Posted on October 4, 2016 by Andrea Field
More about that title later, but first let me set the stage. On September 27, 2016, the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, heard argument in West Virginia v. EPA, in which state, industry, and labor petitioners challenge EPA’s Clean Power Plan (CPP, the Plan, or the Rule). The Plan regulates carbon dioxide emissions from existing power plants under Clean Air Act (CAA) §111(d). I will refrain from addressing issues on which the trade and mainstream press have opined at length (e.g., the judges’ frustration at being asked to make policy decisions because Congress has failed to act and that participants – judges, lawyers, parties, reporters, the public – had to sit through almost 7 hours of argument in one day, in addition to the hours many spent waiting in line). Instead, I offer an ACOEL-centric tour, in non-chronological order, of the five “segments” of the September 27 argument.
Argument Segment #2: The Battle Between CAA §§112 and 111(d). Aficionados of the College’s 2014 white paper on EPA’s §111(d) regulatory authority will recall the difference of opinion over whether – under the 1990 Amendments to the CAA – EPA is prohibited from regulating power plants under CAA §111(d) if EPA already regulates power plants under CAA §112. Plan challengers point to the plain meaning of §111(d)(1)(A) as it appears in the U.S. Code. Plan supporters point to the existence of a “conforming amendment” to §111(d)(1)(A) found in the Statutes at Large but omitted from the U.S. Code, and they argue that EPA’s approach is a valid attempt to reconcile that amendment with the U.S. Code. After listening to the judges express frustration at not being able to satisfyingly reconcile the two versions, I recalled D.C. Circuit Judge Leventhal’s concurring opinion in Citizens to Save Spencer County v. EPA, in which he concluded that contradictory CAA provisions should be viewed as “countermanding.” Quoting from Eugene Field’s poem “The Duel” – about the fight between the gingham dog and the calico cat – he summed up the irreconcilable differences as follows: “The tension between the two animals culminates in these final lines of doggerel: ‘The truth about the cat and pup is this, They ate each other up.’ ”
Argument Segment #3: Constitutional Issues. If forced at knife-point to articulate the first portion of this argument, which began at 2:35 p.m., right after the lunch break, I would be unable to do so, other than to say that the word “commandeering” cropped up a lot. More interesting was how the second advocate for petitioners on this point – Professor Laurence Tribe of Constitutional law fame – was able to expand his separation-of-powers argument into a further analysis of issues argued during the morning session.
Argument Segments #4 and #5: Notice and Record-Based Issues. At the end of a very long day, the panel heard arguments on (a) whether EPA’s standards are “achievable” and whether parts of the Plan’s approach have been “adequately demonstrated” under §111; and (b) whether the final rule is so different from what was proposed that the public lacked notice and an opportunity to comment. Petitioners arguing the former point (the unachievability of program requirements) faced a weary panel, which pondered what the options for state and source relief would be if the Rule is upheld but later turns out to be a train wreck.
A colleague describes as follows the situation that gives rise to parties complaining that they had no notice of what a final rule would require because EPA’s proposal was so different: “EPA may propose an apple and finalize an orange. That’s OK; they’re both fruits. What EPA may not do (and what petitioners argue EPA has done here) is to propose an apple and finalize a pork chop.” Dick Stoll passionately argued – in his June 7, 2016 post for ACOEL – that previous 3-judge panels in the D.C. Circuit have not properly dealt with this lack-of-notice issue. Those panels refused challengers’ attempts to overturn pork chops, saying challengers of pork chops must first file administrative petitions for review under CAA §307(d)(7)(B) and then wait (for what could be years, if ever) for EPA to act on those petitions. Dick argued that the only way the previous 3-judge panel decisions would ever be overturned was by action of the entire court, sitting en banc. I cannot promise Dick the entire court will overturn the previous panels’ reading of §307(d)(7)(B), but I can say that Tom Lorenzen teed up the issue. When asked by Judge Griffith whether this argument appeared in petitioners’ briefs, Lorenzen said it did not because when petitioners wrote their briefs, the case was going to be heard by a 3-judge panel. But said Lorenzen, looking up at Judge Griffith, “Now we are here.” To which Judge Griffith replied, “And who else to ask but an en banc court?” “Exactly,” said Lorenzen.
Argument Segment #1: Core Legal Issues. Although I visit Argument Segment #1 last, the fate of the Clean Power Plan may well rest on how the panel addresses the issue raised at the very beginning of the day: whether or not the Plan is “transformative.” The Supreme Court, in UARG v. EPA, held that EPA cannot engage in a “transformative expansion” of its regulatory authority absent “clear congressional authorization” to do so. Petitioners argue that EPA’s Clean Power Plan amounts to a transformative expansion of EPA’s explicit regulatory authority and thus is illegal. EPA argues the program is not “transformative”; indeed, says EPA, the Rule is very similar to other CAA programs that the D.C. Circuit has upheld. So, is the Rule “business as usual” or is it “transformative”?
And so we return to the title of this post. I cannot predict what the D.C. Circuit will decide, but I think its determination will revolve around how the en banc panel answers the following question about the Clean Power Plan: Is You Is or Is You Ain’t Transformative? And that question prompts me to offer these final lines of doggerel in memory (and honor) of Judge Leventhal:
To predict the end here, it’s informative
To know if C-P-P is transformative.
To prevail in this Court,
One must prove that the sort
Of change caused by that Rule is enormative.