Posted on April 24, 2014
Common law litigation seeking relief from petrochemical companies for causing climate change has been much touted but little successful.
The insurance industry has been warning of huge coming losses due to climate change, but has not taken aggressive action to force change.
In a lawsuit filed in Illinois state court on April 16, 2014, some property insurers sued the City of Chicago and a host of regional and municipal water managers for failure to provide adequate stormwater storage. The class action suit alleges that the plaintiffs’ insureds would not have suffered so much flood damage from a 2013 storm had the defendants exercised better planning and construction to deal with foreseeable storms.
Notably, the plaintiff insurers rely heavily on the 2008 Chicago Climate Action Plan. The plan recognized that climate change would cause increased amounts, durations and intensities of rainfall. Plaintiffs allege that despite the foreseen problem and having had adequate time and opportunity, the defendants failed to make the recommended and necessary improvements, leading to the injuries to the insureds’ properties.
Certainly this suit faces many challenges. Courts are slow to override state and local governments’ complicated budgeting choices. Moreover, courts may be ill-equipped to oversee projects such as Chicago’s Deep Tunnel Project, which was commissioned in the 1970s to address metropolitan flooding, stormwater and sewage. After more than $3 billion so far, itwill not be completed until at least 2029.
Also, query whether such litigation will help or hurt state and local efforts to adapt to climate change. It could deter honest forecasting of what it will take.
Still, this lawsuit could augur a new wave of common law climate change litigation – a category involving well-funded plaintiffs with provable arguments for proximate cause of real damages.
Posted on April 22, 2014
Apart from a relatively mild editorial in the New York Times, the April 13, 2014 report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) warning that despite global efforts, greenhouse gas emissions actually grew more quickly in the first decade of the 21st century than in each of the three previous decades, was greeted, let us say, rather tepidly. In essence, the IPCC report declared that meeting the consensus goal limit of two degrees Celsius of global warming by mid-century would require mitigation measures on an enormous scale which, if not begun within the next decade, would become prohibitively expensive thereafter. As the New York Times put it, this is “the world’s last best chance to get a grip on a problem that . . . could spin out of control.”
Humankind’s track record for global cooperation on any scale is not good. When was the last time world peace broke out, or global poverty became a worldwide priority? The 2008 re-make of the 1951 classic film, The Day the Earth Stood Still, illustrates the problem. In the original movie, the alien civilization sent police robots to stop human aggression and nuclear weapons from spreading beyond Earth; in the re-make, the alien civilization decided that our species would have to be eliminated lest it destroy one of the rare planets in the universe capable of enormous biodiversity. In pleading with the alien for another chance, Professor Barnhardt says, “But it’s only on the brink that people find the will to change. Only at the precipice do we evolve.” And, of course, eventually and after a pretty flashy show of power and destruction, the alien rescinds the death sentence, agreeing with the Professor that at the precipice, humans can change.
Are we there yet? At the precipice? Hard to know. As Seth Jaffe pointed out in his April 14, 2014 post, global giant ExxonMobil has recognized the reality of climate change, but doubts there is sufficient global will to do much about it. On the other hand, the American Physical Society warmed the hearts of climate change skeptics in appointing three like-minded scientists to its panel on public affairs. I tend to agree with that great fictional academic, Professor Barnhardt; it will take something that all humankind recognizes as the clear and unmistakable hallmark of the precipice before we collectively put on the brakes. In the meantime, we muddle through to the next opportunity, the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in December 2014, the first such summit meeting on climate change since Rio in 1992.
Posted on April 21, 2014
Whether a wetland or modest stream is subject to Clean Water Act regulation as a “navigable water” of the United States (navigable in law) remains a muddy question. In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining CWA jurisdiction: the body of water must be “relatively permanent” and it must be adjacent (have a continuous surface connection) to navigable waters. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion says waters or wetlands sharing a “significant nexus” with traditionally navigable waters are subject to CWA jurisdiction.
In 2011, the EPA and Army Corps of Engineers (ACOE) released draft guidance on “waters of the United States” which expanded the waters over which the agencies planned to assert CWA jurisdiction, compared to pre-Rapanos. Then, in September 2013, the EPA’s Science Advisory Board released a draft scientific report, “Connectivity of Streams and Wetlands to Downstream Waters,” for public comment, stating that the final version of the report would be the basis for a joint EPA and ACOE rule on CWA jurisdiction. On March 25, 2014, the two agencies released a proposed rule stating that all tributaries of traditional navigable waters and interstate waters, and adjacent water bodies, are automatically jurisdictional because they share a “significant nexus” with navigable waters. The proposed rule appears to assert default jurisdiction over many seasonal and rain-dependent streams and wetlands near rivers and streams, provided they are “tributaries.” Beyond this, the proposed rule states that jurisdiction over other types of waters with more uncertain connections to downstream waters—such as unidirectional waters, non-adjacent wetlands, and other waters outside of flood zones and riparian areas—will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. The official version of the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register yesterday with public comments due in ninety days.
Parties understandably confused can petition for case-specific jurisdictional determinations. While a decision on such a petition may be definitive, courts have refused to allow judicial review of such decisions because they are not “final decisions” under the Administrative Procedure Act. In Belle Co., LLC v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, a federal district court noted that jurisdictional determinations do not impose any new or additional legal rights or obligations, but merely remind the party of existing duties under the CWA. By contrast, the Supreme Court determined in Sackett v. EPA that compliance orders issued by the ACOE or EPA following or flowing from jurisdictional determinations are subject to judicial review.
Adding to the challenge of navigating these uncertain legal waters, many states and municipalities have expanded their statutory definitions of “waters” (e.g. artificial features and groundwater) and “wetlands” (e.g. soil types and buffers) to increase the breadth and depth of state and local regulation. So, update your navigational charts and prepare for some challenging sailing!
Posted on April 21, 2014
New EPA Rule to Have Broad Implications for Construction Industry; Describes Required Best Management Practices for Stormwater
EPA recently finalized revisions to the effluent limitations rules for the Construction and Development (“C&D”) point source category under the Clean Water Act. The revisions will take effect on May 5th, and reflect the terms of a settlement agreement between EPA and the Wisconsin Builders Association, the National Association of Home Builders, and the Utility Water Act Group. See Wisconsin Builders Association v. EPA, No. 09-4413 (7th Cir. 2012).
The groups challenged EPA’s 2009 Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Construction and Development Industry, known as the 2009 C&D Rule, arguing that the rule was unworkable and reflected incorrect calculations, and that compliance could cost stakeholders up to $10 billion annually.
The new revisions to the C&D rule eliminate the numeric limitations for turbidity in stormwater discharges from construction sites, in favor of non-numeric effluent controls and best management practices for reducing the effects of erosion and scour on water quality. EPA had previously included numeric limitations for turbidity in its 2009 C&D rule but had stayed implementation of those limitations as a result of several legal challenges to the rule.
The C&D rule has wide-ranging applicability, as it typically covers construction activities such as clearing, grading, and excavating at sites where one or more acres of land will be disturbed. Improperly managed soil at construction sites can easily be washed off during storms and has the potential to negatively impact nearby water bodies.
Under the stormwater permitting rule, construction site owners and operators are generally required to:
- implement erosion and sediment controls;
- stabilize soils;
- manage dewatering activities;
- implement pollution prevention measures;
- provide and maintain buffers around surface waters;
- prohibit certain discharges, such as motor fuel and concrete washout; and
- utilize surface outlets for discharges from basins and impoundments.
The new revisions to EPA's stormwater permitting standards may have implications for states that have issued construction-related stormwater permits since 2009. For projects in New York State, for example, the Department of Environmental Conservation Construction General Permit (“CGP”) expires in 2015; any necessary updates to the CGP resulting from the EPA C&D rule are likely to be incorporated into the revised CGP permit due in 2015.
Posted on April 18, 2014
Appalling environmental conditions that have accompanied China’s rapid growth have been described on Chinese social media as “postapocalyptic,” “terrifying,” and “beyond belief.” During the last year, air pollution in several Chinese cities became so horrendous at times that road travel, schools, construction projects, and airports temporarily were shut down. Epidemiologists estimate that 1.2 million Chinese die prematurely each year from exposure to air pollution. Due to widespread water pollution, tap water is not safe to drink, even in luxury hotels. Pollution is estimated to cost the Chinese economy more than 3.5% of gross domestic product annually.
Rising public demand to clean up the environment has caught the attention of China’s Communist Party leadership. In an address at the opening of the annual session of the National People’s Congress (NPC) last month, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared “war on pollution.” Chinese authorities agree that enforcement is the number one problem with their environmental laws. Bie Tao, Deputy Director General of Policies and Regulations of MEP, cited estimates that half of all regulated facilities in China violate the law and that pollution in China would be 70% less than it currently is if polluters were in full compliance with the law.
Problems with enforcement of China’s environmental laws run deep. China’s regulatory system is highly decentralized with the nation’s Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) less than a fiftieth the size of the U.S. EPA for a country with more than three times as many people than the U.S. Enforcement problems are compounded by local corruption, small penalties for violations, the lack of an independent judiciary and the absence of a long tradition of respect for the rule of law.
As Chinese authorities struggle to increase the enforceability of their environmental laws, two ACOEL members were given an unusual opportunity last month to peak into a window on the NPC’s legislative processes. On March 19, James A. Holtkamp and I were invited to appear before the Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC’s Standing Committee in Beijing along with David Pettit, a senior attorney with the Los Angeles office of the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). Billed as a “Green Dialogue,” the event was an extraordinary effort to obtain U.S. expert input to help resolve disagreements within the NPC on proposed amendments to make China’s basic Environmental Protection Law more enforceable.
