http://www.bst-tsbc.gc.ca/eng/enquetes-investigations/rail/2013/R13D0054/R13D0054.asp
and presumed death of five more, extensive damage to the town center and the evacuation of approximately 2,000 people from the surrounding area. Preliminary estimates of costs exceed $1 billion.

**B. DOT Actions and Investigation of Petroleum Crude Oil Classification**

In the wake of these and other events, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) and Federal Rail Administration (FRA) have taken a number of steps to increase the safety of petroleum crude oil shipments by rail. Following the Lac-Mégantic derailment, on August 7, 2013, FRA issued Emergency Order No. 28 (EO 28), establishing securement requirements for certain unattended trains and rail equipment, including petroleum crude oil unit trains. EO 28 remains in effect until further notice by FRA. In addition, on August 7, 2013, PHMSA and FRA issued Safety Advisory 2013-06, which made a number of safety-related recommendations to railroads and hazardous materials offerors operating in the United States, including the recommendation that offerors evaluate their processes to ensure that hazardous materials are properly classed and described in accordance with the HMR, and the recommendation that offerors and carriers conduct reviews of their safety and security plans. On August 27-28, 2013, FRA and PHMSA held a public meeting with industry stakeholders to solicit input on a comprehensive review of safety regulations contained in 49 CFR Part 174 applicable to the safe transportation of hazardous materials by rail. PHMSA and FRA are collaborating to address comments received at the public meeting.

On August 29, 2013, FRA convened an emergency session of the Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC). RSAC is a group composed of railroad industry, labor, and governmental representatives who develop recommendations on new regulatory standards and other rail safety programs. During the emergency meeting, RSAC established three collaborative
working groups to formulate new rulemaking recommendations regarding hazardous materials transportation by rail, appropriate train crew sizes, and train securement procedures. Each of these working groups has been meeting on a regular basis and each working group is expected to produce formal recommendations for consideration on or before April 2014.

On September 6, 2013, PHMSA issued an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM (HM-251); 78 Fed. Reg. 54849) to solicit comments on petitions for rulemaking and National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) recommendations related to rail hazmat safety, including regulations regarding operational practices and DOT specification tank cars, most commonly used to move crude oil by rail. The comment period closed on December 5, 2013, and PHMSA received 135 comments representing almost 100,000 stakeholders. The Department is actively working on developing a regulatory proposal.

PHMSA and FRA issued a supplementary safety advisory, Safety Advisory 2013-07, on November 20, 2013, to emphasize the importance of proper characterization, classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 materials (flammable liquids, including petroleum crude oil), and to reinforce the need to follow the Federal hazardous materials regulations for safety and security planning.

On January 16, 2014, the Secretary of Transportation met with members of the rail and the petroleum industries in a call to action to address the risks associated with the transportation of crude oil by rail.

Notwithstanding the above DOT actions, in light of continued risks associated with petroleum crude oil shipments by rail, the further action described in this Order is necessary to eliminate unsafe conditions and practices related to the classification and packaging of petroleum crude oil that create an imminent hazard to public health and safety and the environment.
C. Classification and Packaging of Petroleum Crude Oil

The proper classification and characterization of a hazardous material is critical and required under the HMR by Parts 171, 172 and 173, as it dictates additional requirements, such as operational controls, emergency response, and proper packaging selection. The HMR is essential for safe transportation. The classification requirements in the HMR dictate the appropriate and authorized selection of packaging, fill densities and outage; accompanying hazard communications (markings, labels and placards); transportation safety and operational controls; and safety and security planning. Not only can properly classified shipments mitigate injury and damage when accidents occur, they are necessary to enable the most effective and informed emergency response. Indeed, the accurate classification of hazardous materials in transportation can protect the safety of emergency responders and others who may come into contact with the material.

Proper classification and characterization is especially important when dealing with an organic material such as mined liquids and gases, as these materials have variable characteristics, unlike manufactured products which are generally consistent. Moreover, crude oil transported by rail often derives from different sources and is then blended, further enhancing the potential range of appropriate classifications.

It is the offeror's responsibility to properly classify and describe the hazardous material in accordance with parts 172 and 173 of the HMR. See § 171.1 and 171.2 and 173.22. When a single material meets more than one hazard class, the shipper must select the proper shipping name based on the hazard precedence table in § 173.2a. Once an offeror has determined the hazard class of the material, the offeror must select the most appropriate proper shipping name from the HMR.