Representatives of the NPC’s Standing Committee and MEP presented us with six sets of questions concerning U.S. enforcement procedures and policies. Many were directed at understanding how penalties for environmental violations are determined in the U.S. A proposal to provide that maximum fines for environmental violations in China be calculated in part based on the number of days the violation has occurred was one issue that had created disagreement within the NPC. We noted that this has become a fundamental principle of U.S. pollution control law and that it provides a powerful incentive for violators promptly to stop and correct violations. We emphasized the importance of monitoring and reporting requirements in environmental permits. We also suggested that China should consider adopting a policy that enforcement actions should recoup at least the economic benefit of the violation to ensure that companies do not profit from their violations. This has been EPA’s long-standing policy and there appears to be some interest in adopting such a policy in China.
Chinese authorities are moving toward requiring greater transparency from polluters. Beginning on January 1, 2014, they mandated that China’s 15,000 largest companies provide the public with continuous data concerning their air and water emissions, something that would have been unthinkable just a few short years ago. By opening up a “Green Dialogue” on U.S. enforcement practices, China’s legislators are exhibiting a healthy appetite for entertaining new ideas to improve the effectiveness of their environmental laws. Our U.S. expert panel consisting of an industry practitioner, a public interest lawyer, and an academic apparently proved to be a persuasive coalition for we have learned that many of our recommendations are being incorporated into the new draft of China’s basic Environmental Law.
Posted on April 17, 2014
On April 15th, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed EPA’s rule setting limits for emissions of mercury and other air toxics from fossil-fuel-fired electric steam generating units. The focus of the decision – and the issue on which Judge Kavanaugh dissented – was whether EPA was required to consider the costs that would be imposed by the rule. EPA said no and the majority agreed.
Section 112(n) of the Clean Air Act required EPA to perform a study of the health hazards related to hazardous emissions from EGUs prior to regulating them. How was EPA to utilize the results of the study?
"The Administrator shall regulate [EGUs] under this section, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the study required by this subparagraph."
The industry petitioners and Judge Kavanaugh took the position that Congress’s use of the word “appropriate” evidenced an intent to require EPA to consider costs. To Judge Kavanaugh, “that’s just common sense and sound government practice.” However, persuasive Judge Kavanaugh may be as a matter of policy, the majority was not persuaded that the law requires a consideration of cost.
As the majority noted, nothing in section 112(n) requires that EPA consider cost. Indeed, the word “cost” is not mentioned in section 112(n). Moreover, Congress required EPA to make the “appropriate and necessary” determination based on a study of health impacts, not a study of costs. Finally, as EPA and the majority noted, the Supreme Court, in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, c
autioned against finding authority – let alone a mandate – to consider costs in ambiguous provisions of the CAA, given that there are sections of the Act which do address costs.
I’m with Judge Kavanaugh as a matter of policy (though it’s worth noting that EPA in fact did a cost-benefit analysis and found that the benefits of the rule substantially outweigh its costs). On the law, however, the dissent seems pretty much a case of ipse dixit. When the rule was promulgated, I said that I would be “stunned” if the rule was not upheld on judicial review. Notwithstanding the dissent, I’d be equally stunned if the Supreme Court flips this decision. I don’t think that there’s anything here warranting Supreme Court review.
Posted on April 16, 2014
Transportation of crude oil via rail has increased from 9,500 carloads in 2008 to more than 400,000 carloads in 2013, and an increase in incidents associated with these shipments has occurred as well. On February 25, 2014, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) issued an Emergency Restriction-Prohibition Order (amended on March 6, 2014) to address safety issues of transporting crude oil by rail.
The DOT Emergency Order focuses on the imminent safety hazard posed by misclassification of crude oil, which can lead to the use of containers that lack the safety enhancements necessary to safely transport oil properly classified as Packing Group (PG) I and II materials. The Emergency Order required testing and classification of crude oil prior to transportation rather than reliance on generic information. The amended Emergency Order stepped back somewhat because it “does not specify how often testing should or must be performed, nor does it require testing to be performed for each and every shipment.” The amended order allows the operator to determine whether it has sufficient data available to reliably classify the crude oil it intends to ship. It still requires operators to treat Class 3 petroleum crude oil as a PG I (highest danger classification) or PG II (medium danger classification) material rather than the less demanding PG III classification. A presumptive PG I or PG II classification removes from use several models of tank cars that have fewer safety measures. Recent accident investigations indicate that presumptive classifications become dangerous where some sources of crude (like the Bakken Formation) exhibit comparatively higher volatility.
This Emergency Order followed a DOT safety initiative (agreed to by the Association of American Railroads (“AAR”)) that establishes new, voluntary safety standards for the transportation of crude oil by rail, including speed restrictions, increased rail and mechanical inspections, and improved braking systems. But are these measures enough?
Overall, yes. Improved safety requires actions of different types: (1) operational changes; (2) additional steps to prevent derailments; and (3) tank car design changes. The Emergency Order and DOT/AAR safety initiative address the first two pathways. What about tank car design? The Emergency Order leaves that issue for another day. Although the Emergency Order will affect the ability to use certain tank cars with fewer safety measures, it has been estimated that the tougher classification standards for crude oil will affect less than three percent of tank cars now used in the United States. In 2011, AAR adopted higher standards for new tank cars transporting crude oil and ethanol, although there were no retrofit specifications adopted. According to the AAR, roughly 92,000 tank cars are moving flammable liquids and approximately 78,000 of them do not meet the new 2011 tank car standards.
Regulators have also acknowledged the need for improvements for tank cars. The Pipelines and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) is considering recommendations by the AAR to upgrade new tank car standards and require existing tank car retrofits. The AAR recommended to PHMSA several improvements for tank cars transporting flammable liquids, including an outer steel jacket around the tank car, thermal protection, improved pressure relief valves, and other measures to prevent puncture in the case of an accident.
None of these measures are the final solution, but the Emergency Order, the DOT safety initiative and upgrades to tank car safety standards are crucial steps toward safer transportation of crude oil.
Posted on April 15, 2014
This week, the Environmental Council of the States (ECOS) publicly announced a memorandum prepared by ACOEL members concerning important issues arising under the Clean Air Act. In May 2013 ACOEL entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with ECOS to facilitate a relationship pursuant to which members of ACOEL will provide assistance on issues of interest to ECOS.
In accord with the President’s June 2013 Climate Action Plan, EPA announced plans to use existing Clean Air Act Section 111 authority to develop greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) standards for new and existing sources. Thereafter, ECOS contacted ACOEL and requested an extensive and neutral review of the history and background of section 111(d) of the Act. A diverse group of ACOEL members from academia, private law firms, and public interest groups volunteered and produced the attached comprehensive memorandum, which was well received by ECOS. This week, ECOS made the memorandum publicly available.
In announcing the memorandum, Dick Pedersen, the President of ECOS and Director of the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality, thanked the members of ACOEL for their significant time and effort in preparing the memorandum, and added that ECOS looks forward to working with ACOEL in the future. ACOEL hopes that this memorandum will serve as a valuable resource in connection with EPA’s anticipated rulemaking efforts in this area.
ACOEL: Memorandum for ECOS Concerning Clean Air Act 111(d) Issues pdf
Posted on April 14, 2014
Last week, in response to shareholder requests that it disclose information regarding how climate change might affect it in the future, ExxonMobil released two reports, one titled Energy and Climate, and one titled Energy and Carbon – Managing the Risks. They actually make fascinating reading and seem to represent a new tack by ExxonMobil in its battle with those seeking aggressive action on climate change.
The reports do not deny the reality of climate change. Indeed, the reports acknowledge climate change, acknowledge the need for both mitigation and adaptation, acknowledge a need to reduce fossil fuel use (at some point), acknowledge the need to set a price on carbon, and acknowledge that ExxonMobil in fact already is making future planning decisions utilizing an internal “proxy” price on carbon that is as high as $80/ton of CO2 in the future.
The reaction of the shareholder activists who pushed for the disclosures? They are not happy. Why not?
Because ExxonMobil has said explicitly that it doesn’t believe that there will be sufficient worldwide pressure – meaning government regulations imposing very high carbon prices – to reduce fossil fuel use sufficiently quickly enough to limit global temperature rise to 2 degrees Celsius. It also does not believe that worldwide carbon regulation will leave it with any “stranded assets.”
I understand the moral case against fossil fuel use. Personally, however, I’d rather rely on a carbon price that provides the appropriate incentives to get the reductions in CO2 emissions that we need to mitigate climate change. On that score, sadly, it’s not obvious to me at this point that ExxonMobil’s analysis of likely outcomes is actually wrong.
My biggest complaint with the reports is the refusal to recognize that markets react dynamically to new regulatory requirements. The history of big regulatory programs is that they pretty much always cost less than the predictions made before the regulations are implemented. The lesson then is that the current projections of energy cost increases resulting from a high cost of carbon are likely to be overestimated.
Time will tell. At least I hope so.
Posted on April 11, 2014
A year ago, this blog contribution described the latest battle in a nearly 40-year old water war in Oregon’s Klamath Basin. Now, there is a tenuous peace agreement in place – but it may be short-lived. With substantial leadership from Senator Ron Wyden and Governor John Kitzhaber, a “Proposed Upper Klamath Basin Comprehensive Agreement” was negotiated among the Klamath Tribes, State of Oregon, and a large group of independent farmers and ranchers who hold water rights to surface waters in the Klamath Basin, above Upper Klamath Lake. The underlying war has to do with who gets how much water in an on-going “general stream adjudication” of water diversions that began in the late 1800s to early 1900s, along with quantification of federally reserved water rights.
In March, 2013, the Oregon Water Resources Department (“OWRD”) issued its “Findings of Fact and Final Order of Determination” (“FFOD”), which approved the federally reserved claims of the Klamath Tribes for substantial instream flows in the Klamath River and tributaries above Upper Klamath Lake, and for specified lake levels. The Tribal water rights were granted a priority date of “time immemorial.” When the FFOD took effect last year, the Tribes were legally entitled to make a “call” for water – requiring the OWRD to take immediate action to curtail water use by junior appropriators until the Tribes’ instream flow allocations were satisfied. As a result, thousands of acres of irrigated farm and pasture lands were dry.
The impact of the call was economically, socially and politically devastating, leading Senator Wyden and Governor Kitzhaber to convene a fast-moving settlement process that began late last fall and resulted in conceptual agreement before the end of 2013. Further work in early 2014 resulted in a comprehensive agreement for the Upper Basin -- but the deal is fragile. Implementation of key settlement terms depends on securing substantial federal funding and state agency support, with no guarantees of either.
The settlement includes two key components: a Water Use Plan and a Riparian Program. Under the Water Use Plan, irrigators will voluntarily retire or reduce historic diversions by up to 30,000 acre-feet. Under the Riparian Program, landowners will commit to voluntary habitat restoration actions. The two components are to be implemented over a five year period, subject to the availability of federal funding. An additional $40 million of federal funding is to be provided for Tribal economic development.
This settlement agreement complements another agreement, reached several years ago, among the Tribes, state and federal agencies, and lower basin irrigators who receive water from Upper Klamath Lake under contracts with the U. S. Bureau of Reclamation. That agreement also requires substantial federal funding that has not yet been committed, due at least in part to political pressures stemming from the fact that it addressed only half of the basin – leaving upper basin irrigators to bear the brunt of a Tribal call. With the upper basin interests now addressed through this second settlement agreement, the basin is now fully covered with strategies to help recover instream flows to meet Tribal water needs while maintaining a sustainable level of economic use for farmers and ranchers.
Optimists are hopeful the region will now be able to move forward with a united front to seek needed support from Congress. Pessimists say the deal will crumble beneath the political weight and budget pressures of Washington DC. One thing is for sure – the Klamath Basin water wars will not be ended soon. Stay tuned for next year’s update.
Posted on April 10, 2014
In the Spring of 2012, just before trial on the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, BP and the plaintiffs reached a class action settlement. This settlement created a business claims process that required no direct causation beyond a showing that the business was located in a certain geographic area and had experienced a certain decline in revenue during the relevant period. The settlement included claims from throughout Mississippi, Louisiana and Alabama, and certain coastal counties of Florida and Texas. In November, 2012, the district court held a fairness hearing where BP argued for approval. In December, 2012, with the support of BP, the court certified the class and approved the settlement.
Over time, estimates of BP’s claims exposure under the settlement agreement grew. Frustrated by attorney advertising that getting paid by BP did not require showing that your losses were caused by the oil spill, BP returned to the district court and objected to the claims administrator’s interpretation of the settlement agreement. BP argued for the first time that claims should be evaluated on an accrual basis accounting method rather than a cash basis. This could have reduced BP’s exposure, but most small businesses maintain their books on a cash basis and the district court upheld the claims administrator’s interpretation. BP appealed to the Fifth Circuit.
In the Summer of 2013, a 3-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit heard this first appeal and remanded the case for further development of the record on the parties’ intent. (link to decision) One judge questioned sua sponte whether a causation standard that did not require proof of a connection to the oil spill undermined the parties’ legal ability to enter into a class action settlement. The panel also instructed the district court to stay the payment of claims pending resolution of these issues.
Meanwhile, parties who had objected at the fairness hearing took a second appeal to the Fifth Circuit that challenged class certification. BP joined in this appeal, notwithstanding having argued for certification before the district court. BP argued that because the settlement agreement was being interpreted to pay claims that were not connected to the oil spill, the class was not properly certified. In January, 2014, a 3-judge panel hearing the second appeal affirmed class certification based on the panel’s understanding of the injury alleged on behalf of potential class members and the panel’s view of Article III standing requirements and Rule 23 class certification requirements applicable at the settlement stage of the case. (link to decision)
Back to the first appeal. On remand, the district court ruled in December, 2013 that the revenue-based causation standard agreed to by the parties was sufficient for class certification and met the requirements of Rule 23 and other federal laws regarding class actions. Predictably, BP asked the first Fifth Circuit panel to review this ruling. On March 3, 2014, that first panel affirmed the district court’s ruling and ordered that the stay on payments be lifted. (link to decision) Focusing more on the Claims Administrator’s interpretations of the Settlement Agreement, this panel determined that the agreed-upon claims process included elements sufficient to establish traceability of the claimed damage to the spill. In a sense, the earlier panel decision reviewed the Settlement Agreement as a matter of principle and the later decision reviewed it in application. On March 17, 2014, BP sought rehearing en banc. As a result, the panel’s mandate will not issue and the stay will remain in place pending resolution of BP’s request for rehearing. Is the gravity-challenged opera person warming up?
Posted on April 8, 2014
On March 28, 2014, a federal district court vacated EPA’s “Water Transfer Rule,” which had sought to clarify EPA’s position that transfers of water between navigable bodies of water do not require NPDES permits. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency (SDNY, 3/28/2014). The Water Transfer Rule, codified at 40 CFR § 122.3(i), was the presumptive culmination of a long and meandering trail of EPA regulatory interpretation, guidance memoranda and judicial opinions, including a trip to the United States Supreme Court in the case of South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004).
The Catskill ruling is notable in several respects. First, it came from a district court. After the Supreme Court ruled, in Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, that district courts, rather than appellate courts, have jurisdiction in certain situations to review such regulations -- even if the suits are brought years after the rules were promulgated, the Eleventh Circuit held in Friends of the Everglades v. EPA that it lacked original jurisdiction over a challenge to the water transfer rulemaking, a ruling that the Supreme Court declined to review.
Second, the district court did not stay its ruling pending appeal, though appeal is a virtual certainty. Thus, the permit status of various water transferors who relied on the rule (irrigation districts, dam operators, water utilities, etc.) is now in limbo until a higher court reviews the Catskill decision or EPA promulgates a temporary fix. Any such fix, by the way, may be hard to come by in light of the district court’s expressed views about EPA’s misinterpretation of Congressional intent.
Third, the opinion contains language about the definition of “navigable waters” that does not quite align with EPA’s and the Corps’ imminent release of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking addressing that very definition.
At this time, then, the only certainty is that litigation over the Water Transfer Rule will continue to flow.
Posted on April 7, 2014
For over forty years, the risk of incurring major liability under the Clean Water Act (CWA) has effectively discouraged “Good Samaritan” volunteers from cleaning up abandoned hardrock mine sites throughout the U.S. Past efforts to amend the CWA to remove this disincentive have been blocked, based in part on the assumption that EPA policies alone should be sufficient to remove the threat of CWA liability and effectively encourage such cleanups.
In the words of the Gold Rush prospectors, that assumption and related agency policies have simply not panned out. A Good Samaritan Initiative adopted by EPA in 2007 and clarified and “improved” in 2012 has had virtually no effect on removing this threat of CWA liability or causing actual cleanups involving water impacts to occur. Meanwhile, willing Good Samaritans continue to be discouraged from conducting useful remedial actions, and these problem sites remain untouched.
During this same period, flexible state and federal “brownfield” and voluntary cleanup programs have cleaned up hundreds of former industrial sites and revitalized key urban areas, including in lower downtown Denver. But some members of Congress have rigidly refused to apply similar common-sense approaches to abandoned mine sites.
The time has come to recognize that informal agency policies encouraging these voluntary mine cleanups have not fixed and legally cannot solve this long-standing problem and to embrace the practical types of legislative approaches that have worked in the urban brownfield programs. The Good Samaritan CWA amendments introduced in 2013 by Senator Udall and others offer just such a practical solution. Past opponents of such legislation should acknowledge that agency efforts alone cannot remove the existing disincentive for cleaning up these sites and should support this modest, practical step to facilitate these mine cleanups.
The Problem. According to the GAO, there are over 160,000 abandoned hardrock mines, mainly in the western U.S., that can leach heavy metals such as lead, mercury and arsenic into the environment. EPA’s estimate is over three times higher. EPA further estimates that historic mines have contaminated over 40 percent of the watersheds in the west and would cost more than $35 billion to clean up. These former mines are considered “orphan” sites, because their owners and operators are either dead, defunct or insolvent.
Remediating these sites has proven to be an intractable problem for several reasons. One is the technical difficulties and enormous costs of remediating such sites in full compliance with applicable environmental laws. Another is the risk of incurring substantial liabilities or obligations under those laws for a non-compliant or partial clean up.
The Disincentive. While CERCLA contains a “Good Samaritan” provision that shields qualified non-liable volunteers from incurring liability under that law when they conduct voluntary remedial actions, the Clean Water Act (CWA) currently contains no such exemption. Because the most serious of these abandoned mine sites involve impacts to water quality, this threat of CWA liability has severely inhibited both private Good Samaritans and state and local governments from conducting common-sense, voluntary cleanups that would significantly improve the affected watersheds.