In the case of petroleum crude oil, minimum properties to properly test, characterize and classify the material include: flash point, corrosivity, specific gravity at loading and reference
temperatures, and the presence and concentration of specific compounds such as sulfur. This information enables an offeror to properly classify a hazardous material and select the proper packaging from the list of packaging authorized for use by the HMR. Such information and determination of the authorized packaging also ensure that the appropriate outage is maintained in accordance with § 173.24b.

With regard to package selection, the HMR requires at § 173.24(b) that each package used for the shipment of hazardous materials shall be designed, constructed, maintained, filled, its contents so limited, and closed, so that under conditions normally incident to transportation there will be no identifiable (without the use of instruments) release of hazardous materials to the environment, and further requires that the effectiveness of the package will not be substantially reduced. Under this requirement, offerors must consider how the properties of the material, including temperature and pressure, may affect the packaging.

PHMSA and FRA issued a supplementary safety advisory, Safety Advisory 2013-07, on November 20, 2013, to emphasize the importance of proper characterization, classification, and selection of a packing group for Class 3 materials, and to reinforce the need to follow the Federal hazardous materials regulations for safety and security planning.

In addition, PHMSA and FRA initiated Operation Classification in August 2013, which involved unannounced inspections requesting samples of the transported petroleum crude oil and testing the oil samples to verify that offerors of the materials have properly classified and described the hazardous materials. Preliminary testing has focused on the classification and packing group assignments that had been selected. These tests measured some of the inherent chemical properties of the petroleum crude oil collected. PHMSA tested samples of petroleum crude oil, destined for transportation by rail, and determined that some of the samples had been
erroneously assigned to a lower packing group by offerors than required under the HMR. As a result of Operation Classification, PHMSA has proposed $93,000 in civil penalties against petroleum crude oil offerors. PHMSA and FRA will continue to test the Bakken petroleum crude oil characteristics to gain information to verify whether the crude oil appears to be classified appropriately under the hazardous materials regulations.

FRA has also discovered incidents, and brought enforcement action, where petroleum crude oil was misclassified. FRA audits of crude oil loading facilities indicate that the classification of crude oil being transported by rail is often based solely on Materials Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) data that provide only a material classification and a range of material properties. This MSDS information is typically provided by the consignee to the shipper, and the shipper does not validate the values of the crude oil properties. FRA’s audits indicate that MSDS information has been based upon old test data, and not from testing for the many different sources of the crude oil. At a petroleum crude oil rail trans-loading facility, the crude oil is collected and stored in an above-ground intermediate storage tank. The above ground intermediate storage tanks accumulate hundreds of cargo tank motor vehicle loads, which may also lead to classification issues. In a problematic example, a shipper provided information to FRA showing that crude oil being transported by rail had a flash point of 68°F, or a Packing Group I hazardous material. The crude oil had been improperly classified as a Packing Group III material, and was being transporting in AAR Specification tank cars that were not equipped with the required design enhancements for DOT Specification 111 cars. This constituted a misuse of the crude oil HMR packaging exceptions, and subsequent violations of the HMR. Reliance upon MSDS information that is outdated and that does not accurately represent the hazardous material may also lead to the incorrect packing group being assigned to the hazardous material, which can lead to an
authorized package being used.

Misclassification can also lead to use of unauthorized containers that lack the required safety enhancements necessary to safely transport PG I & II materials, as well as insufficient development of safety and security plans and the communication of inaccurate information to emergency responders. As a result, these conditions pose an imminent hazard.

D. Investigations conducted by other Agencies involving Petroleum crude oil

Several Government entities have conducted research on transporting petroleum crude oil on trains. These entities include: the United States Department of State, Transport Canada, Transportation Safety Board of Canada, Congressional Research Service, and the National Transportation Safety Board.

While conducting its review of the National Interest Determination for the Keystone Pipeline, on January 31, 2014, the State Department released its Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. This study reviewed the alternatives to building the Keystone Pipeline, which would service the Bakken formation of the Williston Basin. In determining the no-action alternative scenario, in which a pipeline is not built and unit trains continue to deliver the petroleum crude oil, the State Department determined that “a projection of injury and fatality frequencies onto the crude oil transport volume ... indicates a potential additional 49 injuries and six fatalities for the rail alternative”\(^6\) per year.