Beginning in 1995 and continuing to the present, Senator Baucus and others have introduced various “Good Samaritan” amendments to the CWA aimed at removing this major legal disincentive. However, because the amendments would have allowed less than full compliance with otherwise applicable water quality standards and discharge permit requirements, certain NGOs and members of Congress to date have strongly opposed and defeated such efforts.
This well-intentioned opposition has been misguided and a classic instance of the perfect being the enemy of the good. By demanding that remediation of these orphan sites be fully compliant and permitted without exception, only a handful of minor abandoned mine cleanups involving water have occurred during the last four decades.
Ineffective EPA Initiative. To address this Congressional logjam and currently discouraged Good Samaritans, EPA has laudably attempted to address this disincentive by adopting in 2007 an administrative “Good Samaritan Initiative”. The Initiative consisted of an EPA statement of Interim Principles and a “Comfort Letter” and model settlement agreement offered to non-liable entities that volunteer to remediate abandoned hardrock mines. This initial guidance focused primarily on the fact that, under the CERCLA 121(e) “permit shield,” no permit would be required under the CWA or other laws while an on-site CERCLA “removal” action was occurring. However, that guidance did not address the fundamental question troubling Good Samaritans about what happens once the removal is completed but some discharge unavoidably continues. As a result, that Initiative did little to allay those concerns and had no appreciable effect on increasing efforts to remediate abandoned mines with water impacts.
In recognition of that ineffectiveness, EPA in December 2012 attempted to bolster its 2007 Initiative by issuing a guidance Memorandum describing two clarifications to the 2007 Guidance. The first was that a CERCLA removal action could be extended through periodic monitoring or other activities, which would lengthen the period when the CERCLA permit shield would apply. However, the prospect of being engaged in a very-long-term CERCLA action has neither enthused Good Samaritans nor addressed their root concern about CWA liability once the CERCLA action is done.
To address that key issue, EPA further clarified that, based on the application of five listed factors, a Good Samaritan cleaning up an abandoned mine “might” not be considered by EPA to be a liable “operator” required to obtain an NPDES discharge permit. All of those factors relate to whether the volunteer has the “power or responsibility” to access the site and control the ongoing discharge after its remedial action is finished.
While issued with much fanfare in 2012, this “improved” Good Samaritan Initiative has again had virtually no effect on addressing the concerns of potential volunteers or increasing cleanups of these sites, for several reasons. First, EPA has emphasized that this Initiative merely explains its current interpretation but is not binding on EPA, third party NGOs, or the courts and “may not be relied on to create a right or benefit … by any person.” Not exactly the assurance that Good Samaritans want and need. Second, EPA stresses that this guidance applies only to Good Samaritans at orphan mine sites, but the factors for determining whether an entity is a CWA-liable “operator” cannot be unique to those parties. As a result, potential Good Samaritans have rightly been skeptical whether they can make any potential CWA liability vanish simply by arranging that their right to access and conduct operations on the affected site terminates upon completion of some defined task. If a mining lessee or contractor attempted such an arrangement, EPA and the courts no doubt would reject any claim it was not a CWA-liable operator. There currently is no legal basis to treat volunteers any differently. This point also offers no comfort to a governmental volunteer, who likely will always have the power of access and thus trigger operator liability.
The 2012 memo also repeatedly indicates that, if a Good Samaritan is not deemed a responsible operator, then the site owner would be required to comply with NPDES permitting requirements. But EPA ignores the fact that, at these orphan sites, there simply is no owner (unless it is the U.S., which to date has largely ignored its own liability).
Over a year after issuance of this “improved” Good Samaritan Initiative, it is clear that this EPA policy has been ineffective in increasing mine cleanups or addressing the CWA legal disincentive for such actions. To the contrary, several groups dedicated to these voluntary efforts have made clear that these nonbinding agency guidance documents have had little to no impact, and the groups’ efforts continue to be stymied in the absence of effective legislative reform.
The Proposed Legislative Fix. To address this problem, Colorado Senators Udall and Bennett have introduced S. 1443, the Good Samaritan Cleanup of Abandoned Hardrock Mines Act of 2013. The bill creates a new Good Samaritan Permit under the CWA, to be issued by EPA or an approved State or Tribe, that would authorize a Good Samaritan volunteer to conduct a specified remedial action at an abandoned mine site. Those actions could include relocating waste rock, re-routing drainages, establishing wetlands, and similar measures that would greatly improve watershed conditions, but they would not need to result in complete compliance with otherwise applicable water quality standards or require a long-term discharge permit. Compliance with that special permit would then shield the volunteer from liability under the CWA and cure the current disincentive for volunteers willing to address these sites.
This huge, languishing problem of abandoned hardrock mine sites needs a solution. This bill isn’t perfect. But it’s a good start. Let’s get started.
Posted on April 2, 2014
What happens when an administrative agency actually fails to comply with a court order mandating the adoption of regulations? New Jersey administrative agencies and bodies have an idea despite the state’s Supreme Court modification of a lower court’s order. As state environmental agencies and boards often face court orders mandating new or modified regulations, they should know what almost happened in New Jersey.
In New Jersey, the nation’s most densely populated state, there is a constant tug between development and preservation. Two New Jersey Supreme Court decisions and the state’s Fair Housing Act address housing. In effect, they require all 566 municipalities to provide for the development and existence of low and moderate-income housing so that each municipality meets its fair share of the region’s housing needs. The Act created the Council on Affordable Housing (COAH) to establish housing fair share numbers for the municipalities and the regulatory means to meet them. COAH has been criticized routinely and has been the subject of several major decisions since its creation. The last such decision, In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 5:96 & 5:97 by N.J. Council on Affordable Housing, was in September of 2013 when the Supreme Court ordered COAH to enact new rules within five months. With COAH under attack from the current administration and with several seats on its board empty, meeting the deadline seemed unlikely. COAH held no meetings within the five months and the deadline was not met.
As a result of missing the deadline, the Superior Court-Appellate Division, our intermediate court, issued a decision and order of March 7, 2014, that should be a lesson to all regulatory bodies. The Appellate Division took the extraordinary measure of requiring a COAH meeting five days after issuing the order to be attended by sufficient board members to constitute a quorum, at which meeting the board was to instruct its executive director to prepare compliant rules. The Appellate Division required that the new rules be presented to COAH two weeks later. On that date, COAH was to meet again with a quorum, conduct an official meeting and adopt the rules consistent with the state’s Administrative Procedures Act. Six weeks later, again with a quorum required, COAH was to meet to review all public comments, consider them and any amendments proposed by the executive director and adopt the rules.
As if the level of detail in directing COAH was not enough, here’s the part of the decision and order that caused a stir. If this aggressive schedule was not met in any way, the Appellate Division ordered that “each member of the COAH Board will be ordered to personally appear before this court … to show cause why he or she shall not be declared in contempt of this court’s authority subject to monetary sanctions, civil detention, and such other sanctions the court may deep suitable to induce compliance with this order.” If this order does not send a chill into the hearts of tardy regulators, nothing will.
Perhaps the chill was ameliorated by the subsequent order of the New Jersey Supreme Court of March 14, 2014, setting more lenient time frames for compliance. The Supreme Court’s order also dropped the language about appearing personally at a contempt hearing but another court might not if its order to issue regulations is not met. For state regulators in such a situation, their court of highest jurisdiction may not back away from the approach taken by the New Jersey Appellate Division, establishing a specific agency schedule and threatening severe personal consequences in the face of non-compliance with a court order.
There may be nothing particularly new about the judicial power to enforce its orders, including use of citation for contempt. In the context of reviewing administrative regulations and dealing with appointed or elected boards or agencies, exercise of this judicial power generally includes recognition of and sensitivity to the separation of powers and the “real world” circumstances in which agencies act. However, these recent New Jersey orders should put regulators on notice that reviewing courts will be less tolerant of failures to implement their decisions.
Posted on April 1, 2014
Within three days in March, ACOEL lost two Fellows who were among the most important figures in the history of environmental law. David Sive, who died on March 12, 2014, was memorialized on our blog in the March 26, 2014 posting by our colleague Daniel Reisel, Mr. Sive’s longtime law partner. Three days earlier, on March 9, 2014, Professor Joseph L. Sax died in San Francisco at the age of 78.
Joseph Sax, Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley, was responsible for establishing the public trust doctrine in environmental law; the concept that there is a public interest in the protection and preservation of certain natural resources such as water bodies, shores, air and particular lands. He wrote of the principle in a seminal 1970 article in the Michigan Law Review, “The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.”
The doctrine was taken up by environmental advocates as the basis to pursue both legislative initiatives to protect natural resources, and judicial actions and remedies to conserve lands, waterways and air.
In 1979, the National Audubon Society, evoking the public trust doctrine, sued in California state court to enjoin the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power from diverting certain waters from non-navigable tributaries of Mono Lake, far north of the City, due to the impact that the diversions would have on the lake itself. In February, 1983, the Supreme Court of California, referencing a number of the historical antecedents discussed in Professor Sax’s Michigan Law Review article, and citing the article itself for its history of the doctrine, rendered an important and influential decision in favor of the National Audubon Society, recognizing the application of the public trust doctrine both to navigable waters such as the lake, and to the non-navigable tributaries that feed it.
The doctrine has been incorporated in the laws of a number of states, including the Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970, which Professor Sax wrote while on the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School. It has also been adopted in other nations. According to the obituary published in the New York Times, the doctrine has been has been advanced almost 300 times in litigation in state and federal courts in the United States.
Professor Sax graduated from Harvard University (1957) and the University of Chicago Law School (1959). Before beginning his long and distinguished teaching career, he worked at the Department of Justice. He began teaching at the University of Colorado in 1962, then went to the faculty of the University of Michigan in 1965, and joined the U.C. Berkeley School of Law faculty in 1986. Throughout his career as a teacher and scholar, Professor Sax was actively involved in advancing environmental causes and advocacy. From 1994 to 1996, he also served as counsel to Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt, during the Clinton administration.
Posted on March 31, 2014
Quarles & Brady recently represented Wisconsin Energy Corporation and Wisconsin Electric Power Company (doing business as "We Energies") in the construction and commencement of operation of a $250 million biomass-fueled co-generation plant. The project is located at Domtar Corporation's paper mill facility in Rothschild, Wisconsin. Wood, waste wood and sawdust are now being be used to produce 50 megawatts of electricity. The new co-generation project also supports Domtar's sustainable papermaking operations.
The new facility adds another technology to We Energies' renewable energy portfolio. That portfolio includes the 145 megawatt (MW) Blue Sky Green Field Wind Energy Center in Fond du Lac County and the 162 MW Glacier Hills Wind Park in Columbia County. Under Wisconsin law, utilities must use renewable energy to meet 10 percent of the electricity needs of their retail customers by the year 2015. With the start of commercial operation of the Rothschild biomass plant, We Energies estimates that it now has secured enough renewable energy to remain in compliance with the state mandate through 2022. Together, We Energies' three renewable energy operations are capable of delivering nearly 360 MW of renewable energy, enough to supply approximately 120,000 homes.
The Rothschild biomass project created approximately 400 construction jobs and 150 permanent jobs in the surrounding community. This includes independent wood suppliers and haulers from northern and central Wisconsin who are now securing waste wood for the project. We Energies appeared in proceedings before the Public Service Commission of Wisconsin in support of the Company's application for a Certificate of Authority for approval for the biomass plant. The Company filed an application for an air permit and other environmental approvals for the project, including the preparation of environmental assessments in support of the regulatory decisions.
The air permit for the project was issued on March 28, 2011. We Energies obtained one of the first PSD BACT (Prevention of Significant Deterioration - Best Available Control Technology) determinations for this project for Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions in the U.S. under EPA's GHG Tailoring Rule. The Company worked with the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) in developing a novel case-by-case Maximum Available Control Technology (MACT) determination for the biomass boiler under the Section 112 (hazardous air pollutant) provisions of the federal Clean Air Act. The permit was challenged by several environmental groups. The Company prevailed in the permit appeal process. The appeal was dismissed on the merits by the Marathon County Circuit Court in October, 2011. The facility started commercial operation on November 8, 2013.
Posted on March 26, 2014
David Sive, a founder of modern environmental law, brilliant litigator, untiring mentor and dear friend to many of us, has passed away. He was 91.
David Sive, the founding partner of Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. was a great friend to his colleagues, an exceptional litigator, and a loving husband, father, and grandfather. As an intellectual and spiritual leader of the modern environmental law movement, he devoted his energies and passion to protecting the environment.
A veteran of World War II, David fought in the Battle of the Bulge. After graduating from Columbia Law School in 1948, he emerged as an authority on administrative law. However, his love of the wilderness soon led him into the then-nascent field of environmental law. He quickly became an authority in this new field, and was often referred to as the father of modern environmental law. His sustained success in the courtroom over decades established vitally important precedents for later generations of environmental lawyers.
David was one of the first lawyers to bring litigation effectuating the “forever wild” provisions of the New York State Constitution, and litigated a number of cases protecting the environment in his beloved Adirondack and Catskill Mountains. In the 1960s, he played a leading role in the administrative and judicial proceedings that prevented the construction of a power plant on Storm King Mountain along the Hudson River, and helped to establish aesthetics as a recognized environmental value.
In subsequent decades David litigated numerous important environmental cases. He prevented the construction of the proposed Hudson River Expressway (a precursor of the ill-fated Westway Project). He challenged up to the U.S. Supreme Court the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s testing of atomic weapons off Alaska’s Amchitka Island, and litigated the principal case establishing that the military is subject to the National Environmental Policy Act. In a landmark case decided by the New York Court of Appeals, David established that the preservation of wilderness areas for the benefit of the public serves charitable, educational, and moral purposes and entitles nature preserves to the tax-exempt status that is essential to their survival.
David was proud of his role as a teacher, introducing generations of young lawyers to the emerging field of environmental law, both as a member of the adjunct faculty of Columbia and Pace Law Schools, and as the founder of several continuing legal education courses for the Environmental Law Institute and the American Law Institute- American Bar Association. David’s lectures and written scholarship, including an environmental column in the National Law Journal and articles in numerous law reviews, helped to shape the field of environmental law.
David also played a critical role in the creation of the Environmental Law Institute, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and other prominent national environmental organizations, as well as scores of regional and local entities. His legacy is permanently embedded in innumerable precedent-setting cases. But to those who knew David well and worked with him closely, his gentle way and kind soul will be missed most of all.
Posted on March 24, 2014
While the world waits for the Supreme Court to decide whether EPA can regulate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act, EPA and state permitting authorities have moved ahead to issue GHG permits. Some of those permits are encountering legal challenges. The Sierra Club and citizen activists are challenging permits issued by EPA Regions as insufficiently stringent, and urging EPA to use its Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permitting authority to require greater use of solar energy and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) at new facilities.
So far, EPA’s Environmental Appeals Board has rejected two citizen challenges to GHG PSD permits issued by EPA Regions. On March 14, 2014, the Board denied the Sierra Club’s petition for review of a GHG permit issued by Region 6 for a new natural gas-fired power plant in Harlingen, Texas. In re La Paloma Energy Center, LLC. (Those of you who follow events in Texas will recall that EPA is currently running the GHG permitting program in that state, but has proposed to approve the state’s application to assume responsibility for that program.) The Board rejected Sierra Club’s arguments that the permit’s GHG emission limits were not stringent enough to meet BACT standards and that Region 6 should have required La Paloma to consider adding a solar energy component to its power plant. The Board cautioned, however, that there is no “automatic BACT off-ramp” for solar energy alternatives, and emphasized that permitting authorities must consider suggestions for adding solar energy components at new facilities on a case-specific basis.
In 2012 the Board rejected similar arguments by citizen activists who urged Region 9 to use its PSD permitting authority to require a new hybrid (gas-solar) power plant in California to reduce GHG emissions by increasing its planned solar generation capacity. In re City of Palmdale. The proposed plant was to be fueled primarily by natural gas, with a modest (10%) solar power component to satisfy California renewable energy requirements. The decisions in both City of Palmdale and La Paloma relied heavily on the Regions’ findings that there was insufficient space at the project sites to accommodate the solar power generation capacity that the petitioners were advocating.
The Palmdale decision also upheld Region 9’s rejection of CCS as a BACT requirement for that facility based on cost considerations. The estimated annual cost of CCS would have been twice the project cost (annualized over 20 years) in that case. Sierra Club has renewed the debate over the affordability of CCS in a new PSD permit appeal that is currently pending before the Board. In re ExxonMobil Chemical Company Baytown Olefins Plant. Region 6 rejected the CCS option in this case based on a finding that the cost would be disproportionately high. Stay tuned for a Board decision in the next few months . . .
*Any views expressed herein are the views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or the United States.
Posted on March 17, 2014
How far can an agency deviate from a statutory scheme in order to achieve what it sees as the goals of that scheme? Can the regulatory structure “improve on” the statute? These issues are currently playing out in two closely watched cases.
Last year these pages described a then-undecided Massachusetts state court case that had attracted a surprising degree of national attention. Pepin v. Division of Fisheries and Wildlife began as a relatively straightforward challenge to an agency determination that the plaintiffs’ land provided habitat for the Eastern Box Turtle and that construction of their planned retirement home was therefore subject to regulation under the Massachusetts Endangered Species Act (MESA). In the course of judicial appeals of the agency decision, the plaintiffs, with new counsel, shifted the focus of their argument to a challenge to the regulations themselves. When the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (Mass SJC), acting sua sponte, transferred the case to its own docket, interest in the case spiked dramatically. Amicus curiae briefs were filed not only by state-based groups, on both sides of the issue (Massachusetts Audubon Society, Development Council of Western Massachusetts, Home Builders Association of Massachusetts), but also by those from farther afield (Pacific Legal Foundation, Defenders of Wildlife, National Association of Homebuilders, The Nature Conservancy). Clearly, something was at stake. And now, just as the Mass SJC has reached a decision in Pepin, very similar arguments are being made, with even more at stake, in this year’s most closely watched environmental case, Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, the United States Supreme Court’s review of the Obama Administration’s attempt to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.
To understand these issues, some background on the Massachusetts endangered species regulatory scheme and the challenge to it is necessary. (These are described in more detail in the earlier posting.) The challenged regulations established a process for mapping “priority habitats,” areas that are important for species that fall into any of the three categories established under MESA – in descending order of the peril that they face, endangered species, threatened species, and species of special concern. These Priority Habitat regulations require that before a project is undertaken in such an area, it must be reviewed by the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife to determine whether it will result in a “take” of a species falling into any of the three categories. (“Take” is very broadly defined in the statute and includes habitat alteration.) If a take will occur, the regulations provide, the project may nevertheless proceed if it can be conditioned in such a way as to avoid that result or, in more difficult cases, if the project proponent takes other steps that will result in “a long-term net benefit to the conservation of the impacted species.”