\(^6\) Found at: http://keystonepipeline-xl.state.gov/finalseiis/index.htm Chapter 5.1.1.4 p. 5.1-6. While the State Department’s analysis did not take into account any measures that FRA and PHMSA have taken and are taking with respect to the safety of rail transport of crude oil (which would tend to increase projected injuries and fatalities), they also did not consider the Lac-Mégantic accident, which was outside of the time frame that the State Department considered (and would tend to decrease projected injuries and fatalities). Chapter 5.1.1.4 p. 5.1-6
The Congressional Research Service (CRS), a nonpartisan research group for the United States Congress,\(^7\) has analyzed the U.S. Rail Transportation of Crude Oil issue and on February 6, 2014, prepared a report for Congress.\(^8\) In its Report, CRS determined that the increasing deployment of unit trains concentrates a large amount of potentially environmentally harmful and flammable material, increasing the probability that, should an accident occur, large fires and explosions could result.\(^9\) Further, the increased use of rail for crude oil shipments is likely to increase the number of incidents, some of which may involve oil spills.\(^10\)

Transport Canada (TC), the Canadian equivalent to the U.S. Department of Transportation, has implemented many changes as a result of the catastrophic accident in Lac-Mégantic on July 6, 2013. Most recently, TC has implemented Protective Direction No. 31.\(^11\) This Directive requires that any person engaged in importing or offering crude oil for transport to immediately test the classification of crude oil being imported, handled, offered for transport or transported as UN 1267, or UN 1993, if the classification testing has not been conducted since July 7, 2013, and to provide those test results to TC upon request. Moreover, following testing, any person who imports or offers for transport UN 1267 or UN 1993 must immediately provide a MSDS for the tested product to TC, through the Canadian Transport Emergency Centre, also known as CANUTEC. Finally, until such time as the person importing or offering for transport has completed the testing, any person who imports, handles, offers for transport, or transports crude oil classified as UN 1267

\(^7\) The Congressional Research Service (CRS) works exclusively for the United States Congress, providing policy and legal analysis to committees and Members of both the House and Senate, regardless of party affiliation. As a legislative branch agency within the Library of Congress, CRS has been a valued and respected resource on Capitol Hill for nearly a century.

\(^8\) [http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf](http://www.fas.org/spp/crs/misc/R43390.pdf)

\(^9\) Id., at p. 10.

\(^10\) Id., at p. 19.

or UN 1993 by rail must ship all such crude oil as a Class 3 Flammable Liquid PG I and meet the requirements established in the Act, regulations and standards regarding UN 1267 or UN 1993 classified as PG I. Classification testing must follow the requirements of the Act and its regulations.

Finally, the National Transportation Safety Board has made recommendations to PHMSA and FRA on January 23, 2014. In its recommendations to PHMSA regarding the transportation of petroleum crude oil, the NTSB indicated Canadian authorities analyzed petroleum crude oil from nine undamaged tank cars in the train that caused the Lac-Mégantic accident. Testing indicated that the crude oil being transported in those trains had been incorrectly assigned to Packing Group III rather than Packing Group II. The crude oil on the Lac-Mégantic accident train was derived from wells in the Bakken. The above information is clear evidence of an ongoing problem with classification of petroleum crude oil that is being shipped by rail. The continuing misclassification has consequences with regard to the type of packaging in which the petroleum crude oil is transported, the protections those packages provide if an accident occurs, and, notably with regard to emergency responders, sufficient knowledge about the hazards of the materials being transported so that if an accident occurs, they can respond appropriately. The Secretary finds that this misclassification of petroleum crude oil as a Packing Group III is an imminent hazard (as defined by § 109.1) that presents a substantial likelihood that death, serious illness, severe personal injury, or a substantial endangerment to health, property, or the

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14 Id.
15 Id.
environment may occur. The information conveyed to PHMSA by the NTSB in its recent recommendations regarding the misclassification of the petroleum crude oil in the Lac-Mégantic accident train provides evidence of this imminent hazard.