In practice, the evidence showed, 75% of projects proposed in Priority Habitat have been approved without conditions, 22% have proceeded with conditions, and 3% have required that other measures, resulting in a “long-term net benefit,” be taken in order to permit the project to proceed. Because of this history, at least parts of the development community in Massachusetts had accepted the Priority Habitat regulations as a reasonable way of accommodating both developers’ interests and the purposes of MESA.
This acceptance was likely based on something else as well: As a practical matter, the Priority Habitat regulations were promulgated in lieu of regulations under another scheme, specifically set out in the legislation but never put into effect by the Division of Fisheries and Wildlife. MESA authorizes the Division to designate as “Significant Habitat” areas that are important to the survival of endangered and threatened species (but not species of special concern). And MESA severely constrains development in areas that the Division has so designated. But, because of the severity of the constraint, the Act also establishes substantial procedural protections before a particular property can be designated as Significant Habitat.
Rather than designating any Significant Habitat, the Division, relying on a general grant of authority to adopt regulations, created the Priority Habitat scheme, with its less severe restrictions on development and its less burdensome (for the agency) procedural requirements. In short, the Division chose not to adopt regulations specifically contemplated in the enabling legislation and adopted instead regulations that were easier to administer, less intrusive for those in the regulated community who would have fallen under the legislatively-contemplated scheme and, as a consequence, arguably more effective at protecting at-risk species in Massachusetts. Doing that, though, made the Priority Habitat regulations subject to challenge by those who might prefer that there be no regulation of land use in the interest of protecting at-risk species at all.
The challenge in the Pepin case to the Massachusetts wildlife agency’s rulemaking power is very like the industry challenge to EPA’s rulemaking in Utility Air Regulatory Group. On February 18 of this year, the Mass SJC upheld the validity of the Priority Habitat regulations. On February 24, the United States Supreme Court heard argument on the challenge by industry and certain states to the Environmental Protection Agency greenhouse gas regulations. (Other states intervened in support of the regulations, and there was extensive amicus participation.) At the heart of the challenge in the Supreme Court is an attack on EPA’s determination that it would raise very substantially the threshold at which emitters of greenhouse gases would be regulated; the emission levels specified in the Clean Air Act are much lower, but they were intended for “conventional” pollutants, not greenhouse gases. Using the Congressionally-specified levels would have been an administrative nightmare for EPA. And it would have been enormously burdensome for businesses and even individuals. EPA therefore determined to use higher thresholds. This presumably benefits the industry petitioners and the states that support them. But that is not the point. EPA’s action leaves it subject to the accusation leveled at the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife: That it re-wrote a statute in order, in its view, to make it work better, and that an administrative agency may not do that.
The Mass SJC had little difficulty rejecting this claim. The unanimous opinion begins its discussion of the validity of the Priority Habitat regulations by noting that “[d]uly promulgated regulations . . . are presumptively valid and ‘must be accorded all the deference due to a statute.’” And in analyzing whether the plaintiffs had overcome that presumption, the court “look[ed] to the statute as a whole to determine the scope of the agency’s power.” In the recent United States Supreme Court argument, EPA sought to invoke these principles in defense of its greenhouse gas regulations. And it received some support from the Court. Justice Elena Kagan, according to the New York Times, acknowledged that what the agency did “was true to the law’s larger purpose.” But other Justices were less comfortable: Justice Anthony Kennedy “couldn’t find a single precedent that strongly supports [EPA’s] position.” And Justice Samuel Alito insisted that the agency’s use of its own threshold numbers, rather than those in the Clean Air Act, was unprecedented “in the entire history of federal regulation.”
The two cases are not the same, of course: the statutes are different; the agencies’ actions and choices were different; and the governing administrative law principles may be different in some respects. But it seems likely that the outcomes in the cases turned and will turn less on any of those factors and more on the views of the judges deciding them about the appropriateness of administrative agencies making their own judgments about how best to accomplish broadly-stated legislative objectives.
One could easily argue that the Massachusetts Division of Fisheries and Wildlife took a more dramatic step, in declining to promulgate regulations that the enabling legislation called for and instead promulgating regulations that were not specifically contemplated by that legislation, than EPA did in adopting the regulatory model that Congress had called for but limiting its reach when it was clear that not doing that would be havoc-making. Perhaps if the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had reviewed EPA’s actions and the United States Supreme Court had reviewed the Priority Habitat regulations, the results would reflect that distinction. But they didn’t. And what we got, and likely will get, are decisions that reflect as much the views of the members of those courts as they do the substantive nuances of the cases themselves.
Posted on March 12, 2014
Among other changes, the new standard now defines “migration” to include the movement of vapor in the subsurface. That change makes it more clear that the environmental professional conducting a Phase I must, when identifying releases and threatened releases, evaluate the potential for vapors to migrate from contaminated subsurface soils and ground water into the indoor air of buildings on the surface.
While many lawyers and environmental professionals believed the old standard already required an evaluation of the potential for vapor intrusion, there was no consensus, and there are many Phase I reports out there that do not evaluate that potential. Because treatment of vapor intrusion under the old standard was a topic of genuine dispute among practitioners, you might think we could accept this clarification and move on. Not so.
The USEPA rolled a grenade into the tent when, in its preamble to the final rule sanctioning E1527-13, it stated that it “. . . wishes to be clear that, in its view, vapor migration has always been a relevant potential source of release or threatened release that, depending on site-specific conditions, may warrant identification when conducting all appropriate inquires.” (78 Federal Register 79319 (December 30, 2013).
The USEPA’s clarification has prompted some discussion in the blogosphere about potential malpractice claims against environmental professionals who failed to address relevant vapor intrusion issues in past Phase I reports. Closely related is the question of whether landowners currently relying on one of CERCLA’s landowner liability protections may be at risk due to the inadequacy of their consultant’s work. These are legitimate concerns and only time will tell if theoretic liability leads to actual liability and litigation.
However, it does not appear that the sky is falling and there are reasons to suggest that a landside of litigation over this issue is unlikely. While litigation can be expected under the right (very limited) fact pattern, the following factors should alleviate concerns about widespread litigation:
- While the aggregate Phase I universe is vast, the portion of that universe affected by the vapor intrusion issue is very limited; involving only circumstances where subsurface contamination is known or suspected.
- Even when genuine vapor intrusion questions exist, a cause of action for malpractice requires damages. Simple receipt of a substandard Phase I report is not enough. The recipient of the report must experience damages related to the failure to address vapor intrusion. I see two such scenarios:
- A landowner faces liability for remediation of a vapor intrusion problem, and does not qualify for liability protection under CERCLA because the Phase I failed to evaluate the threat of vapor intrusion.
- A landowner discovers that a vapor intrusion problem reduces the value of its property, after relying on a Phase I that did not evaluate the threat of vapor intrusion.
- In the former situation, case law demonstrates that courts are reluctant to deny CERCLA liability protection to landowners who reasonably rely on an environmental professional’s Phase I report to satisfy AAI. Reliance on an environmental professional would seem particularly reasonable and appropriate regarding a technical issue such as whether or not an assessment should evaluate the threat of vapor intrusion. If landowner liability is improbable, the specter of derivative Phase I malpractice claims is also diminished.
- Concerning the latter (reduced property value) scenario, most Phase I reports are conducted in order to satisfy AAI and qualify for landowner liability protection. While use of the ASTM standard is not limited to that task, the standard directs the environmental professional to assume, absent other direction from the user, that satisfaction of AAI is the user’s purpose. If the user obtains the liability protection it bargained for, can it maintain a malpractice action? The answer to that question will depend upon the facts of each case, but I suspect that the user will face an uphill battle.
- Only after paring down potential vapor intrusion disputes to those involving actual relevant damages do we reach the substantive malpractice question of whether or not the failure to address vapor intrusion in a Phase I is a breach of a professional standard of care.
The answer to that breach of standard question is beyond the scope of this note and will require a descent into the bowels of the ASTM standard. I suggest that the USEPA’s proclamation is not dispositive because it addresses compliance with its own AAI requirement, not compliance with the ASTM standard guiding the environmental professional; a distinction that may make a difference.
For transactions in the pipeline when the December 31, 2013 final rule was promulgated, most will not be affected because they do not present the particular facts and circumstances (i.e., subsurface contamination) triggering a vapor intrusion assessment. In those transactions where vapor intrusion is an issue, however, it is key that AAI be completed prior to the acquisition of property. For pending transactions, deficient Phase I assessments should be revised or supplemented to address vapor intrusion potential. If the property has already changed hands, the new owner’s claim to any of the CERCLA landowner liability protections will be at risk.
How great a risk? Time will tell. But it is clear that good faith arguments that vapor intrusion need not be part of new Phase 1 assessments are no longer tenable.
Posted on March 10, 2014
Environmentalists and utility companies don’t always see eye to eye. But when we do find common ground, big changes can happen. Earlier this month, NRDC and the Edison Electric Institute, which represents all the nation’s investor-owned utility companies, serving 220 million Americans, announced an agreement to work together to bring more clean energy and efficiency into the electric grid.
Moving toward a cleaner, more efficient electric grid is less a question of technology than of policy. Outdated utility regulations can pit utility companies and clean energy against each other. Under the traditional regulatory scheme, utilities have to sell increasing amounts of electricity in order to recover their costs. So when customers start putting up solar panels on their roofs, the utility “loses.” Or when customers weatherize their homes and don’t need as much heat to stay warm, the utility “loses.”
This outdated regulatory model is slowing the growth of clean energy and efficiency, and jeopardizing the development of the grid that utilities and customers would all like to have: an enhanced grid that provides clean, reliable, affordable electricity with less carbon and toxic air pollution. In order to speed up the deployment of clean energy and efficiency across the country, and bring our grid into the modern era, utility companies and customers need to be rewarded for doing the right thing.
NRDC and the EEI have come to a path-breaking agreement on key policy changes that will make our electric grid cleaner and more robust. The most significant change is a shift in thinking. Instead of being in the business of selling electricity, a commodity, utilities should be in the business of providing better quality electricity services. This means more efficient electricity, from diverse clean sources like wind and sun, supplied by a robust, modern grid that can take advantage of clean energy, whether it’s generated from someone’s roof or from a power plant. Both utilities and clean energy providers will be winners if this is done right.
Having the support of utilities is a major step forward in pushing for reform. When utilities are rewarded for making our grid better--cleaner and more efficient--instead of merely for selling more electricity, we’ll see improvements much faster. More clean energy, more efficiency, more reliability, more options for consumers. Working together, with a host of diverse partners, NRDC and EEI can help convince state utility commissions to update their regulatory policies and help usher in a new era of clean, reliable, affordable electricity.
Posted on March 7, 2014
Almost as soon as U.S. Supreme Court Justice Scalia joined the bench in the fall of 1986, he made clear his disdain for arguments that the meaning of statutory text could be gleaned from its legislative history. And advocates before the Court who made the mistake of equating “congressional intent” with a statement made by an individual member of Congress during a hearing or a colloquy on a chamber floor could expect a sharp rebuke from the Justice.
The debate at the Court about the proper role of legislative history in statutory construction was not fully joined, however, until 1994 when Justice Stephen Breyer joined the bench. From the outset, Breyer, a former Senate staffer, made equally plain his view that legislative history was both fair game and could be highly relevant.
Indeed, Scalia’s and Breyer’s contrasting views regarding textualism in both statutory and constitutional interpretation became so celebrated that they literally took their debate on the road. To be sure, theirs was a far cry from the Lincoln-Douglas Debates on slavery 150 years earlier, but for legal scholars and Supreme Court observers, it was High Court entertainment.
During the oral arguments last month before the Supreme Court in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, Justice Breyer managed to take the debate to yet a new level. The issue before the Justices concerned the lawfulness of EPA’s regulations applying the Clean Air Act’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program to the emissions of greenhouse gases from new and modified stationary sources. As the Justices struggled to decipher the meaning of statutory terms and phrases that befuddle even seasoned environmental lawyers, Justice Breyer made a surprising reference. He did not merely ask what Senator Edmund Muskie, the bill’s chief sponsor, might have been intending in drafting the language at dispute before the Court. He asked what “Mr. Billings, I think, is the staff person” would have intended if faced with the policy issue that EPA now faced in trying to apply the language he drafted to greenhouse gases.
The Supreme Court courtroom was filled to capacity for the argument. Yet, I can probably safely say that fewer than ten, and likely fewer than five people in the room had any idea to whom the Justice was referring. And those few most certainly did not include any of the Justice’s colleagues on the bench or any of the advocates before him.
But for a few of us, who thrive on environmental law’s history, it was a moment of glory. The Justice was referring, of course, to Leon Billings who was Senator Ed Muskie’s chief staffer for the drafting of almost all of the nation’s path-breaking environmental laws during the 1970s, including, as the Justice correctly surmised, the Clean Air Act of 1970. The statutes were revolutionary in their reach, as they sought no less than to redefine the relationship of human activities to the nation’s environment.
Not relying merely on the soaring rhetoric of a law like the National Environmental Policy Act, these new pollution control laws got into the nitty-gritty of lawmaking. They addressed the extent to which costs, benefits, risk assessment, scientific uncertainty, and technological availability should all be relevant in determining the pollution control standards. They brokered compromises across partisan divides and remained nonetheless exceedingly ambitious and demanding in their reach.
The nation, more than four decades later, has reason to be grateful for the work of former congressional staffers like Leon Billings. Their impressive work lies in sharp contrast to that of Congresses over the past twenty plus years, which have passed no comparably significant environmental laws and done little more than deepen partisan divides even further. For that reason, the Supreme Court shout-out to “Mr. Billings” was a great moment at the Court. And the Justice’s question an apt one too.
Posted on March 5, 2014
Environmental response trusts created as a result of corporate bankruptcies demonstrate that workable mechanisms exist to protect against future environmental liability. This prompts the question: Can this concept be expanded and become an official amendment to CERCLA, or a separate Brownfields law?
The Revitalizing Auto Communities Environmental Response Trust (“RACER Trust”), the largest response trust every created, owns, manages and remediates the former holdings of General Motors. It includes 89 properties, 60 of which needed environmental remediation, with over $640 million provided to RACER Trust, nearly $500 million of that designated to address environmental liability. The RACER Trust holds the liability for onsite contamination when it sells a property as long as the new owner allows the remediation work to continue. This liability shield also travels with the land, providing security to future purchasers with regard to unexpected contamination that could otherwise cost thousands or millions of dollars. What is unique about this and other trusts, is the cooperative nature which the Trustees and the regulatory agencies have displayed in addressing contamination and remedial activities, very different than the standard contentious approach which routinely exist at sites today.
There have been several legislative proposals in the 113th Congress to provide fixes to CERCLA, the cornerstone law of environmental remediation. The proposed legislation, however, is more focused on transferring authority over clean-up of sites to the states and implementing credit for state contributions to the remediation. In its testimony to the House Energy and Commerce Committee last May, EPA’s Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response laid out the reasons for its opposition to many of the legislative proposals. The main points of concern are over the potential delays, increased administrative and litigation costs, and conflicting clean-up authority at sites.
But instead of legislation that could result in further slowing down an already protracted process, what about creating opportunities and enticements for development of contaminated properties? Whether under the CERCLA regime, or through the Brownfields program, there are ways to create environmental liability shields that would restore these properties to useful status, providing industry and jobs for the surrounding communities. In 2007, a nascent proposal to address this issue was developed. The draft legislation called for the creation of the Recovered Property Protection and Assurance Trust or R-PAT for transfer of contaminated properties and their associated environmental liabilities to a quasi-governmental trust. The R-PAT concept would have required a current property owner to pay a significant fee in order to place the land in the trust, and then cleaned up and conveyed, liability-free, to a purchaser. For various reasons, including the quasi-governmental nature of the trust and the floundering economy, the proposal was a non-starter.
However, given the dearth of other viable proposals, perhaps it is time to re-examine the trust concept and how contaminated properties can be best put back to profitable use. If we really want to streamline CERCLA or improve the Brownfields program, then let’s talk about how to get the land back into use, how to remove the time consuming and wasteful antagonism surrounding remediation and how to provide bullet-proof shields for bona fide purchasers now and in the future.
Posted on March 4, 2014
I sit on the board of a land conservation organization. Recently, the Director of Land Preservation for our board made a presentation in which she lamented the negative impact that the 2008 recession continues to have on land conservation activities at the organization. Funding by governments, grant-making organizations and private donors have been reduced, and local governments – one key source of land preservation – are themselves cutting their conservation budgets. Our organization has preserved a steadily decreasing amount of acreage since 2008, and the amount of funds spent on acquiring lands has been diminishing.
Many questions presented themselves following this sobering presentation, including whether a similar situation obtains at other land conservation groups, and what might be done until the economy turns the corner and, hopefully, funding is restored to pre-recession levels.
My research has been neither exhaustive nor scientific, and my sources largely anecdotal, but land conservation in other areas of the country seems to have been a mixed bag during this recessionary period, with some regions able to preserve a significant amount of land. In areas as diverse as the Chesapeake Bay, western North Carolina and large swathes of the West, for example, conservation has been robust in recent years. According to the Land Trust Alliance, more land has been preserved in recent years in states such as California, Colorado and Montana than has been developed. Following the housing crisis of 2008, development has been substantially reduced, lowering land prices and thus presenting an opportunity for conservation organizations to purchase land at lower prices.
Yet, at the same time, many conservation groups lack the resources to take advantage of these opportunities. Government-funded trust funds have been depleted by reduced federal and state budgets, and land conservation organizations’ endowments similarly have dropped as a result of fewer donations and, at least until recently, a depressed stock market. Thus, while land is less costly, less money may be available to take advantage of the opportunity, a classic catch-22. What a shame to be losing the chance to preserve environmentally sensitive land while development pressures are reduced. It is only a matter of time before the economy improves, increasing land values and making preservation more costly.
A recent article in The Wall Street Journal illustrates one impact of tightening local budgets on conservation. As noted in that article, cases are pending before state supreme courts in Maine and Massachusetts in which local governments have assessed real estate taxes on land held for conservation, arguing that they provide insufficient public benefit to warrant full tax exempt status. One or more judgments in favor of the municipalities, while nominally increasing their coffers, would have a further negative impact on conservation by imposing an additional financial burden on conservation organizations.