NTSB also issued recommendation R-14-6 that PHMSA “require shippers [offerors] to sufficiently test and document the physical and chemical characteristics of hazardous materials to ensure the proper classification, packaging, and record-keeping of products offered in transportation.”¹⁶ In light of the above discussion, PHMSA concurs with NTSB, and to address the imminent hazard, this Order requires that any person who offers a large bulk quantity of petroleum crude oil into transportation in commerce conduct minimum testing of that petroleum crude oil to verify its classification and to retain records of that testing. Each offeror must conduct testing of a sample of a bulk quantity of petroleum crude oil being offered into transportation in commerce prior to offering that bulk quantity of petroleum crude oil into transportation. At a minimum, the tests shall be capable of determining the petroleum crude oil’s flash point; boiling point; corrosivity to steel and aluminum; presence and content of compounds such as sulfur/hydrogen sulfide; percentage presence of flammable gases; and, the vapor pressure at 50°C. The offeror should clearly identify the method used to determine the vapor pressure.

This testing will also help ensure that petroleum crude oil offerors are testing the hazardous material regularly and verifying that they have been classified, described and packaged the petroleum crude oil in accordance with the HMR. This minimum testing will address, in part, the imminent hazard described above. Offerors’ review of the testing data could help DOT to ensure compliance with existing HMR requirements regarding the proper classification of petroleum crude oil and the subsequent selection of permissible packaging.

¹⁶ Id.
As discussed in PHMSA’s January 2, 2014 safety alert, PHMSA is still investigating the variability and flammability of petroleum crude oil being produced in the Bakken. Because the evidence indicates that petroleum crude oil being produced in the Bakken is being misclassified and improperly packaged in non-DOT Specification tank cars, and because the properties and volatility of this petroleum crude oil are still unknown in certain regards, the Secretary finds that the Order is necessary to prevent the imminent hazard that exists when petroleum crude oil being transported by railroad is misclassified. This Order ensures that petroleum crude oil will be transported (until this Order is rescinded, amended or otherwise expires by regulation or law) in, at a minimum, a DOT Specification tank car.

**Remedial Action**

To eliminate or abate the imminent hazard, you must:

1) prior to offering into transportation, or transporting, ensure that the petroleum crude oil is properly tested and classed in accordance with 49 CFR parts 172 and 173.

2) From the date of this Order, assure that shipments by rail of UN 1267, petroleum crude oil, 3, PG I, II, or III shall be handled as a Packing Group I or II hazardous material.

**Rescission of this Order**

Before you may offer and/or transport any package subject to this order you must be able to adequately demonstrate that you have taken the actions listed above, or that you have taken other actions, and that the actions taken have, in fact, resulted in an imminent hazard no longer existing,
or if a change in applicable statute or Federal regulation occurs that supersedes the requirements of this Order, the Secretary will issue a Rescission Order.

**Failure to Comply**

Any person failing to comply with this Emergency Order is subject to civil penalties of up to $175,000 for each violation or for each day they are found to be in violation (49 U.S.C. §5123). A person violating this Emergency Order is also subject to criminal prosecution, which may result in fines under title 18, imprisonment of up to ten years, or both (49 U.S.C. § 5124).

**Right to Review**

Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 5121(d)(3) and in accordance with section 554 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq, a review of this action may be filed. Any petition seeking relief must be filed within 20 calendar days of the date of this order (49 U.S.C. § 5121 (d)(3)), and addressed to U.S. DOT Dockets, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E., Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590 ([http://Regulations.gov](http://Regulations.gov)). Furthermore, a petition for review must state the material facts at issue which the petitioner believes dispute the existence of an imminent hazard and must include all evidence and exhibits to be considered. The petition must also state the relief sought. Within 30 days from the date the petition for review is filed, the Secretary must approve or deny the relief in writing; or find that the imminent hazard continues to exist, and extend the original Emergency Order. In response to a petition for review, the Secretary may grant the requested relief in whole or in part; or may order other relief as justice may require (including the immediate assignment of the case to the Office of Hearings for a formal hearing on the record).
Emergency Contact Officials

If you have any questions concerning this Emergency Order, you should contact the Office of General Counsel, at 202-366-4702.

Dated: February 25, 2014

[Signature]

Anthony R. Foxx
Secretary of Transportation