Until the economy improves, and monies again become available for preservation, land trusts need to become creative in their strategies. For example, conservation easements are less costly than acquiring the fee itself, and often come without management costs because the landowners typically continue to use their land for timber, grazing or agriculture. Instead of purchasing larger tracts, our organization has been shifting its resources in recent years to buying largely residential properties that are subject to frequent flooding. Preservation of these parcels, while typically small in size, serves a vital function by allowing families to relocate to higher and safer grounds and by returning flood-prone areas to a relatively undeveloped state, thereby reducing both human impacts and further downstream flooding.
Let’s hope funding for land conservation – government as well as private and non-profit – increases in the coming years to enable the preservation of sensitive and ecologically-valuable lands for years and years to come.
Posted on February 28, 2014
In the words of Justice Thomas in United States v. Atlantic Research Corp., the Circuit Courts have “frequently grappled” with the interplay between Sections 107(a) and 113 of CERCLA. These are the two provisions of the Statute that enable “covered persons”, commonly referred to as potentially responsible parties or “PRPs”, to recover response costs from other PRPs. In Atlantic Research, the Court held that Section 107(a)(4)(B) provides PRPs with a cost recovery cause of action; whereas, Section 113 provides PRPs with two separate contribution claims. One right to contribution exists under Section 113(f)(1) but, according to the Court in Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., only “during or following” a Section 106 or 107 enforcement action. The second contribution remedy is found in Section 113(f)(3)(B) for a PRP who has “resolved its liability” for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such an action in a consent decree or an administrative order on consent (“AOC”). The Court, in Atlantic Research, explained that Section 107(a) allows a PRP to recover costs that it has itself incurred from other PRPs; whereas, the Section 113 contribution remedies allow a PRP to recover amounts it has paid to reimburse others who have actually incurred the costs. These distinctions would seem clear enough, but the lower courts have struggled to apply them.
At least part of the explanation for that struggle can be traced to the statement of the Court in Atlantic Research, that “[w]e do not suggest that 107(a)(4)(B) and 113(f) have no overlap at all,” citing the case where a PRP incurs its own costs pursuant to a consent decree following a Section 106 or 107 suit:
“In such a case, the PRP does not incur costs voluntarily, but does not reimburse the costs of another party. We do not decide whether these compelled costs of response are recoverable under 113(f), 107(a), or both.” (emphasis added).
In Bernstein v. Bankert, the Seventh Circuit resolved that issue, ruling, consistently with most other Circuit Courts, that after Atlantic Research, a plaintiff cannot pursue a cost recovery claim when a contribution claim is available. Thus, CERCLA plaintiffs cannot have “both,” as the Atlantic States footnote had suggested might be the case. For many Superfund practitioners, however, much of the rest of the amended panel decision in Bernstein appears to be novel.
The plaintiffs in Bernstein entered into two AOCs with EPA under Section 113(f)(3)(B), one in 1999, the other in 2002. Under the 1999 AOC, the plaintiffs performed a study to identify a removal action to be conducted at the site. In 2000, EPA determined that the plaintiffs had successfully completed the requirements of the 1999 AOC. Plaintiffs then agreed to perform the selected removal action pursuant to a 2002 AOC. At the time of the Seventh Circuit decision, the plaintiffs were continuing to perform the work required by the 2002 AOC. Plaintiffs brought suit in 2008, seeking cost recovery and contribution from other PRPs with respect to both AOCs.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had a Section 113(f)(3)(B) contribution claim as to the 1999 AOC because they had “resolved” their liability to EPA, but the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argued that Section 113(g)(3), the statute of limitations applicable to contribution claims, contained a “gap” which should be filled by applying Section 113(g)(2), the statute of limitations applicable to removal actions, such as the work required by the 1999 AOC. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it need not resolve the “gap” argument because the claims under the 1999 AOC, filed in 2008, were barred under either Section 113(g)(2) (three years from the 2000 completion of the removal action) or Section 113(g)(3) (three years from the date of the 1999 AOC).
As to contribution claims under the 2002 AOC, the Seventh Circuit focused on the statutory phrase “resolved its liability” as a limitation on the availability of the contribution remedy under that section. Analyzing the language of the AOC (which appears to have been based upon EPA's model AOC for removal actions), the court concluded that a party “resolved its liability” when it completed the requirements of the AOC to the satisfaction of EPA, an event which had not yet occurred. Only then would EPA's “conditional covenant not to sue” the settling parties become effective. Since work in fulfillment of the requirement of the 2002 AOC was ongoing, the court held that the plaintiffs had not “resolved” their liability and therefore had no contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B). Moreover, the Court concluded that a party has not “resolved its liability,” within the meaning of that provision, until “the nature, extent or amount of [the] PRP's liability” is determined, or settled at least in part with EPA. The 2002 AOC, like virtually all other AOCs entered in the Superfund program, contained a reservation of rights on the part of the settling parties to contest their liability. The Court then went on to conclude that since the plaintiffs did not have a contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B), they had a cost recovery claim under Section 107(a)(4)(B) because they had incurred necessary costs of response consistent with the National Contingency Plan.
The defendants-appellees moved the Seventh Circuit for a panel rehearing of its first decision, supported by EPA as amicus. The Seventh Circuit denied reconsideration, but granted rehearing, “in part, to address some issues raised by the EPA:
Specifically, the EPA identified certain passages of our original opinion which suggested that a party may never structure a settlement agreement with EPA in such a way as to resolve their liability immediately upon execution of that agreement. That is not the case. A party responsible for an instance of environmental contamination may obtain an immediately effective release from the EPA in a settlement, or it may obtain only a performance-dependent conditional covenant not to sue with an accompanying disclaimer of liability. Whether, and when, a given settlement 'resolves' a party's liability is ultimately a case-specific question dependent on the terms of the settlement before the court. In this case, the terms of the settlement did not provide for a resolution upon entering into the agreement.
The Seventh Circuit panel interpreted Section 113(f)(3)(B) to authorize contribution actions only once a contribution plaintiff has “resolved its liability” in a settlement, but then went on to conclude that resolution of liability does not occur until the requirements of the settlement have been completed and accepted by EPA and until the liability of the PRP has been “determined.” Given the fact that response actions can take decades to complete, this reading of the statute could result in very substantial and likely unanticipated delays in the effectiveness of the covenants not to sue contained in Section 113(f)(3)(B) settlements. Moreover, the same statutory phrase, “resolved its liability,” also appears in Section 113(f)(2), the provision affording protection for settling parties against contribution claims. Before this decision, most Superfund practitioners are likely to have thought that the benefits of a settlement under Sections 113(f)(3)(B) and Section 113(f)(2) accrued when the settlement agreement was signed. Many will be surprised to learn that, at least in the Seventh Circuit, they will not enjoy those benefits until they finish the work required by their settlements and until that work is approved by EPA. Even then, they may not have those benefits if they reserved their right to contest liability, as is commonly the case in Superfund AOCs.
The interpretations of Section 113 in Bernstein appear to be contrary to commonly held understandings of Section 113 (even by EPA) and contrary to the analysis of the Sixth Circuit in RSR Corp. v. Commercial Metals Co. Therefore, many Superfund practitioners believed that such a split might motivate the Supreme Court to grant the petition for certiorari; however, the petition was denied on January 27. While EPA had served as amicus curiae in support of reconsideration of the original panel decision, EPA did not file an amicus brief in support of the petition.
The Seventh Circuit decision is surprising for several reasons:
- Although the Seventh Circuit did not have occasion in Bernstein to analyze the impact of the phrase “resolved its liability” on consent decrees, the reasoning of the court would suggest that the benefits of Section 113(f)(3)(B) will not accrue to signatories of consent decrees until the requirements of the consent decree have been completed and accepted by EPA. Since CERCLA requires that settlements involving remedial actions be documented in consent decrees, that effectiveness could easily be delayed for many decades. In the meantime, signatories to consent decrees in the Seventh Circuit may not have contribution rights under Section 113(f)(3)(B) or contribution protection under Section 113(f)(2).
- The Seventh Circuit reasoned that such delays could be avoided by specific language in AOCs or consent decrees, making the covenants not to sue in settlements effective immediately. This reasoning, however, would appear to overlook Section 122(f)(1) which requires that discretionary covenants not to sue contain reservations of rights for “future liability.” The reasoning also appears to overlook the fact that there are many hundreds, if not thousands, of AOCs and consent decrees that have been signed over the years which contain the same EPA “model” language found in the Bernstein AOCs. If the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in Bernstein is followed elsewhere, those settling parties may have a major surprise awaiting them.
- No other circuit court has interpreted Section 113(f)(3)(B) in the way the Seventh Circuit did in Bernstein. No other circuit court has placed such emphasis on the term “resolved its liability” to shift the effectiveness of settlements from the point when the settlement agreement is signed until potentially decades later.
- The Seventh Circuit decision logically defers contribution protection, a key incentive for PRPs to settle with EPA, potentially for decades. Will settlements with EPA be more difficult to achieve in the Seventh Circuit?
- Under Bernstein, settling parties do not obtain the benefits of Section 113 unless their liability is “determined.” Forcing settling parties to concede their liability may prove to be a major deterrent to settlements.
- The Seventh Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had a Section 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery claim even though their Section 113(f)(3(B) contribution claim had not yet matured. What happens when that contribution claim matures? Do the Bernstein settling parties then lose their Section 107(a)(4)(B) claim? What statute of limitations will then apply? What standard of liability will then apply?
CERCLA is notorious for its ambiguities and lack of clarity. This decision by the Seventh Circuit will likely do little to shed light on the interplay between CERCLA cost recovery and contribution. In the meantime, settling parties in the Seventh Circuit may have different rights than settling parties in other circuits.